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Abstract
This thesis offers a solution to the problems caused by a particular sort of philosophical project 
–  that of attempting to identify the roots of normativity; of showing what it is that allows that 
we have norms which can be applied to the empirical world.
Transcendental idealism sets the mould for the form of such projects as I will examine. It does 
so, I argue, for two reasons: (1) it considers seriously the problems inherent in taking a 
normatively and modally bereft world to provide criteria for the application of our norms to it, 
and (2), after due reflection, it allows us to see that the response it offers to such problems 
serves only to reiterate, in a particularly clear manner, the problems it addresses. 
The thesis claims we should avoid the attempt signalled in (1). We can do so, I will suggest, if 
we can find a way to think of the world we inhabit as thoroughly modally and normatively 
imbued and to take these features of the world at face value – that is, if we can find a way to 
think of the world being as it is which does not call for a further explanation in appeals to 
anything anormative. For the desire to give such explanations, I argue, ineluctably leads to a 
reinstatement of the very problems such explanations are a response to by divesting norms of 
their force. The thesis thus aims to provide a way to avoid (1), and to give examples of how if 
anything of the desire to give such explanations is left over once this is done, we are bound to 
make a mistake which is a variant of (2).
In the thesis, then, transcendental idealism sets the scene for a consideration of the normativity 
involved in the use of descriptive language, of perception, and finally in general causality. In 
conclusion, I point to an alternative to the project identified above in an attempt to gain a 
perspicuous description of how things are as opposed to any (self-defeating, I claim) 
explanation of normativity in its roots.
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Introduction
This thesis is concerned with transcendental idealism, the philosophical picture which 
takes seriously the problems inherent in marrying the idea of an anormative world as it 
is in itself with the fact that our experience of the world and action within the causal 
world must be thoroughly normative. The central problem with marrying these ways of 
thinking of the world and our experience of it is expressed by this question: why is the 
apparently anormative empirical world of a form to which our norms are applicable? 
The transcendental idealist response is that our conceptual scheme is partly constitutive 
of the empirical world because it somehow unifies with the world as it is in itself  to 
create the empirical world, so the empirical world is of a form to which our norms are 
applicable by default.
This response is interestingly incoherent:  it  is incoherent because it only appears to 
answer the  question at hand by explaining the applicability of our norms to the world 
in a self undermining way; a way which re-instantiates a dualism which it is seeking to 
avoid. It is interesting for at least two reasons:
• It  brings  to  the  fore  the  deeply  pernicious  nature  of  accepting  a  dualism 
between the anormative and the normative, a dualism which it seems almost all 
other philosophical pictures either accept, or deny in problematic ways which 
transcendental idealism is at pains to avoid. 
• Taking  the  problems  of  associating  norms  and  their  application  to  the 
anormative world which transcendental idealism makes clear to heart, whilst 
attempting to avoid failing in the manner of the Kantian transcendental idealist,  
can appear  inevitably to  lead to  those pictures  being self-undermining in  a 
manner analogous to the Kantian transcendental idealist's picture.
It will, then, be a large part of the purpose of this thesis to chart some of the ways in 
which  other  responses  to  the  same problems as  the  Kantian  transcendental  idealist 
picture responds to have strived to distance themselves from the Kantian transcendental 
idealist  picture,  but  failed  to  do  so.  These  responses  (be  they attempted  solutions, 
resolutions,  dissolutions,  or  dismissals)  all  fail  to  distance  themselves  because  in 
articulating their responses to the question 'why is the apparently anormative empirical 
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world  of  a  form  to  which  our  norms  are  applicable?'  they  ultimately  rely  upon 
metaphysical pictures which are similarly destructive of the very possibility of sense. 
The cases I will  look at all embody some of  the following family of confusions as 
symptoms of their shared trait.
Confusion  1:  that  there  are  prerequisites  of  sense  which  are  intrinsically 
normative (and often, even worse, that they directly intimate to us that they are 
so).
Confusion  2:  that  there  are  norms  which  give  their  own criteria  for  correct 
application.
Confusion  3: that  of  keeping  the  metaphysical  picture  of  the  normative  as 
opposed to the anormative by holding that: i) the world we refer to is anormative, 
and is either given a normative role by our practices, or is only brought into view 
by our normative practices; or, ii) the world we refer to is normative and hence 
cannot be the anormative world, so the anormative world plays no normative role 
in our normative practices;  or, iii) endorsing the  metaphysical picture that  the 
world we refer to is normative so we cannot cannot give sense to any other idea 
of the world by explaining what it is to be normative (this is a limiting case of 
this confusion because, as will unfold through this thesis, explaining what it is to  
be normative is to tacitly take up a position outside of the normative realm).
Of these confusions, it is important to note that the first two can be accommodated in 
subtle ways by retaining the variants of the transcendental idealist picture listed under 
confusion 3. Because in such metaphysical pictures norms which set their own criteria 
and intrinsic normativity can be accommodated as  sui generis natural facts, they can 
figure in  denials  of  the need for an explanation of the relation between scheme (or 
norms) and content (the empirical world). The problem with treating norms as in some 
sense sui generis is that the efficacy of the norms becomes problematic in ways whose 
form I will describe in chapter 1 and identify throughout this thesis (in particular, cf. 
1.31-1.33, 4.12).
Thus, in the cases making confusions 1 and 2, one is still endorsing a philosophical 
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picture upon which the relation between norms and the world is problematic (I detail 
these  problems  in  chapters  1  and  2).  Making  confusion  3,  one  is  avoiding  such 
problems by appealing (whether intentionally or not) to some specious metaphysical 
picture in order to cordon off norms from the world or unite norms with the world (I 
describe the variety of positions given under 'confusion 3' in chapter 3). I will thus be 
criticising philosophers both for  giving explanations where they ought  not,  and for 
painting pictures of the relation between norms and the world which require further 
explanation  (which  indicates  they  have  not  rid  themselves  of  the  dogmatism  in 
question), but denying that their pictures require them to do any explaining.
My aim,  though,  is  not  to  paint  the  philosophical  pictures  I  criticise  as  essentially 
useless; nor to give a reason for rejecting the scheme-content dichotomies they embody 
tout court. Rather, I want to make a case for the usefulness of thinking in terms of 
scheme and content – such as these pictures  could provide – in a way which is not 
destructive  of  the  possibility  of  sense.  So,  I  am implicitly  making  a  case  for  the 
usefulness  of  treating  the  philosophical  positions  presented  above  as  means  of 
elucidation but not theoretical explanations (cf. 4.3). 
To take three examples: 
• Steiner (2009) holds onto a tacit notion of the determinate prerequisites of sense 
and the external relation of norms to the empirical world, which, if dropped, 
leaves a picture which neatly describes the inseparability of applied norms and 
their empirical criteria (cf. 2.5-2.6). 
• Read (2005), by rejecting the idea of ineffable prerequisites of sense but not 
shaking off a picture of language upon which sense is determinate, commits 
himself to rejecting the use of criterion-less norms along with norms which give 
their own criteria for application (cf. 4.13); if this commitment is appropriately 
adjusted, what is left is a nice illustration of the point that if one treats anything 
as intrinsically and foundationally normative, then they invoke something both 
ineffable and normatively inert (for a clear expression of this thought cf. PI 46). 
• Evans (1985) holds that we must deploy a partly theoretical notion of intrinsic 
properties which  could never be checked against any criteria, and in doing so 
instantiates confusion 2. When this confusion is explained away, what is left 
over is a very rich description of our experience of space-occupying stuff which 
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needs no theoretical supplement (cf. 5-5.3).
In  each  of  these  cases,  then,  a  dialogical  playing  out  of  the  philosophical  picture 
presented brings to light a way of mis-picturing of the world – a way of picturing upon 
which sense would not be possible – but it also makes possible positive elucidations of 
what we already do with language (cf. 4.3).
How, though, can this way of doing philosophy be realised? As follows:
A) by adjusting  our notion of the world in such a way that we do not conceive of 
the world as in any sense anormative or amodal;
B) by adjusting our philosophical method such that we do not use transcendental 
argument in order to establish determinate prerequisites of sense, but rather we 
determine prerequisites of particular models of language in order to create 
'objects of comparison'.1 Objects of comparison allow us a descriptive purchase 
upon the ways in which our normative practices relate to one another and to the 
world.
A) and B) are interdependent.  B) depends upon A) because it is only if an already 
normative structure is available to us that we can determine some part of it to be a 
prerequisite of an object of comparison in a way which does not require us to make 
confusion 1 or 2. 
A) depends upon B) because a normative structure just is a system of relations of 
accountability between some relata; making sense of what it is to be a relatum just is 
describing the place of a relatum within a space of modal and normative relations. 
Seeing something as occupying a place within a space of modal and normative 
relations then requires the ability to individuate such a place; and individuating a place 
requires us to be able to hold some relations fixed in order to get a backdrop against 
which to make comparisons which show what goes on at a certain place.
1 I take the notion of an object of comparison from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI).
Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of  
language—as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-
games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of 
our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities. (PI 130)
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In playing through the transcendental idealist picture in the way I suggest, and making 
clear what one needs to do to avoid it, I also want to show why the transcendental  
idealist picture is so hard to drop (I do so in chapters 2 and 4). Roughly, it is hard to 
drop because the following confusions  form a sort  of circle,  so taking up any one 
confusion leads to taking up the other confusions and to the subsequent reinforcement 
of each confusion:
• a confusion about the role of objects of comparison in allowing us to consider 
the objects of investigation (what we already do) makes it seem as though the 
properties which an object of comparison is stipulated to have are essential 
characteristics of the object of investigation; 
• thinking things have essential characteristics leads us to the mistaken view that 
there  are  determinate  prerequisites  of  sense  which  underpin  our  normative 
lives;
• thinking  that  there  can  be  no  normative  structure  unless  there  are  some 
determinate prerequisites of sense leads one to lose sight of the idea that things 
can be normatively structured without having a criteria for correct use. This 
obscures the difference between the roles played by objects of comparison and 
the roles played by objects of investigation.
I  have  been  presenting  these  ideas  as  innovations;  I  think,  however,  that  the  later 
Wittgenstein has already played through the transcendental idealist picture in order to 
use it as the sort of heuristic tool I claimed it can be. As I result, I think there is already 
a philosophical stance available upon which normativity and modality are natural and 
irreducible features of the world we inhabit which ought to be taken at face value. I will 
thus be drawing heavily upon the later Wittgenstein's work.
Here is how all these themes will play out in the chapters to follow:
Chapter 1: in this chapter I introduce various distinctions which will be used 
throughout the thesis. I then use these distinctions to describe the landscape of 
problems one faces in answering the question 'why is the empirical world of a form to 
which our norms are applicable?'. Next, I describe how normative authority and 
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normative force interact in descriptive language use, and I show the relation between 
norms and their worldly criteria to be problematic in such cases, if we take the world 
and our normative capacities to be externally related.
Chapter 2: here I show that 1) our experience of space-occupying stuff as space-
occupying stuff is normative; 2) accounting for the relation between criteria and our 
appropriate use of perceptual norms is problematic in such cases unless we locate the 
normative content in the visual experience itself; 3) locating the normative content in  
the visual experience itself is problematic unless the experience is internally related to 
some normative authority - an object.
In unpacking an acceptable sense of an experience being internally related the 
empirical object of the experience, I draw upon and criticise Steiner's account of 
mathematical novelty. In doing so I give an overview of the way to treat the relation 
between norms and their criteria for application which I will unpack in chapters 3 and 
4.
Chapter 3: here I take a step back in order to fill out the overview which ended the 
previous chapter. I do so by characterising the transcendental idealist response to the 
problems surrounding the relation of norms and their criteria for application. I show in 
more detail the particular way in which this response fails, then I look at a particular 
way of modifying the account in order to salvage its promise. I show that such 
modification is bound to fail, and I attribute this failure to carrying forward the 
mistaken presumptions discussed above. 
Here a consideration of certain aspects of Wittgenstein's Tractatus becomes useful. I 
show that whilst the Tractatus shares a failing of the transcendental idealist's problem, 
it does not do so in a straightforward way.
I show that if we appreciate the particular failing of the Tractatus, we are in a better 
position to see how the later Wittgenstein helps us to shift away from the 
transcendental idealist's picture.
Chapter 4: In this chapter the themes of the thesis so far culminate. I elaborate upon 
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the claim that scheme-content dichotomies are pernicious, and I use Cora Diamond's 
treatment of Kripke's claims concerning the relation between the standard metre stick 
in Paris and measurements in metres as an exemplification of a way of exposing a 
philosophical picture as destructive of the possibility of sense if used dogmatically, 
whilst neither assuming a metaphysical stance with which to do so, nor divesting the 
target picture of its usefulness. 
The broader message is that deploying such a method as Diamond's allows us to work 
from examinations of particular cases to an appreciation of the import of avoiding 
dogmatism without ourselves taking up a dogmatic position; we can do so by using 
objects of comparison.
Chapter 5: here I apply the position developed in chapters 1-4 in order to show that 
causality is an inherently normative phenomenon. I do so for three main reasons:
1) To show how Kant takes the categories and the world of substance to be externally 
related, and how this commitment can be dropped whilst still retaining important 
benefits.
2) To allay the urge to to think of the empirical world as essentially merely empirical – 
merely empirical in the sense of being  bereft of normativity and modality – an urge 
which is bound to reinstate pernicious scheme-content dichotomies. 
3) To show that treating causality as an inherently normative phenomenon neither robs 
causes of their objectivity nor science of its explanatory power.
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Chapter 1: Normative Force and Normative Authority
 
1.1 Normativity and Relations
Before moving on to transcendental idealism  per se, I will offer some reasons as to 
why  we  need  to  tell  a  story  about  our  normative  capacities  by  talking  about  the 
relationship  between  normativity  itself  and  language  (cf  1.4-1.6),  and  then,  more 
broadly, between normativity and some particular sorts of perceptual experience (cf. 
Chapter 2).  I will use these descriptions of normative relations in order to provide a 
framework  upon  which  to  describe  a  broad  collection  of  positions  as  varieties  of 
transcendental idealism  (also broadly construed – for a characterisation of this broad 
construal cf. 1.32), and both to show the general failings of varieties of transcendental 
idealism thus broadly construed, and how to avoid such failings (cf chapters 3 and 4). 
In the current section I want to focus on the notion of normativity itself.
When introducing someone to the concept of normativity one typically starts with 
propositions that concern ascriptions of value, or lack of it. Paradigm examples are, for 
instance, moral claims like 'one ought not to be proud', or evaluative claims like 'that's 
actually a poor washing machine'. To make sense of these statements, ideally, one 
would have some idea about why pride is so deplorable, and what to expect of a good 
washing machine; to grasp that they are normative, though, it would suffice to have a 
vague idea that there are ways in which, and ways in which not to act, and ways in 
which washing machines might excel or fall short; or, more generally, that there is 
some standard to which these sorts of things are accountable.
 
The above sorts of cases are presented as paradigm examples because of the clear 
relation between the standards in question and particular and familiar human interests; 
that is, in these cases, the value of washing machines and of pride has a dependency on 
their place within human practices which we can explain, or at least helpfully elaborate 
upon, simply by pointing out interests we can agree we share and asking what role the 
things in consideration play with regard to this interest.
 
In a less obvious way, we might talk of normativity as inherent in concept use: 
concepts are accountable to the way the world is; and any particular concept use is 
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accountable to other actual and possible uses of concepts. What makes this sort of case 
slightly less perspicuous is the open endedness of concept use – whilst there is a clear 
end to the use of things like washing machines, and, given an agreement on moral 
interests, avoiding pride, concept use cannot be pinned down in this way: it is not clear 
that there is any fixity to what in the world concepts are accountable to, and there are 
problems with thinking of concept uses as accountable in this way at all; nor is there 
any obvious fixity to quite how particular concept uses fit into the nexus of 
accountability they co-constitute with other concept uses.
In another less obvious way still, we might also talk of some particular for which there 
is a standard to which that particular is in some sense accountable – a standard which is 
seemingly independent of the role such particulars play in any given practices; here we 
might include norms of natural selection, or of the proper function of a natural kind. 
What is less clear is the following. To make sense of normativity we need to appeal to 
some mode of accountability; however, we would normally think of accountability as 
only making sense in the context of practices concerning reasons; and yet, the relata 
governed by the norms involved in the above examples are usually thought of in terms 
of the merely causal.
 
To help us to get at these less obvious uses of the concept of normativity I want to 
make some terminology clear by noting that in the paradigm cases discussed above one 
can make the following distinction:
• the particular standards in question so far appear to bear an external relation to 
the particular in question; which is to say, in each case we can imagine the same 
particular in the absence of accountability to those particular standards, or in the 
presence of others. For instance, we may have valued this sort of pride, we 
might have expected different – perhaps aesthetic – things of washing 
machines, or there could perhaps be a possible world with the same natural kind 
but different laws of nature.
 
• there is an internal relation between objects like washing machines and some 
standard. We cannot make sense of what it would be to be a washing machine, 
16
nor have an idea of a washing machine featuring in thought experiments in 
which we vary its place in a wider normative web, without an initial web of 
accountability within which to locate it. Inasmuch as making sense of this sort 
of accountability involves making sense of succeeding or failing to play a role 
within a system of other things, it seems we could not individuate washing 
machines as washing machines without taking them to be accountable to some 
initial norm of proper function. 
I am describing these features of a possible logical landscape in order to introduce 
questions regarding how processes of individuation relate to the individuals they bear 
normative relations to. More particularly, on the brief sketch given above it looks like 
the internal relations are prerequisites of a particular kind of individual's intelligibility  
to us; once intelligible, notions of such particular kinds of individuals are free to be 
used in descriptions of external relations. 
Wittgenstein expresses something similar here:
I should like to say, if there were only an external connection no connection could be 
described at all, since we only describe the external connection by means of the internal 
one. If this is lacking, we lose the footing we need for describing anything at all – just as 
we can't shift anything with our hands unless our feet are planted firmly. (PR 66)
However, we should note here, the matter is far from being described as a simple 
identification of the real internal relations followed by a charting of the relevant 
dependences.
In order to get to this theme more clearly, I will now describe some distinctions which 
are key to the clear framing of a discussion of the relation between normativity and 
modal relations.
 
1.2 Internal and External Relations, Determination, and Normativity
 
I have just been using a distinction between internal and external relations; external 
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relations were opposed to internal relations with regard to the modal freedom of the 
relata involved in a relation. More specifically, relations are external if the relata are 
modally free of one another, where, as Schaffer puts it:
 
[m]odally  free  entities  are  like  multiple  knobs  on  a  stereo.  There  are  no  necessary 
connections between the setting of the one knob and the other. Any way the one knob 
can be set, and any way the other knob can be set, is a way both knobs can be set. All  
combinations are possible. (Schaffer 2010; 351)
 
When  opposing  internal  relations  to  modally  free  relations,  however,  we  must  be 
careful to distinguish between different ways in which two relata might be modally 
constrained. As, Johansson  (2011) frames it, relata might be constrained by
 
Strongly internal Relations (SIR): “there is between a and b a strongly internal 
relation iff, a cannot exist if b does not exist, and vice versa” (op. cit.; 7)
or by,
Weakly internal Relations (WIR): “there is between a and b a weakly internal 
relation R iff, a and b can exist independently of each other, but if both exist then, 
necessarily, aRb.” (op. cit.; 7)
(Given the above definitions of Johansson 's, we should also note that we may want to 
talk about asymmetric strongly internal relations:
Asymmetric  Strongly  internal  Relations: there  is  between  a  and  b  an 
asymmetric strongly internal relation R iff, a can exist independently of b, but b 
cannot exist independently of a; if b exists then, necessarily, aRb.)
Making these distinctions is important in the present context because recognising 
weakly internal relations to be distinct from strongly internal relations allows us to talk 
of two things necessarily putting modal constraints upon each other only if those two 
things do in fact exist. The distinction thus allows us to separate matters where: a) the 
possibility of the relata's existence is a separate matter from their relationship (their  
actuality is modally free with regard to one another, but the mode of their existence is 
not); b) cases where there is no separating the things in question and their relation to 
18
one another.
 
For instance, with the above distinctions in hand, we can make a distinction between 
relations like resemblance, which is a weak internal relation (for instance, if two 
footballs exist then they necessarily resemble one another, but the existence of one 
football does not depend upon nor entail the existence of another), and internal 
relations like interdependence – which is a strong internal relation  (if the concept of a 
football depends upon the concept of playing football and the concept of playing 
football depends upon the concept of a football then it is unintelligible that footballs  
could be conceived of without the practice of playing football being conceived of and 
vice versa).
 
Aside from the usefulness of delineating exactly which relations and relata we are 
talking about and their modal implications, a potentially deeper usefulness is made 
available by distinguishing between different types of internal relation. Once we have 
made the above distinctions, we are in a better position from which to ask questions 
about what differentiates modes of modal constraint, and how the different sorts of 
relations relate to one another.
 
Given that we have, in effect, characterised strongly internal relations as, as Glock puts 
it,
 ...relations which could not fail to obtain, since they are given with or (partly) 
constitutive of the terms (objects or relata). (Glock 1996; 189) 
there is a  prima facie story to tell according to which strongly internal relations 
articulate the modal properties which are intrinsic to, or at least essential to, the 
individuation of individuals of any given kind. Given that these properties expressed by 
strongly internal relations are modal properties, when instantiated they bear relations of 
compatibility and exclusion to the properties of individuals of their own and other 
kinds.
 
If the above prima facie story is correct, then we can then appeal to those relations of 
compatibility and exclusion in order to articulate weakly internal relations: given that  
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strongly internal relations articulate an individual's essential properties, weakly internal  
relations articulate the constraints different individuals would put upon each other if 
those individuals existed. In this way, the modal properties implicitly expressed by 
internal relations likewise can be seen as underwriting  “the rules of [a] framework” of 
the sort Carnap appeals to in Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology:
 
To recognize something as a real thing or event means to succeed in incorporating it into 
the system of things at a particular space-time position so that it fits together with the 
other things as real, according to the rules of the framework. (Carnap 1991; 86)
With reference to Carnap's idea of a framework, strongly internal relations articulate 
what can constitute part of a framework; given these parts, weakly internal relations 
articulate what possible frameworks there can be.
Given this distinction between different kinds of modal constraint one might now be 
tempted to ask what, if anything at all, grounds strongly internal relations. Falling for 
such a temptation might lead one to appeal to a distinction between properties which 
are the properties they are because of the relations they bear to other properties, and 
properties which are the properties they are independently of the relations they bear to 
other properties. This distinction could be construed as a distinction between 
determinables and determinates, respectively. So we need now to consider what an 
appeal to such a distinction would amount to.
 
If strongly internal relations form the rudiments of any possible system of space-time, 
in Carnap's terms, it is determinates which, by grounding strongly internal relations, 
determine the modal landscape. Matters get a little messy, however, if we start to 
wonder what the determinates are determinates in virtue of, or even whether there is 
any sense to the idea of determinates at all.
Consider, for instance, how we make sense of the underlying network of resemblances 
which underwrite our individuation of things like footballs. To individuate an instance 
of a football which has not been yet recognised as a football we must be able to 
recognise that the part of the world we are considering is similar to the parts of the 
world we already recognise as footballs with respect to their intrinsic and extrinsic 
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properties; to be identified as a football that ball must resemble footballs more than any 
other things. Yet, whilst it may seem in some sense natural to say that footballs 
resemble each other more than they do, say, bricks, it is far from clear that there is any 
absolute sense in which this is so; for resemblances might be drawn in respect of many 
different features and combinations of features of whichever respective parts of the 
world we are comparing. In this sense resemblances come cheaply (and, it is important 
not to forget that unless the aforementioned features of parts of the world are in some 
sense given to us, their individuation is problematic in the same way as the football's 
individuation is). Narrowing down the options for what gets associated with what, then, 
is a matter of first having some criterion of comparison – something which sets the 
standard for resemblance.
However, there are an indefinite number of potential criteria with which to relate most 
parts of the world we would seek to compare. To make sense of resemblance talk, then, 
we already need some framework of salient relations of resemblance, set by the 
aforementioned criteria, which fix the ways in which to compare the relata in question. 
Such a framework, however, seems to be articulable only by recourse to just such 
relations between relata as we are here hoping to identify the grounding for by finding 
a criteria for football-hood. Thus, to individuate footballs, it seems that, in the above 
sense, we need to already know what a football is.
Given that we do accept that resemblance is always resemblance in some respect, we 
might then try to explain the natural sense in which footballs bear more resemblance to 
each other than to anything else by claiming that footballs resemble each other in more 
respects than any given football resembles anything else. To do so, however, is to beg 
the question, for as we have just seen, respects by which to judge resemblance come 
cheaply, so to pick the set of resemblances which matters we would have to already 
have an idea of the way in which footballs resemble one another. 2
2 A clear objection might be that to take things like a footballs for our example is to start, as it were, too 
far up the ontological ladder – that whilst there may be, for instance, vagueness concerning which 
resemblance relations we count as salient, there would not be the space for vagueness with less 
ontologically complex things. Another related obvious objection is that footballs are not determinates. 
The real issue then, the objection, would go, is with simples in whatever form they happen to take. 
  By taking footballs to be simples, I am here only trying to establish the form of a problem that 
would apply to simples if there were any. 
  Besides the above justification for treating footballs as simples there is a stronger reason still 
for appealing to things which are not simples in order to outline the concept of being simple. The same 
sort
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So, unless we can make sense of some basic and obvious class of absolute 
resemblance, resemblance will always be resemblance in some respects, which 
respects, however set, occupy a central role within our conceptual lives; as Johansson 
(2011), for instance, puts it:
 
Without relations such as greater than with respect to X there would be no metric or 
ordinal measurement X-scales at all, only classifications by means of names. And 
without relations such as exact resemblance with respect to X, it would be impossible to 
use a measurement scale on two different occasions, and truly claim that if the 
measurement values are the same then the objects measured have the same determinate 
property. (op. cit.; 9)
1.3 Authority and Force
The development of the themes and claims of 1– 1.2 is going to take some subtle 
treatment . There are, however, two clear points which have arisen thus far which I 
would presently like to keep in mind:
 
• When we reflect upon what makes something count as falling under a 
particular concept, such as 'a football', we do so in part by appeal to different 
sorts of internal relations. These relations, in turn, make the articulation of the 
bearing of external relations to other things intelligible; that is, they demarcate 
realms of modal constraint such that if something is outside of that realm 
anything inside that realm bears an external relation to it.
• Individuating anything as an x depends upon internal relations, and 
which internal relations count is set by their accountability to some standard, so 
here there is normativity at play.
So far, then, we have seen that the matter of what resembles what – and so of what, if 
anything, we count as determinates – is normative in at least the sense that there is 
some standard, however set (for instance by, choice, happenstance, custom, biology, 
of example could not be constructed with sui generis determinates even if there were sui generis  
determinates, for they would be determinate prerequisites of sense, and inasmuch, we could not speak 
about them. This issue will be brought out in 4.13 (also cf. PI 46).
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the individuals themselves), which determines whatever resemblances and relations 
between things we are to count as salient.
I now want to introduce some general distinctions, and outline some key positions, 
which will allow us better to describe a tension between allowing that something 
serves as a criterion of correctness for concept-use, or individuation, and making sense 
of how it can do so; this is a tension which I will be giving examples of in the rest of 
this chapter and the next (examples concerning language and perception, respectively). 
The wider purpose of making this distinction is that having these general distinctions 
in hand will allow us a way of articulating how accepting a deep philosophical 
assumption – that of the external relation between the normative realm and the 
empirical world – puts us in a set of variously related problematic positions (see 
below). For this reason, making this distinction also serves to provide a vocabulary 
with which to describe how transcendental idealism recognises and responds to this 
problem, but fails.
The first term I want to define is one which will be used to refer to whatever is, in a 
given context and respect, the standard for correctness and incorrectness. Call such 
things Normative Authorities, where normative authority is defined so:
Normative Authority: that which determines correctness and incorrectness.
For there to be useful standards for correctness and incorrectness there must be some 
mode of holding whatever is being determined to be correct or incorrect to account; 
standards must be able to exert Normative Force, where normative force is defined so:
Normative Force: the non-accidental conforming of a practice to some standard 
(or standards) of correctness and incorrectness.
With these themes, and the above terminology, in hand we can set out some options for 
the form the relation between normative authority and normative force may take.
 
• First,  one  might  think  that  there  being  normative  authorities is  a 
prerequisite of the possibility of any given system of normative force, but not 
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vice versa. As such, normative authority must be privileged in the order of an 
explanation of our normative practices.
• Secondly, and in direct opposition to the first, one might think that there 
being normative force –  the structure which affords accountability –  is a 
prerequisite of there being accountability to any normative authorities, but not 
vice versa.  As such, normative force must be privileged in the order of an 
explanation of our normative practices.
• Thirdly, one might hold a no-priority view; that normative force, and 
normative authority have no priority over one another. 
As this variety of possible positions is important, I want to use a few subsections to 
characterise them in a general way before I make the rest of the distinctions that I want 
to introduce.
 
1.31 Privileging Normative Authority
For an example of an explanation which privileges normative authority, consider an 
account of measuring length using the metric system upon which the claim is made 
that for there to be a system of measurement in terms of metres, there must already be 
something of which it is true that it bears the property '1 metre'. The reason for making 
the claim could be this: in order for there to be any determinables – things which have 
some length in metres or portions of a metre  –  there must first be some determinate 
by relation to which a determinable can determined to be so. 
If this same line of reasoning applies to all systems of determinates and determinables, 
then there must be some normative authorities which have an intrinsic power to exert 
normative force; and so a full explanation of a normative practice would, upon such a 
picture, flow from an identification of the intrinsic normativity of such determinates.
As we briefly touched upon in the case of individuating a football (1.2), however, 
unless we can make sense of what it is to be a standard (a normative authority) without 
already having a framework with which to relate a standard to an array of other things, 
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we can not give sense to that normative authority being an intrinsic source of 
normative authority. The problem with this idea for one who privileges normative 
authority is, then, that bearing particular relations to other individuals seems 
constitutive of the possibility of standing as a normative authority, but privileging 
normative authority demands that sources of normative authority are intrinsically so 
(viz., they stand as potential sources of normative authority in the absence of any 
relations to other things); hence it is not clear that the idea of putting normative 
authority first in the order of explanation of our normative practices makes sense.
The problems with the idea of privileging normative authority, then, revolve around 
whether the idea of something having intrinsic normative authority makes sense. I will 
later argue that these problems are elucidated by considering the later Wittgenstein's  
move away from the idea of determinate simples of the Tractatus (cf 3.11-3.41, 4), and 
are brought to the fore in particular when Wittgenstein considers the matter of private 
sensations (cf. 4.11). I will defer making this link, however, until later in the thesis (cf. 
3-4) because the treatment of Wittgenstein's arguments requires some context setting.
A closely related link, which is worth illustrating now because I will appeal to it in 
1.51, is that if an account privileges normative authority in the order of explanation of 
our normative relation to the world, it will be prone to feature 'Givens' of a kind which 
are described by The Myth of the Given.
The idea of the Myth of the Given is one which originated with Sellars (1997). Here is 
an early characterisation Sellars gives of one form of the myth :
One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must be, 
a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be 
noninferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of 
particular matter of fact, or of general truths; and (b) such that the noninferential 
knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals 
for all factual claims -- particular and general -- about the world. (Sellars 1997: 68-9)
The sense in which I will use the term is, however, that which McDowell (2008) 
defines here: 
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Givenness in the sense of the Myth would be an availability for cognition to subjects 
whose getting what is supposedly Given to them does not draw on capacities required 
for the sort of cognition in question. (op. cit.; 1).
I will use the notion of the Myth of the Given as characterised by McDowell rather than 
by Sellars because Sellars' characterisation of the Myth of the Given and argument for 
the mythical nature of such Givens is tied to various claims about the nature of 
inferences and propositions. Furthermore, it is tied to particular treatments of the 
content of perception. As we will see in chapter 2, I intend my use of the Myth of the  
Given to be applicable in areas where we would neither want to talk of propositional 
content nor be theoretically committed in the way Sellars appears to be. 
McDowell's characterisation meets my demand for generality in applying to any 
account for which both: a) the availability of something to cognition requires 
possession of a particular capacity or set of capacities (whatever the capacities are 
which enable one to cognise that the something in question is appropriately related to 
other things); and b) that something features within the account in question as available 
in the absence of those capacities.
The Myth of the Given as I appeal to it is not meant to articulate either an actual 
obstacle to our acquiring capacities for being in contact with the world, or an obstacle 
to being in contact with the world. The role of identifying instances of the Myth of the  
Given is, rather, this: if an account contains an instance of the Myth of the Given, 
recognising that it is so highlights a tension in the relation between concept-use and the 
criteria for concept-use which is internal to that account.
The tension is that, by the lights of whichever account is in question, sensitivity to the 
grounds for grasping criteria for concept-use would be impossible unless we invoke in 
the grounds for the criteria some mystical power to intimate to us, or imbue us with the 
capacity to cognize, the way in which it is the grounds for such criteria. If in one's 
account of how mind and world relate there is some relation to the world instancing the 
Myth of the Given, then one must be either on the one hand taking something to exert 
normative force which upon that account is ex hypothesi without a way to exert 
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normative force, or, on the other hand, mis-characterising the capacities which subjects 
already have.
Allowing Mythical Givens is thus only a symptom of holding that there are intrinsic  
sources of normative authority (inasmuch as it is such a symptom, it is hypothetically 
linked to, or externally related to, holding that there are intrinsic sources of normative  
authority): we might hold that there are intrinsic sources of normative authority and 
that we somehow already have the cognitive capacities which would allow us to 
establish that there are such sources. Note, however, that holding this would not be to 
privilege normative authority in an explanation of our normative practices – rather it 
would be to hold a no-priority view (cf. 1.33). Alternatively, we might hold that there 
are no such things as intrinsic sources of normative authority but still fall prey to the 
Myth of the Given by assuming the intelligibility of a notion of some other class of 
individuals without accounting for our possession of the proper cognitive prerequisites. 
1.32 Privileging Normative Force
An explanation which privileges normative force is one given by any account  of our 
normative practices upon which the world we refer to is referable to only in virtue of 
parts of it being individuated in accordance with some independently intelligible 
system of norms; that is, any view that holds that parts of the world may be somehow 
'brought into view' in virtue of their accord with, or creation by, some system of norms 
which is intelligible in the absence of that to which it applies. (An example of such an 
explanations would be forms of antirealism which hold that we project onto the world, 
or Kantian theories upon which the categories of the understanding are metaphysically 
prior to the constituents of the empirical world).
Returning to the example of the metric system of measuring length; an explanation of 
such a system in terms of privileged normative force might run like this: to inaugurate 
a system of measurement in terms of metres by picking out a standard for correctness 
for metre-hood, one must first have a command of the concept of length. Having a 
command of the concept of length is having command of a set of rules which can be 
applied to the ordering of objects in terms of the size of their extensions. So in this 
sense, a command of a system of norms is prior to the possibility of identifying a 
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determinate – the standard bearer for metre-hood.
To turn an explanation of the above sort into an account which held that normative 
force is ultimately prior to normative authority one would take a relation of the form 
described above, between the criterion for the correctness of the use of the concept 
'metre' and the background rules which allowed us to articulate such a criterion, to 
exist at the most basic level of our contact with the world. There would be, on such a 
picture, for any given individuation, some prior set, or sets, of rules which enable us to 
individuate thusly.
Any such account, I take it, runs into a form of the rule following problem. My use of 
this latter phrase draws on the paradox expressed by Wittgenstein at PI 201.
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything 
can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. 
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course 
of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at 
least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it.
The problem expressed here is, I take it, this: if one expects rules to determine what 
does and what does not count as the correct application of a concept, then one will find 
this expectation undermined because for any given rule, there are an indeterminate 
array of ways of applying it, and the only way to bring fixity to this situation if we are 
privileging normative force would be to invoke another rule, which would itself be 
indeterminate in the very same manner.
I am not, though, putting forward PI 201 as presenting a philosophical problem (that 
“every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule”(ibid)) and its answer 
(that we should abandon the idea that there is any objective constraint upon what 
counts as correct and what does not; that the matter of correctness is one for which 
there is no higher tribunal than our conventions), for to do so would be exactly to 
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accept, under a different guise, a view upon which normative force was prior to 
normative authority. Rather, in the same way as I did with the Myth of the Given, I am 
putting forward the rule following problem as a problem which is internal to the 
project of attempting to find an objective constraint upon what counts as correct by 
appealing to an independently intelligible system of norms.
1.33 A No-Priority View
Recall that 'no priority view' names the view that neither normative force nor 
normative authority ought to have priority in explanations of our normative practices. 
To put the matter another way, the view is that making sense of normative authorities – 
things like the standard metre in Paris – requires situating those authorities within a 
context in which things can be held accountable to one another, and that to make sense 
of normative force – there being a mode by which things are held accountable to one 
another – one has to have some standards to be accountable to, which latter imperative 
itself requires some normative authorities.
There is, however, more than one way of taking up – or at least appearing to take up – 
a no priority view. Even if one thinks that neither normative force nor normative 
authority ought to be privileged – that each is required for the other's description – one 
might still think that each is intelligible independently of the existence each other.
One might, for instance, in place of the story of 1.32, think that the realm of substance 
and the realm of norms are metaphysically independent, but that the intelligibility of  
each depends upon the intelligibility of the other. On such a view, to speak of 
substance one has to be in accord with some norms; whilst, likewise, to describe those 
norms one needs to make reference to what those norms govern viz., our relation to 
substance. On this sort of picture, then, the metaphor of being trapped within the realm 
of meaning takes hold. For, if we take it that meaning involves both substance and 
norms, and each is unintelligible to us in the absence of the other, to explain any one 
semantic item would always take the use of other semantic items which can similarly 
only be explained from within the realm of meaning. For this reason, accepting such a 
no priority view appears to entail accepting an epistemological limitation upon our 
29
theorising about normativity; it draws a bound to sense.3 
Alternatively, in place of the story told at 1.31, one might think that there are things 
which are intrinsic or determinate normative authorities, but that these authorities 
themselves exert no normative force; rather, that we have a system of representations 
of   normative authorities and it is between these representations, and only between 
these representations, that normative force is exerted. For instance, consider the 
thought that our concepts on the whole isomorphically mirror the objective way the 
world is, but are, in some merely causal way, dependent upon the world for their 
content.4
Considering these options may make it look like I have, in the previous two 
subsections, been presenting problems with straw men. Given that there are 
philosophical pictures which do not instantiate the sorts of privileging outlined in the 
previous two subsections, it may at least seem as though I am drawing a useless 
distinction; that I am drawing a distinction which does not distinguish the picture I 
endorse from those I wish to reject. To take this at face value would, however, be to 
misconstrue the dialogical role of making explicit what privileging normative force 
and privileging normative authority amounts to, and results in, in those situations such 
as those which I outlined in 1.31 and 1.32. 
It is worth making this clear. The reason for considering the most basic way of 
privileging normative force and normative authority was to bring out in the clearest 
manner the structural deficits which go hand in hand with either taking normativity to 
be an intrinsic property of objects or rules, or norms to be at some level sui generis; it 
was to make some particular kinds of mistake explicit; it was not to set out positions 
which I will be arguing against. 
My contention is, rather, that the structural deficits (like the Myth of the Given, the 
3 For a more concrete example see Sacks' and Read's visions of the later Wittgenstein as, respectively, a  
transcendental idealist, and as a philosopher who is limiting what he says in light of the sort of self-
limiting idea of meaning just outlined, above (cf. 3.21-3.4, 4.13).
4 For slightly richer examples, imagine: a brute causal-externalism about our most basic thoughts and 
only our most basic thoughts; or, a world in which our veridical apprehension of most of the objective 
features of the world we are privy to is constituted by representations fashioned by our evolutionary 
history.
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indeterminacy of fixing rules with rules, and the contentlessness of private languages) 
which find their clearest exemplification in such simple pictures as those outlined in 
1.31 and 1.32, above (pictures where the intrinsic nature of normativity and sui generis 
nature of rules is obvious and global), reside within more subtle philosophical pictures 
(pictures which do not aim straightforwardly to explain our normative lives). 
I will be arguing that such deficits are to be found within any picture which allows that 
there is still the conceptual space for a scheme-content dichotomy, because it is 
allowing such a conceptual space which detaches particular instances of normative 
authority from the context which allows them normative force (this thought will not 
come to full fruition until chapter 4). It is this capacity for the detachment of normative 
force from normative authority which I think serves to distinguish desirable no priority  
views from undesirable ones; and it is this sort of detachment of which rule-following 
problems and mythical Givens are symptomatic.
In making clearer both this distinction and how the undesirable cases are masked as 
desirable, it is helpful to appeal to a distinction within types of scheme-content 
dichotomy drawn by Child (1994). The distinction in question is between scheme-
world dualisms and scheme-experience dualisms:
• Scheme-World Dualisms (S-W): “the world has an intrinsic structure (or lack 
of structure) wholly independent of the structure of the concepts we use to 
describe it.” (op. cit.; 59)
• Scheme-Experience Dualisms (S-E): The mind “construct[s] a conceptual 
scheme from world independent resources” (op. cit.; 68 )
Having this distinction is helpful, because with it in hand we can articulate an 
asymmetry which underlies the difference between what I am terming desirable and 
undesirable no priority views: a rejection of scheme-world dualisms entails a rejection 
of scheme-experience dualisms, because excluding scheme-world dualisms precludes 
any external relation or weakly internal relation between scheme and world, and a 
scheme-experience dualism is an instance of such an external, or weakly internal, 
relation; rejecting scheme-experience dualisms does not entail a rejection of scheme-
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world dualisms because rejecting scheme-experience dualisms only precludes a 
particular sort of external relation, or weakly internal relation, between scheme and 
world. 
Furthermore, with this distinction in hand, we can frame the above contrast between 
desirable and undesirable no priority views as follows: the view I endorse – the 
desirable – is a rejection of both scheme-world dualisms and scheme-experience 
dualisms. On the view I am advancing there is no conceptual space for either dualism 
because normative authority and normative force are strongly internally related, 
whereas the only sort of dualism which is precluded by those who would hold a no 
priority view but hold that normative force and normative authority are independently 
intelligible, or metaphysically independent of each other but not independently 
intelligible (that is, views upon which normative force and normative authority are 
weakly internally related), is scheme-experience dualism. So in such cases the 
conceptual space for a scheme-world dualism is left open. 
This undesirable way of dealing with the relation between scheme and content is the 
common denominator in the broad family of philosophical pictures I will call 
'transcendental idealist'. Kantian transcendental idealism does maintain both a scheme-
world dualism and a scheme-experience dualism by privileging normative force (and is 
thus an exemplar of the position outlined in 1.32). Kantian transcendental idealism is 
such an exemplar, however, in a way which makes it a limiting case of pictures which 
tacitly accept scheme-world dualisms whilst rejecting scheme-experience dualisms. 
For, as the world we experience upon such a picture (the empirical world), is a product 
of the interaction between the categories (our conceptual scheme) and the noumenal 
world, such a transcendental idealist is only committed to a scheme-experience 
dualism because of the claim that the categories are metaphysically independent of the 
empirical world.  As we will see in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, dropping the claim 
that the categories are independent of the empirical world would thus result in a denial 
of scheme-experience dualisms (for the categories are then comprised of content) 
whilst still maintaining, or at least leaving the conceptual space open for, a scheme-
world dualism. 
In the above manner, by dropping the idea of a difference in kind between the 
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categories and the empirical world (cf. 3.2), or by dropping the idea of a noumenal 
world (cf. 3.32-3.33), variants upon the transcendental idealist pictures appear to rid 
themselves of the need to explain normative force in terms of normative authority, or 
vice versa, whilst still unfortunately containing the deficits identified above in 1.31 and 
1.32.
In 1.31 and 1.32 I presented two simple philosophical pictures of which particular 
deficits were constitutive (inasmuch as they were globally present within such 
pictures). Identifying such deficits operating within more subtle philosophical pictures 
in more local ways (such as we do when identifying instances of the myth of the 
Given), then, presents us with a point from which to work back. What I want to work 
back to are tacit ways of thinking of normativity, or a lack of normativity, within those 
pictures which are an obstacle to relating normative authority and normative force. 
Identifying such obstacles, then, will serve to undermine the idea that such pictures 
simply present our normative capacities just as they are. 
1.34 Normative Context and Logical Space
Before  I move onto the application of the above ideas to language and perception, 
respectively,  I want  to  draw  on  the  forgoing  to  introduce  three  more  pieces  of 
terminology which are useful when talking about the interaction of normative force 
and normative authority.
If there are some determinables, and if to be a determinable is to be in some relation of 
accountability to some determinates or other determinables, we can say that there are 
normative nodes:
 
Normative Nodes: any particular such that, in order for it to be intelligible to 
us, it must be situated in a relation of accountability to something else.
 
If there are normative nodes then things like washing machines and pride are both 
normative nodes; for a washing machine to be what it is, it must bear normative 
relations to other normative nodes – like clean clothes –  and pride is likewise only 
what it is if it is accountable to other normative nodes, like attitudes. Obviously, if  
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there is such a thing as a normative node, there must be more than one such thing. Call 
such a set of nodes which allow a particular node intelligibility that node's normative 
context.
 
Normative Context: the normative nodes and relations between normative 
nodes which one would appeal to to describe a particular normative node.
Normative contexts thought of in the above manner are descriptions of a set of internal 
relations made by reference to a particular node, or particular set of nodes. We might 
also want to talk of a set of normative nodes which are all internally related to one 
another and can thus provide each other with a normative context; call such a set a 
logical space.
Logical Space: a set of relations which allows a common kind of accountability 
between a set of normative nodes. 
Now that we have the above terminology and thoughts about the links between 
accountability, intelligibility, internal and external relations, and normativity in hand, I 
want to examine how these thoughts apply to a particular sort of language use: 
descriptive language use. I will do so with a view to bringing out how the problems 
identified in the simple philosophical pictures of 1.31-1.33 can arise when we attempt 
to explain the normativity inherent within such language use.
1.4 Normativity and Descriptive Language Use
I will here be concerned with descriptive language use because I take it to be quite 
clear that the constituents of language so used certainly would not be the things they 
are if they did not bear at least some sort of normative relation to other intra-linguisitc 
and extra-linguistic things; this is true at least inasmuch as sentences are unintelligible 
in isolation from the normative context set by the language of which they are a part, 
and are made true or false by the way the world is. 
By thus starting with language we will be able to demonstrate more clearly what would 
be wrong with privileging either normative force or normative authority. Once this 
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identification is done, we will be in a position from which to see how the tension 
between authority and force has a more general application than just to explanations 
concerning language, and will have started to clear the path towards identifying what it  
will take to privilege neither normative force nor normative authority in more general 
circumstances. 
Certain descriptive uses of language have such a use in virtue of their propensity to 
succeed or fail in expressing the way things are. Here the idea of a normative node 
applies immediately: for a descriptive sentence to have a use it must be checkable 
against something else; that is, we cannot make sense of what it is to be a meaningful 
descriptive term unless we take into account its accountability to what it is about.
 
What resources would it take to use descriptive language if descriptive language is to 
be like this? One clear resource amounts to a notion of objectivity: in order to make 
sense of ‘checking', the user must be in command of, as McDowell (2001) puts it,
 
...the idea of things being thus and such anyway, whether or not we choose to investigate 
the matter in question, and whatever the outcome of any such investigation. That idea 
requires the conception of how things could correctly be said to be anyway—whatever, 
if anything, we in fact go on to say about the matter. (McDowell, 2001; 222)
 
That is, according to this view, a key sort of language use is inherently normative in the 
simple sense that to understand it one has to believe that its instances aim to present 
the way things are independently of how we may think they are; otherwise put, one has 
to see the object of description as being a normative authority.
 
1.41 A Qualification Regarding the Accountability of Language to the World
My assent to the idea that a key aspect of the inherent normativity of language can be 
seen by observing the accountability of descriptions to the way things are may seem to 
be discordant with my earlier claims. It might seem that, because this idea requires the 
accountability of language use to something extra-linguistic, it requires an 
accountability of thoughts about the world to normatively bare criteria (and thus, errs 
either by allowing something anormative to have normative force, or by privileging 
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normative force in allowing that it imbues the anormative with normative authority). 
Worse still, my assent to the idea of the world providing criteria  for some descriptive 
language use might look to be a totalising claim about language's capacity for 
meaning: it might appear that I am claiming that case that language is meaningful only  
if it can be compared to the world.
It is part of the purpose of this thesis to show that it is a mistake to make inferences 
which make the accountability of some language-use to the world lead to conclusions 
to the effect that there is accountability of some (or, worse, all) language use to 
anormative criteria; that is, to show that mistaken inferences such as the following are 
in play: 
a) An inference from the idea that extra-linguistic individuals can be normative 
authorities to the idea that anormative individuals can be normative authorities.
b) An inference from accountability to the extra-linguistic being a feature of 
some language-use to the thought that  all language-use is underwritten by the 
accountability of language to the extra-linguistic.
Once we see the inferences in play, I further wish to establish that such inferences are 
mistaken because they rely upon the following fallacious assumptions: 
a) That the extralinguistic – even the way the world is – is de facto anormative 
(cf. 2 and 5).
b) That all language-use must have a conceptual unity and so if  the 
descriptive/representative function of language is essential to some language-use 
it must be the primary/real function of language.
The  import and relation of these mistakes and assumptions will be developed in detail 
thought this thesis (see in particular, below, 2.5-2.6, 3.3-3.41, 4.13, 5); the point of 
mentioning them now is to emphasise that looking at our capacity to describe is merely 
a way of opening up questions regarding the inherent normativity of language, the 
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connections between this sort of normativity and normativity in other areas of our lives 
(for instance, in our perceptual lives (cf. 1.6 and 2)), and, further how to think of the 
relation between our normative practices and the world, in terms of normative force 
and normative authority. Making such a claim about the relation of language to the 
world is not, then, tantamount to making a totalising claim about a normative relation 
which is constitutive of the essential nature of language. 
 
1.42 Normative Contexts and Patterns of Applicability
To  spell out more clearly in what sense language is accountable to the world, and how 
this accountability requires a normative context, I now want to concentrate on an 
aspect of the earlier quotation from McDowell (2001; 46). In this quotation we see the 
beginnings of a link being made to the necessity of a normative context, from the 
inherent accountability of descriptive language use to the way things actually are. 
Looking back to that quotation, we see that, somehow, the possibility of accountability 
to the world comes along with having some conception of what “we could in fact go 
on to say about the matter” (ibid).
 
Why, then, ought we to associate a conception of accountability to the world with what 
we could go on to say? The way McDowell unpacks the thought is that the notion of 
correctness we are interested in
 
...can only be the notion of how a pattern of application that we grasp, when we come to 
understand the concept in question, extends, independently of the actual outcome of any 
investigation, to the relevant case. (ibid)
 
The “notion of correctness can only be the notion of how a pattern of application” 
(ibid) extends because of a second sense in which meaningful parts of descriptive 
language are necessarily normative nodes. The thought, I take it, is this: the pattern of 
application of any part of descriptive language is constituted by synchronic and 
diachronic relations between the uses of that part of language, other parts of language, 
and the world. Given these relations, that the related uses are different uses of the same 
part of language (rather than just homonyms) is shown by looking to their occupation 
of a similar place within a network of related inferences, usages, and associations.  
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I will leave the diachronic element until later because the relation is not normative in 
quite the same way (cf. 1.43). An elaboration of the above thought about synchronic 
relations can be found in Brandom (2010; 29): as he says, concepts “belong within 
networks in which a range of connections and distinctions are discriminated”, where 
being connected is standing “in modally robust relations of material consequence and 
incompatibility” to other concepts. 
For an example of these sorts of counterfactual connections, consider the following: if 
something falls under the concept green a material consequence is that that thing also 
falls under the concept  colour.  Furthermore if we attribute greenness to something, it 
would be incompatible to attribute redness to the very same portion of the same thing 
at the same time. Naming a green thing, then, depends upon grasping that these modal 
relations form part  of  the  stage-setting for  naming,  or,  in  other  words,  part  of  the 
appropriate normative context.
 
Now, to make sense of distinctions between concepts we need criteria of individuation. 
The respect in which a concept is the same as or different from others just is whether it 
differs in its connections to other concepts, and so in its worldly application. So, to 
individuate, we need to trace out such relations as compatibility and exclusion, and, in 
doing so, we must talk about the sort of connections just mentioned by invoking and 
using modal concepts. That is, we need a sense of how possible situations might vary 
whilst counting a thing to fall under the same concept, and we need a sense of what 
would follow if the concept were to obtain. We ought here to think of something like 
the capacity expressed by Evans' 'generality constraint':
 
... if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the 
conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being 
G of which he has a conception. (1982; 104) 
Here, 'entertaining' is not taken to commit the thinker to crediting every entertaining as 
an entertaining of a proposition with sense, but rather just with the capacity to consider 
such combinations in order to feel out which have the capacity for use and which do 
not (our capacity to do this sort of entertaining will be revisited in a different light in 
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4.24-4.25, and play a role in establishing the claims made at 4.3).5  
It is important to think of 'entertaining' in this way, for if we do not, and if instead, we 
read Evans as claiming that every concept must be applicable to every potential 
referent, we thereby import a theory of language which causes clear problems. For 
example, we might be forced to allow that there must already be sense to phrases like 
'tuesday is green' or 'Sally is an irrational number' rather than merely allowing that we 
could give such phrases sense or refrain from giving them sense.
If we are to accept the sort of minimally inferentialist story I have been explicating 
from McDowells's quotation,6 then we must have already accepted an interdependence 
underwritten by modal relations: discrimination relies on the possibility of 
differentiation, which in turn relies on there being some criteria of individuation. We 
gain these criteria by looking for differences in connections to other concepts – 
differences in what would and would not follow. However, we can only talk about 
connections if we have some concepts to compare, concepts which in turn rely upon 
the prior individuation of other concepts. In this sense, “the use of concepts requires a 
sense of their modal dimension” (Baldwin 2002; 6); it does so inasmuch as a concept's 
use is internally related to its modal dimension (where it fits into in the modal nexus of 
language and the world), and this modal dimension is articulated by recourse to some 
criteria for the concept's use, and required for the articulation of such criteria. 
Whatever sets the criteria is then, in the same way as the criteria for being a football 
was seen to be (cf. 1.2), a normative authority. To make sense of the criteria we must 
look to whatever they bear salient modal relations to – to the normative context of the 
concept.
Here, then, we have an interesting convergence of a very basic sort of modality and a 
notion of understanding: the modal connections which constitute concepts are the very 
same connections which one would use to spell out what one ought to understand if 
one understands a concept. This thought needs to be appreciated along with a key point 
of  section 1.4: that the modal connections which objects commit us to are how they 
5  This is not to make any exegetical claim about what Evans meant. It is just to stipulate how we need 
to read the constraint Evans articulated if it is to be useful to us.
6 I am calling it minimally inferentialist because I am not here endorsing inferentialism (the thesis that 
the meaning of  a concept is the inferential role it plays), but rather the more weaker claim that we 
must appeal to inferential roles to describe the content of linguistic description.
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are largely irrespectively of how we take them to be.7 The sort of modal nexus in 
question objectively outstrips a subject's comprehension of it (or at least must be able 
to). In the same way, when we use descriptive language, our commitments to that use's 
synchronic relations (relations of entailment and exclusion) to other parts of language 
must, in most circumstances, be capable of outstripping our awareness of what we are 
committed to. In order for any given use of a concept to be understood, the modal 
nexus of language use in which concepts are situated must be understood to be 
objective in a like manner to objects. 
I will return to the link between our idea of objectivity and the way in which the 
synchronic relations of language outstrip our usage in a few paragraphs' time. First, I 
want to make clear that we can certainly tell the same story as I have just outlined for 
all other basic empirical concepts, because to be an empirical concept is to hold a place 
in the logical space of modal relations between physical things; for instance, for the 
notion of an object, we have to have the notion of space, and we have to understand 
that objects of the same type cannot co-exist in the same spatio-temporal region (these 
relations are the sorts of internal relation which would be descriptive of Carnap's 
system of space and time mentioned in 1.2). 
Given the aforementioned dependence between the deployment of empirical concepts 
and an awareness of a wider modal nexus, a further insight into the modal nature of 
empirical concepts can be gained by considering the very possibility of empirical 
investigation – a possibility which must be realised in order for there to be concepts 
with empirical content at all. Empirical investigation relies upon a pre-established 
network of possibilities. Think, for example, of the status of apparatus in an 
experiment: we can think of the apparatus utilised in a particular experiment as a 
network of related possibilities being held fixed in order that we find out what it means 
to vary some particular variable; that is, we find out how what is varied relates to what 
is observed only given that everything else is held fixed. 
So here again, we see a dependence between a modal nexus and a thing we are 
7 I qualify with 'largely' because there are important respects in which what we believe is implicated in 
how we individuate what it is we can possibly be referring to. This point will not be fully developed 
until the end of this thesis, but it does not affect the point being made here, which is that – for the 
requisite objectivity –  there must be the capacity for what we believe and how things are to come 
apart.
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observing which mirrors the general dependence between the individuation and 
connection of concepts, and points to the deep role of a command of modal notions. 
We must have some prior notion of modality in order that we can investigate anything 
actual at all. This gives us a particular sense in which internal relations are 
prerequisites of external relations in the general way Wittgenstein expressed at PR 66 
(quoted towards the end of 1.1).
 
Being 'in touch with the world', then, is a matter of being aware that we are in touch 
with objects whose properties make them appropriate targets for some concept use, and 
not others; further, having such awareness requires a command of a modal nexus 
which outstrips our appreciation of it  –  as McDowell puts it:
 
A normative context is necessary for the idea of being in touch with the world at all, 
whether knowledgeably or not (McDowell 1996; xiv)
 
We must, then, have some sort of appreciation of our position with regard to the modal 
nexus we inhabit if we are to command concepts at all. Intuitively, this would involve 
some contact with normative authorities, given that it is contact with such objects as 
normative authorities which shows us that there is more to any given object than we 
are immediately aware of, and underwrites some of the exclusion and entailment 
relations between parts of our descriptive language. 
1.43 Diachronic Relations and Conceptual Novelty
It is from the foregoing thought – that an appreciation of a modal-cum-normative 
context which outstrips our grasp of it is a prerequisite of concept application – that I 
want to make the link to diachronic relations between descriptive language use.  
In Evan's generality constraint  we briefly saw expression of one sort of diachronic 
relation: that of our ability to identify sameness of concept in virtue of some part of 
language use occupying a similar position with regard to its synchronic relations to 
another use within a different normative context. To take an oversimplified example, 
we may judge that the green of a leaf is the same as the green of a depicted leaf we see 
at some later time in virtue of each colour occupying a similar place in a nexus of 
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similarity and difference relations to other colours. 
Another sort of diachronic relation, which I will focus on here, is between the 
canonical use of some descriptive language and the use of that same part of language 
in a novel way. I want to bring out how this sort of diachronic relation first seems more 
problematic than the aforementioned sort inasmuch as it seems to be different in kind. I 
will suggest, however, that such a usage is in fact no more or less problematic because 
it is not in fact different in kind; it is only different in degree. For this reason 
examining such cases provides another good heuristic tool (in addition to the simple 
philosophical pictures examined earlier), with which to bring out the problems 
surrounding the relating of normative force and normative authority in any diachronic 
relation.
What I have in mind are just the sorts of cases which were up for being endowed with, 
or denied, sense when we considered the generality constraint and our capacity for 
entertaining the recombination of concepts, earlier. Such cases which have already 
been and gone, and have been endowed with sense, are, for instance: 'Barry is feeling 
blue'; 'Barry has kicked the bucket'; 'Barry has been dropped from the team'; 'Barry is 
fishing for compliments'; 'Barry is the pilot of the plane'.
The only issue I want to bring to the fore by examining these sorts of novel usages of 
established concepts is to show an obstacle to our being in a position to make sense of 
such novel utterances applying to anything at all for those who take norms and the 
empirical world to be externally related.8 The obstacle is the apparent need to answer 
the following question: how can we make sense of our ability to use concepts which 
are seemingly the concepts they are because of a relation to some empirical criteria 
within a situation in which such a concept seems to lack the capacity to bear a clear 
relation to any such empirical criteria?
8 That is, in addressing novel concept application in this general way I am not intending to address any 
of the following: the issue of whether these phrases are conceptually unified in any way other than under  
the problem I am about to articulate;  the wider issue of how to distinguish the figurative from the literal, 
or rhetorical from the logical; whether the words before and after their successful novel deployment are  
expressing what is essentially the same concept; and  whether different kinds of novel extension (for 
instance, metonymic, ironic, metaphorical) are afflicted by the same problem as I am about to illustrate,  
or, if they are, whether they are afflicted in exactly the same way.
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The issue with allowing the novel use of a concept an appropriate relation to a 
normative authority is, then, as follows. The picture of descriptive language use we 
have painted so far has at its core the accountability of that language to the empirical  
world. To be accountable to the world, such language must be of a form which is 
applicable to the empirical world. Being of such a form, we have seen, would seem to 
be a matter of being modally articulated in much the the same way as the target of the 
description. For instance a green thing is more similar to blue things than red things 
and cannot be red; and so if we are committed to the the thought that an object is green 
we are also committed to the thought that it is not red and that it is more like blue 
things than red things. To be a  normative authority, the object's modal nature ought to 
be able to play a role in setting the criteria for concept use (i.e. the object ought to be 
able to exert normative force); but, given that there is no precedent for such a usage, 
the empirical world can play no such role, and so how the novel usage has applicable 
content is mysterious.
Even though the empirical objects to which canonical descriptive language use is 
accountable cannot provide the criteria for the application of a novel use of a concept,  
however, we do not want to say that the modal nexus of accountability surrounding the 
canonical use of a concept plays no role in making a novel use of that concept 
available, for the following reasons.
Take, for instance, 'Barry is the pilot of the plane'. Consider the use of this sentence 
which pioneered the transition from the prior use of 'pilot' (the person who steers a 
boat) to the current use of 'pilot' (the person who flies a plane); the user would be 
maintaining that Barry is related to the plane as, hitherto, pilots had been related to 
ships. To understand this would require ignoring all of the relations previous uses of 
'pilot' would have borne to their contexts, which if taken to be essential to the concept 
'pilot', would be in conflict with the possibility of attributing the concept 'pilot' to the 
flyer of an aeroplane. If the two uses of 'pilot' are taken to be uses of the same concept, 
then, being in command of a vessel must seen to be internally related to, or essential to, 
the concept, whilst the hitherto exclusive application of the term to water-vessels 
would have to be taken to be accidental.
The point of the discussion so far, then, is threefold: 1) novel extensions could not be 
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made if the normative context surrounding the canonical usage had not been so; 2) use 
of a concept in a novel situation requires counting certain relations the concept has 
borne to the world and other concepts to be accidental or external, and some to be 
essential or internal; 3) the normative context surrounding the canonical usage cannot 
justify the novel deployment of a concept. (1) asserts an internal relation between the 
empirical world and novel concept use; (2) asserts that there is normativity at play – 
for the concept to be understood in the appropriate way, certain relations must be taken 
to be essential and certain relations must be taken to be accidental; (3) asserts that the 
connection is arbitrary - nothing about the empirical world could necessitate which 
relations must be taken to be essential, and certain relations must be taken to be 
accidental. 
There thus seems to be tension between the internal relation of (1) and the arbitrariness 
of (3), which revolves around the question of what gives the norms operative in (2) 
their force. In view of the above description, if we take novel concept applications to 
be meaningful because they have descriptive content (content which can be found to be 
true or false according to some criteria), and we take normative authority and force to 
be externally or weakly internally related, it is difficult not to privilege either 
normative force or normative authority. For it seems apparent that in such situations 
the normative authorities are being made available by the application of some prior 
rule which outstrips the empirical uses to which it has been hitherto applied; or the 
subject of the novel usages must somehow have guided us in our application of rules 
which we already have.
This difficulty is only intensified when we note that there is no clean way to 
distinguish between the diachronic and synchronic relations between parts of language: 
because every instance of concept use is made in a different context to any prior use, 
we must perpetually pick out which relations are salient and which are not. So there is 
no hard and fast distinction to make between the canonical and the novel. Rather, all 
we have are varying degrees of novelty at each instance of a diachronic relation.
Novel rule application, then, epitomises a problem for any account of an external 
relation, or weakly internal relation, between concepts and their criteria for application 
in this way: even if we had a contingently correct bridging principle for all of the 
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hitherto canonical cases of rule application, this would not, in principle, work for novel 
cases. For such a principle to work it would have to be not only contingently 
applicable to all of the previous cases of rule use, but also applicable to any possible 
future case. For such a guarantee we would have to invoke more rules to guarantee the 
application (initiating a regress) or invoke instances of the myth of the Given in 
allowing that new cases make obvious to us which rules to use. If we then admit that, 
to some degree, all descriptive language use, or perception of things as things, relies 
upon norms obtaining in diachronic relations to novel situations, we see that this is a 
problem for any account of an external relation, or weakly internal relation, between 
concepts and their criteria for application.
There is a pithy expression of the apparent mystery here in PI:
  
...we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, 
and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the ‘use' which is 
extended in time! (PI 138)
That is, if we think of language and the world as externally related, or weakly 
internally related, then at every instance of use or grasp of a use, a theoretical 
explanation is required which would explain its correctness.
So, if we presume that there is an external relation or weakly internal relation between 
parts of descriptive language and the parts of the world which serve as criteria for 
those descriptions, 'grasping in a flash' is not to be seen just as a difficult theoretical 
task that we can perhaps eventually describe our clever practical solution to (as 
language users). 'Grasping in a flash' looks to be a problem in principle. For to 'grasp 
in a flash', a language user would have to be either in command of a set of rules which 
cannot be grounded in the empirical world – for they outstrip every empirical situation 
whilst still being applicable to the empirical world, or else she would have to be guided 
in her application of novel rules by the way the world is.
1.5 Problems
So, in summary, if we are to grasp name-bearers as normative authorities, we must 
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grasp that they are objectively so. This requires more than mere accord with the rules. 
That is, more is required than the embodiment of the appropriate counterfactual in our 
behaviours by, for instance, reacting as one ought to when prompted by stimulus; it 
requires, as we saw above (1.4-1.43), grasping (in a practical way, at least) that one's 
own reactions are situated within a modal nexus which outstrips one's own conception 
of it. 
Given this, quite how we are in a position to use language starts again to look 
mysterious. For, if we take the empirical world to have merely causal efficacy, and we 
also require that our contact with the world informs us of its modal multiplicity (and 
we must be so informed if we are to be able to think about it), then we require more of 
the world than it can give. Being at the distal end of a causal chain cannot put us in a 
position to appreciate our place within a web of modals if we accept that parts of a 
merely causal chain are anormative (as we must if we think normative force and 
normative authority are externally related). On the other hand, if – even for our most 
basic concepts – we already had to have a grasp of the modal nexus of language use 
prior to contact with the grounding for such a grasp, this too seems odd. (If our grasp 
of the appropriate modals were to be intelligible independently of the instantiations of 
those modals we would be privileging normative force in the way exemplified, and 
problematised, in 1.32). 
1.51 Modal Content, the   Myth of The Given , and  Rule-Following 
Let us now have a closer look at the problems I have just outlined in terms of modals, 
and relate them to how the problems I identified with privileging either normative 
authority, or normative force (sketched at 1.31 and 1.32, respectively) can be 
manifested within a picture of language which ultimately privileges neither.
First let us refresh the points of 1.31 and 1.32 with respect to language and modals. 
Individuating the bearer of a name involves locating it within a modal nexus which is 
spread across space and time; one might think that we can simply look to the things we 
are talking about to gain the requisite grasp of their place within the modal nexus. This, 
however, would be to do a disservice to the deepness of the claim that a normative 
context is required in order to have contact with the world. For, if the above 
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considerations about descriptive language hold, then, in the same way as an 
appreciation of salient respects in which one thing resembled another was a 
prerequisite of individuating footballs as footballs, an appreciation of the relation 
between an appropriate pattern and an object which satisfies that pattern is a 
prerequisite of naming that object.  Here is something akin to the thought that,
 
...a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is 
to make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name to [an x], what is 
presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word ['x']; it shews the post where 
the new word is stationed. (PI 257; my square brackets)
On the other hand one might think that it is we that bring the modal backdrop to bear 
upon the world by bringing our autonomous (in the sense of world-independent) 
grammar to bear upon it. If we take this route, however, in privileging normative force 
we meet with the sort of rule following problem outlined at 1.32. In the absence of the 
possibility of contact with the object being named providing criteria of correctness for 
the applicability of the norms in question, we are left with the thought that a prior 
command of grammar  (a system of rules) is what allows us to find a 'station' for a new 
name amidst an objective modal context. Such a thought, however, presupposes the 
applicability of the system of rules in question to the object that is being named. 
Nothing about rules themselves, however, tells us how they are to be applied – rules 
are in this sense indeterminate – so to make sure the rules apply would require an 
external criterion for correctness; as the only place to look for a criterion, other than 
the object itself, would be some further set of rules, a vicious regress then threatens. 
For the foregoing reasons, we ought to accept a no priority view.
We can now, however, provide a more articulated outline of how global problems of 
the above sort can arise in a local way, within a no priority view, by connecting the 
centrality of modal notions to empirical concepts, and so to descriptive language 
(discussed in 1.43 above), with the notion of the Myth of the Given which I introduced 
in section 1.31. 
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If the enabling conditions for making sense of empirical descriptions involves an 
ability to enquire after something modal, then there is an important connection 
between accepting the modality of basic empirical concepts, and rejecting anything 
like the myth of the given. That is, to reiterate, rejecting the notion that we can make 
sense of “an availability [of something] for cognition to subjects whose getting what is 
supposedly Given to them does not draw on capacities required for the sort of 
cognition in question” (McDowell 2008; 1). In other words, for empirical objects to be 
intelligible to us we must have the capacity to identify those objects by attributing to 
them modal properties.
 
The connection plays out like this: if we accept that empirical concepts are necessarily  
modally imbued, then any candidate for being a Given which involved worldly content 
would likewise have to be modally imbued. For if we can only make sense of the 
content of concepts by appreciating their modal relations to other concepts, and we are 
(for the sake of argument) to accept that the world impresses contentful representations 
upon us, then we must take it that the world imparts modal information to us. 
This sort of 'Given' is clearly undesirable; making sense of it would require that the 
world is modally structured, and moreover the world is this way and that it shows us 
that it is; that is, in observing one spatio-temporal portion of the world, our observation 
of that portion bequeaths us modal information which extends beyond the portion of 
the modal structure we are observing. Such Givens' normative force, and so also their 
ability to be a normative authority, is indeed mythical; there is a deficit in the account 
concerning how normative force and normative authority relate which is being filled 
with a normative authority which has the power to intimate to us that that is how it is. 
So, allowing that we accept that the idea of such a Given is mythical, and so 
undesirable, we have these explanatory options left as regards the normative force of 
normative authorities:
•  The world is amodal (modally bereft), and this fact precludes the possibility of 
name-bearers intimating their place in a modal nexus to us in any way - the 
world thus conceived does not have the capacity to do so. Thus, modality, and 
its normative force, is something which we bring to the world.
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• The world is modally structured, but we cannot be privy to this until we are 
suitably configured (we must already have the tools which make the world's 
modal structure perspicuous).
 
Prima facie, neither the idea that modality is something we project onto the world, nor 
the idea that the world is modally rich, look to be of any help in elucidating how 
normative authorities can have normative force. For the world conceived of in the first 
manner cannot itself be a normative authority for modal claims (it cannot make modal  
claims true),9 whilst the world conceived of in the second  manner could only help 
relate normative authority and normative force if it could display to us its place in the 
modal nexus. However, in order for what this latter clause expresses to be possible we 
would already have to be in a position to see the world as grounds for the particular 
modal information we use, so we would need an explanation of how our command of 
modals and the modal structure of the world relate.  
This is not to say that we should give an explanation of how we do come to see the 
world as modal. Rather it is to say that the above pictures have built into them 
discontinuities between normative authority and normative force which, if we are to 
maintain those pictures, need to be made continuous by way of an explanation which 
identifies a further relation or relata. Accepting such pictures, then, brings with it the 
onus to explain, not how we came to occupy a place in the modal-cum-normative 
nexus of the world, but how the parts of this nexus could exert normative force upon 
one another and us. Put differently, these pictures as they stand give us the 'is' but not 
the 'ought', and they make the 'ought' look like an added ingredient. 
The added ingredient an explanation of normative force in the above pictures requires 
is a bridging principle to account for the accord between our capacities and the way the 
world is. It is worth considering what could accomplish this bridging. If it is a rule 
pertaining to concept use, then we have the problems exemplified by pictures that 
privilege normative force. If it is an object, then we have to account for its normative 
force (which would lead us to the same set of problems as we have unpacked here).
9 One might still object, perhaps, that the amodal world could simply cause us to have such concepts; I 
leave this aside for now, however, because I think it is unintelligible for reasons to come in the last 
chapter of this thesis.
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In summary: the above two options are the only options available if we (even tacitly) 
presume an external relation, or weakly internal relation, between our descriptive 
language and the way the world is (between scheme and content). So, if we buy into 
the idea of an external relation, or weakly internal relation, between scheme and 
content, we are pressed to ask (given that we cannot explain modality and normativity 
away) how we can coherently think of the world and our practices in such a way that 
the world can exert normative force upon our descriptive language.
1.6 A Link to Chapter 2 
For our use of descriptive language to be unproblematic there must be no mystery 
concerning how the normative context which is a precondition for descriptive language 
use could allow normative authorities – which are required for our descriptive 
language use – to exert normative force. 
In the next chapter I will make analogous moves to those made in this chapter but at a 
more fundamental level of normative context. I will present an argument which 
establishes that a particular sort of perceptual experience we have is thoroughly 
modally and normatively imbued. I will then show that grounding these norms can 
neither be a matter of looking to the objects which feature in those perceptual 
experiences, nor can it be a matter of looking to some system of norms which is 
intelligible independently of the objects which those norms are supposed to put us into 
perceptual contact with. In order to avoid such problems, I will sketch a way of 
thinking of objects and our normative practices as strongly internally related.
Examining linguistic description has, then, provided this way in to a wider 
examination of our normative lives: the normative accountability required for 
linguistic description depends upon our capacity to name things in order that those 
things can be normative authorities for our descriptions; and our capacity to name 
things – at a basic level of descriptive language use –  depends upon our ability to pick 
out perceptually-experienced individuals as candidates for being a normative authority. 
The forgoing points set the scene for the next chapter's claim, which that that being 
able to pick out individuals perceptually depends upon those individuals already 
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occupying a place within a normative context, for if there were not an already 
normative context, we would be forced to privilege normative force or normative 
authority.
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Chapter 2: Seeing and Novelty
Looking at the lamp upon my desk, I am presented with an object. I move ninety 
degrees around this object and, although the visual experience I am having is vastly 
different – in the first instance I see the round rim of the lamp shade which contains the 
bulb sat upon a flexible pillar which takes a bent, s-shaped, locus from the oval base 
which has a switch on the left hand portion; whilst in the second I see the funnel shape 
of the exterior of the lampshade, the flexible pillar taking an entirely different locus,  
and a base with a switch dead centre. I have no hesitation in taking the object presented 
at each instance as being one and the same object, and I am not surprised by the 
qualitative change (in fact, I would be surprised if there were no change; if, when 
moving around an object's location, my visual experience did not change at all, then it 
would be an odd experience indeed).
 
Given the possible degree of difference between views upon the same object from 
different positions relative to that object (different points of view), the lack of surprise 
experienced when the difference becomes apparent might seem to be an odd fact about 
perceiving objects. It would seem that we are constantly presented with novelty and 
constantly take it in our stride – we appropriately associate our present sensory 
experience with other possible present sensory experiences, past experiences, and 
possible future experiences. If this is the case, we ought to wonder what accounts for 
our capacity to make the appropriate associations; that is, in virtue of what do we 
associate our present perceptual experience with absent, or possible, perceptual 
experiences?
The problem at hand is, I think, a problem akin in form to the problem of how to relate 
normative force and normative authority with regard to linguistic description. We 
ought to be able to say what grounds the appropriate association of different 
experiences of the same object – to identify the proper normative authority – and say 
what allows these grounds to do their grounding; to describe how normative authorities 
have normative force. Furthermore, it will become clear that, even if no one wants to 
privilege normative force, or normative authority, nevertheless if we take on a view 
according to which the system of norms which allows us to perceptually experience 
objects as objects, and the normative authorities for such experiences – objects –  are 
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externally related, we will be forced to privilege the one or the other. 
This chapter is concerned with the normative context (cf. 1.34, 1.6) which is required 
for demonstrative reference, and so is also required for a capacity to use richer 
descriptive language. In considering these topics I want to show that, at least with 
respect to a very basic sort of visual experience – experience of spatially unified 
objects as spatially unified objects –  there is no clear division to be made between the 
objects of experience and how our experiences of those objects are structured such that 
we can cleanly discriminate the normative context required for such demonstrative 
reference from the object pointed at. That is, we must take the objects we experience 
and the norms which enable us to experience them as internally related. 
I want, then, to show that there are internal relations between spatially unified objects,  
our experience of spatially unified objects as spatially unified objects, and the 
normative context which enables such experiences. In doing so I will show that, at 
least as regards the perception of spatially unified objects as spatially unified objects, 
the perceived property of being an object
...is properly understood as an intensional one, which emerges in the context of 
understanding the role that is played by the logical constituents of propositions, and it 
cannot be understood independently of this. (McGinn 2006; 5)
 
The above quotation may seem to be out of context; after all, it refers to the simple 
objects of the Tractatus. However, once we drop the dogmatism of the Tractatus (a 
move which will feature heavily in the following two chapters), and also follow the 
line of argument in this chapter, we will see that the thought applies to our perception 
of spatially unified objects as spatially unified objects, and may well apply to the 
perceptual experience of other kinds of common or garden objects as those kinds of 
objects.
More importantly, we will see that there is no way of thinking of any perceived 
property which is not also a way of thinking of the normative role the property plays in 
our normative practices; and that, as the objects of perception ground our 
demonstratives, it is normative 'role players' we are thinking of when we think of the 
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world we perceive.10 This way of thinking of both perception of objects and objects 
themselves is key to making sense of the idea that objects themselves feature in both 
our perceptual experience, and in our grammar (cf. 2.5-2.6, 4, 5).
This last move will be fundamental to our coming to see that our reference to the world 
is reference to normative role players, and that this is not just so because of our 
inability to perceive objects without bestowing a normative role upon part of the 
merely empirical world. That is, I am not here expressing a view about normative 
contexts as necessary intermediaries between us and empirical objects, or as necessary 
tools for bringing us into contact with objects as they are in themselves, because, (as 
we will start to see in this chapter, and work to by the end of the thesis), there is no 
tenable distinction to be made between normative role players and empirical objects at  
the most basic levels of our conceptual lives.
 
2.1 A More Particular Overview
The more particular focus of this chapter is twofold: first, I want to show that certain 
approaches which we have seen to be useful (in the previous chapter) when 
considering the normativity of descriptive language - viz. articulating the content of 
particular utterances in terms of their place within a modal and normative nexus 
comprised of synchronic and diachronic relations between the uses of particular 
concepts - can be fruitfully be applied to the content of perceptual experiences. I will 
endeavour to detail some of the benefits of applying such approaches in the course of 
this chapter. My major purpose, however, is to find a way of talking about perceptual 
experience on which such experience has a normative and modal content, whilst not 
being propositionally structured or necessarily representational. I am interested in 
establishing this way of thinking of perception because it is key to thinking of 
perceptual experience as part of the normative context which provides a background 
against which practices like representation can take place.
Secondly, once I have made a case for such an idea of perceptual content, I want to 
make clear that if we attempt to explain the synchronic and diachronic relations 
10 By 'normative role players' here I mean things which are intelligible in virtue of the place they 
occupy within a logical space.
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between different perceptual experiences by offering a criterion of correctness which is 
either anormative, or normative in a way which is independent of our practices, much 
the same sorts of problems arise for the intelligibility of perceptual experience as arose 
for the intelligibility of descriptive language. These problems are concerned with the 
possibility of normative authorities having normative force; they are problems which 
ensue from a presumption that normative authorities and the norms which allow them 
such authority are either externally related or internally related in a way which is 
metaphysically mysterious.
What I will seek to demonstrate, then, is that this is a structural problem with any 
theory which holds that accounting for our experience of objects is a matter of relating 
two distinct tiers: a level of raw data, and some operation which imbues this data with 
normative significance. I call this position Dualism and contrast it with a more 
favourable, but still vulnerable, Monism:
 
Dualism: Our first person visual experience is the combination of some raw 
visual data and some operation upon that data, which imbues the whole 
experience (the total phenomenology) with the appropriate normative content.
 
Monism: There is no raw data; visual experience is irreducibly normatively 
imbued.
 
By considering the above opposition, we can tell that the problem of describing the 
mode of the association of the sensory experiences which are implicated in our 
experience of objects is closely related to a methodological debate concerning a 
current question in the philosophy of perception: how can we distinguish the properties 
which are part of our perceptual phenomenology from those which are part of our total 
phenomenology?11  That is, how do we tell apart the properties which are actually 
present in our visual experience from those which, in some undefined sense, come 
along with it but reside in our wider conscious experience? For example, upon 
returning home I am confronted with a blue door; that it is blue seems to be a clear 
feature of my visual experience; that it is the entrance to my home, however, is not so 
11 See Nanay (2011) for a brief survey and discussion of the orthodox method of doing so, and an 
argument for what he takes to be a better variation of that method.
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obviously experienced visually – it is not so clear that it is part of the content of 
perception.
I should make clear here that the ideas of the content of perception, perceptual 
phenomenology, and total phenomenology, are not here being used with a view to 
getting theoretical characterisations of those ideas right; nor are they being used with a 
view to showing that they are ideas we ought to get rid of. Rather, I aim to show that 
the distinction between total phenomenology and perceptual phenomenology can 
operate as a scheme-experience dualism, and the distinction between what we 
perceive, and our experience of those objects, can operate as a scheme-world dualism, 
and that we should avoid uses of these distinctions which allow them to operate in this 
way. The content of perceptual phenomenology will just turn out to be (normally) 
unmediated contact with a part of the world which plays a normative role in our 
practices. The argument I will make in this chapter, then, is one which locates the 
properties which ground the association of our sensory experiences within our 
perceptual content, and makes the claim that such properties are described when we 
describe our perceptual phenomenology; the argument locates the properties in this 
way because if they were not located thusly, a version of a bad scheme-content dualism 
would be supposed. 
2.1  1  Argument Summary 
The first step in my argument will be to show that experience of modal and normative 
properties is a prerequisite of experiencing spatially unified objects as spatially unified 
objects; seeing objects as objects requires a capacity appropriately to associate points 
of views upon an object, and to use this capacity requires a command of modal and 
normative information. 
The second step will be to show that if we locate the grounds for the association of 
points of view within the total phenomenology, rather than the perceptual 
phenomenology (the perceptual content itself) of a perceiving subject, we cannot 
account for the normativity of the total phenomenology at all. The requisite modal and 
normative information must be part of the content of perception (however we choose 
to think of this content), because the normative structure of perception is a prerequisite 
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of our ability to use concepts; and using concepts is a prerequisite of interpreting our 
experiences according to some norms.12
Thus, for a Dualist, what provides the normative force –  the system of norms a 
perceiver interprets with – and the normative authorities for such concepts –  the 
objects perceived – are problematically disconnected. We can see the symptoms of this 
disconnection, as we did in the case of descriptive language (cf  1.5-1.51) in the 
positing of objects that intimate norms or norms which set their own criteria for their 
own application. 
If the above line of argument holds, and we still want to save an account which 
features such an external relation between our command of the norms which govern 
our judgements of sensory similarity and difference, and the objects they make 
perceptually intelligible to us, we would have to explain the availability of the requisite  
modal and normative information to object experiencers at a level which did not 
involve our phenomenology at all. I will dismiss one potential way of explaining how 
the required information is present at the level of our perceptual experience – objects 
causally effecting our sub-personal processing – and explore another more promising 
one: giving a selectional story about how we came to process in the way we do. I will 
show that making this latter move only pushes back the problem we faced at the level 
of experience, and I will further suggest that this provides us with good grounds for 
thinking that this involves a regress of the sort we found earlier when thinking about 
privileging normative force (cf. 1.32). For seeking to explain the norms governing  the 
content of our phenomenology at a lower level of explanation than that at which the 
content obtains (by which I mean a level prior to the perceptual life of any one 
individual), either calls that lower level's normative status into question in the same 
way as the higher level's status was called into question, or provides the requisite 
normativity by privileging normative authority and thus accepting a self-legitimating 
content of a sort analogous to that which we wanted to avoid in the case of linguistic 
12  Such experiences are a prerequisite of engagement with the empirical world in the sense that a 
prerequisite of our ability to describe the empirical world is an ability to name objects ostensively, 
and to name objects ostensively, objects must be experientially present to one as individuals. I thus 
claim that such experiences are at the normative bedrock. This, together with my claims about the 
dependence of the content of any experience upon synchronic and diachronic relations to other 
experiences, is also to claim that the foundations of our ability to use concepts are holistically 
structured, and that, if we did not have an experience thusly holistically structured, neither would we 
have the capacity for using the sorts of concepts which we do use.
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description (viz., it instantiates instances of the Myth of the Given).
Here is a step-by-step summary of the argumentative strategy which I just sketched:
1) Experiencing particular spatially unified objects as spatially unified objects is 
dependent upon the presence of appropriate modal and normative information. 
(2.5)
2) If the content of a subject's experience of spatially unified objects as spatially 
unified objects is at the level of their total phenomenology but not their visual 
phenomenology, Dualism is true. 
3) If Dualism is true, unless objects can somehow intimate to us the appropriate 
modal and normative information, we cannot ground the requisite modal and 
normative information which pertains to the particular objects to which the 
norms and modals apply.
4) If objects intimate modal and normative information to us through perceptual 
experience, then the information is either a part of the total phenomenology of a 
perceptual experience, or part of the visual phenomenology of a perceptual 
experience.
5) If the modal and normative information is part of our visual phenomenology 
then Dualism is false.
6) If the  modal and normative information is part of our total phenomenology, 
but not our visual phenomenology, we have merely reinstated the problem we 
encountered in trying to make sense of Dualism.
C1: From 1-6, if we are to maintain Dualism, we ought to maintain that objects 
do not intimate to us the modal and normative information which is required for 
us to experience them through the medium of experience.
7) Given C1, if we are Dualists we are committed to one of the following:
i)At a sub-experiential level, a perceiving subject possesses the modal and 
normative information which is required for the subject to see spatially unified 
objects as such; the perceiving subject has such information, and that 
information is grounded by way of a relation to its immediate environment.
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ii)  At a sub-experiential level, a perceiving subject possesses the modal and 
normative information which is required for the subject to see spatially unified 
objects as such; the perceiving subject has such information, and that 
information is grounded by way of a relation to something which is extrinsic to 
its immediate environment.
iii) Perceiving subjects have a groundless command of the requisite modal and 
normative information (and it is externally related, or weakly internally related,  
to our sensory experience of objects – otherwise Monism would be true).
8) If  'i' or 'ii' is true, and merely causal objects cannot intimate norms to us, the 
information (even if it is in accord with external norms) is realised within us in a 
way which is purely dispositional.
9) If the information is dispositional, it is, considered independently of 
interpretation, anormative.
10) If 'i' or 'ii' are true, then if we are to experience spatially unified objects as 
such, we must appreciate the significance of the normative information.
11) If the information we have access to is anormative, it stands in need of 
interpretation if we are to appreciate its normative significance.
12) If we have to interpret the information which is present by way of 'i' or 'ii', 
we have reinstated a problem of the same form as we encountered in trying to 
make sense of Dualism.
So,
C2: We cannot make sense of locating the requisite modal and normative 
information in our total phenomenology but not our visual phenomenology, 
unless 'iii' is true.
So,
C3:The modal and normative information required to experience objects as 
objects must feature in our visual phenomenology (that is, it must feature in the 
perceptual content itself) unless 'iii' is true.
If 'iii' is true, then we still require an account of how the normative information we 
have (which cannot be embodied by mere dispositions) is applicable to the empirical 
world; that is of how the system of normative force can connect us to normative 
authorities. We thus find in perceptual experience an analogue of the problem we 
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found in descriptive language in the last chapter: how could normative systems take 
criteria of application from the empirical world if they are externally related, or weakly 
internally related, to those parts of the empirical world?
At the end of this chapter I will suggest, and in the next chapter I will show, that there 
is a seeming way to respond to such problems, which is in the lineage of 
transcendental idealism. This response works by denying that there are scheme-
experience dualisms with regard to perceptual experience by allowing the empirical 
world to play a constitutive role in our conceptual scheme, a move which appears to 
collapse the scheme-world dualism at play. I will suggest and show that these 
responses are internally incoherent, because the manner in which empirical objects are 
taken to play such roles in fact presupposes a deeper scheme-world dualism. The 
alternative I will suggest (cf 2.5-6), and show (cf. 4-5), is that one must go further and 
deny scheme-world dualisms tout court, thereby denying  particular scheme-world 
dualisms with respect to perceptual experience. This requires finding a way to take 
objects themselves to be partly constitutive of our conceptual schemes, without 
explaining their role by  taking as determinate prerequisites of sense an anormative 
realm, or to the existence of essential some essential norms.
2.2   Modals, Norms, and Experience 
This section aims to establish that experience of spatially unified objects as spatially 
unified objects requires an appreciation of modal and normative relations. To simplify 
discussion, I will talk about a relatively simple object; a coin. The coin is a very thin 
cylinder, and in normal circumstances, all we are ever visually privy to at any one 
juncture is one aspect of the surface of the coin.
I am going to assume that,
A1: From each point of view upon the coin we do, at the very least, seem to 
experience one aspect of the surface of a spatially unified object.
One might wonder what work the word 'seem' is doing in A1. I use 'seem' to keep A1 
neutral as between the different explanatory possibilities under consideration (Dualism 
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and Monism). Phenomenologically speaking, I take it that we do not feel that our 
experience is composed of raw data (that is, data which is itself bereft of the properties 
which associate it with other data), and that we infer that it is data about a such-and-
such. For example, when experiencing an object, say a tomato, we do not feel that we 
are visually presented with an array of shape and colour properties, and then interpret 
this array to be properties of an object; we just take ourselves to be presented with a 
whole object – a tomato. 
So, if we allow (for the sake of argument), that it is possible that we are only ever 
visually privy to some sort of raw data, and that this data is interpreted in such a way 
as to be an experience as of an object, this possibility must nevertheless fit with the 
reported phenomenology. For our purposes, the key consequence of this 
phenomenological commitment is that, even if perceptual phenomenology and total 
phenomenology come apart here, we must describe perceptual experience in a way 
which, from the first person perspective, allows for no distinguishing between the total 
phenomenology and the perceptual phenomenology; that is, on any account, there must 
be a unified state in which one feels oneself to be simply experiencing a spatially 
unified object.
What, then, is the information which allows us to take the presently experienced 
portion of the coin to be an aspect of a whole object? Here I will make another 
assumption which I will offer some argument for,
A2: Experiencing a spatially unified object as a spatially unified object requires 
experiencing the spatially unified object as the sort of thing which would present 
different aspects of itself to different points of view upon it.
So, in order to experience the coin as a whole object, certain associations must be 
made regarding the relation between presently experienced aspects of the coin and 
aspects of the coin absent from present experience.
A2 is true because the notion of experiencing a spatially unified object as a spatially 
unified object is internally related to some awareness of material entailment and 
material exclusion relations between spatial aspects of an object (which are also 
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internal relations). The thought is this: objects are typically the sorts of thing which 
stay the same or vary independently of how we stay the same or vary (given, of course, 
that we do not causally affect the object in question); but our sensory experience of an 
object which is stationary and which we are moving around is one of variance rather 
than sensory sameness. So, to take each variant as a view of an aspect of the same 
whole object, we must have some capacity to unify the different experiences 
appropriately13. We must, somehow, take those different spatial aspects to be 
appropriately spatially related, viz. each different spatial aspect of the same object  
must be related to each of the other spatial aspects of that object in such a way that that 
spatial aspect, along with the others, could make up a unified whole. So, to experience 
a point of view upon an aspect of an object as a point of view upon an aspect of a 
unified object, one must experience that aspect as appropriately associated with other 
aspects, and possibly associated with further possible aspects, of the object in question.
The possible commensurability of  a spatial part with other spatial parts is described by 
internal relations, inasmuch as facts like the following hold: as regards the objects we 
experience, we do not give sense to the possibility of two different lots of space 
occupying stuff co-occupying a zone of space unless one is a proper part of the other, 
or vice versa. That is, given that 'space occupying stuff' is taken to be a very broad 
sortal, the occupation of a portion of space by one portion of space occupying stuff, 
excludes and entails facts about other portions of space occupying stuff. The exclusion 
and entailment works here in a way similar to the sense drawn out by Schaffer:
...I think that the philosopher who holds that non-identical concrete objects cannot co-
locate has already upheld a real constraint on modal freedom. She has already declared 
that all concrete objects are relationally connected as occupants of a common space-time 
system, in a way that imposes global constraints.* Just like someone who has the 
essential relational property of being room-mates with someone else requires the rest of 
the world to accommodate her needs, so an object that has the essential relation property 
of not being placemates with anything else requires the rest of the world to 
accommodate her needs. 
*[In a somewhat related vein, Bosanquet speaks of internal relations which involve ‘a 
13 There are appropriate and inappropriate ways to associate views. Given the same sensory data we  
may, for instance, associate views of aspects inappropriately by taking the experience to be of two 
qualitatively identical objects which are swapping places so very rapidly that we cannot tell that they 
are.
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community of kind', giving the example: ‘You cannot have a spatial relation between 
terms which are not in space' (1911, p. 277)] (2010; 353)
I qualify my assent to Schaffer's claim in the above quotation by saying 'similar' 
because I cannot see why one could not hold to a slightly less modally constraining 
claim whilst keeping the same idea of a system of internal relations; namely, the claim 
that non-identical objects of the same kind cannot co-locate. For such a view leaves 
open the possibility of the co-location of objects with different modal properties – such 
as statues and lumps of clay – whilst precluding the possibility of  counting the same 
portion of stuff considered as space occupying stuff more than once.
The footnote to Schaffer's quotation (marked with an '*') serves to sow the seed for an 
idea which will be very important later (cf . 2.21, 2.5-2.6, 4.24-4.25): that descriptions 
in terms of relations within a 'community of kind' are descriptions within a particular 
logical space – a space within which certain relations, which express what are essential 
to the kind in question, count as internal relations, and others, which express accidental 
qualities associated with such kinds, do not (cf. the discussion of how internal relations 
are implicated in the individuation of things like footballs in 1.2-1.3 ).
Experiencing space occupying stuff as space occupying stuff then, is internally related 
to the notion of a whole individual inasmuch as we can only understand unified space 
occupying stuff as being (or at least being composed of) some whole as a spatially  
unified thing or things; so, to make sense of the notion of a spatial aspect of a unified 
object each spatial aspect must relate to other aspects in such a way that it, along with 
the others, could be an aspect of a spatially unified whole.
Being a member of a set of possible points of view upon different aspects of a whole 
object experienced as a whole object, then, is also to be part of a possible network of 
possible points of views upon space occupying stuff. Part of what makes it a network 
of possible points of view upon space occupying stuff is the commensurability between 
information carried by any one perception and an array of other perceptions. We can 
then spell out commensurability in terms of material entailment and material  
exclusion. For example,
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Material Entailment: In order for there to be a point of view upon a red thing to 
the left of a blue thing which is slightly obscuring a green thing, there must also 
be a point of view, available if I moved to the other side of the scene, upon a 
green thing slightly obscuring a blue thing which has a red thing to its right.
Material Exclusion: In order for there to be a point of view upon a red thing to 
the left of a blue thing which is slightly obscuring a green thing, there cannot be 
a point of view upon a red thing to the right of a blue thing which is slightly 
obscuring a green thing in the same place at the same time.
Spelling out these conditions upon the possibility of experiencing a set of sensory 
experiences in such a way as to have an experience of an spatially unified object as a 
spatially unified object, just is to spell out some of the content of such an experience.
Here it is important to stress that for a point of view upon an aspect of an object to be 
intelligible as a point of view upon a spatial part of an object it is only necessary that 
those aspects which are viewed could make up a whole, or the outer surface of a larger 
part of a whole. In making this claim room is left for a degree of indeterminacy. The 
importance of this indeterminacy is that it leaves open a gap between the way we 
experience things to be, and the way they actually are. This gap is central to possessing 
the sort of notion of mind-independence we spoke of in the last chapter: the way things 
actually are may always, within bounds, outstrip our expectations of it (cf. 1.4-1.43). 
For an example of such indeterminacy, consider Siegel's case of  a flowerpot which has 
a miniature city on its back (2006; 5). As we move around the flower-pot, we see the 
sorts of changes we would expect of a flower-pot until we reach the other side of it and 
meet with the unexpected structure. At this point we are surprised, but not by 
something unintelligible, for we can place this aspect of the plant-pot amongst its other 
possible and actual aspects.
2.21 Functional Properties, Spatial Properties, and Sortals
In making reference to Siegel's example I moved from talking of objects individuated 
solely in terms of their spatial properties to objects individuated also in terms of their 
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functional properties – 'being a flowerpot' and 'being a city'. I want to dwell on this 
movement from spatial to functional properties for a section, and connect it to a point I 
initiated in the introduction, and alluded to in the last section: that systems of internal 
relations obtain within 'communities of a kind'. I want to dwell on these points and 
their connection in order to: 
a) make clear that similar examples of the type of indeterminacy made clear by 
Sigel's flower-pot example are available for objects individuated in terms of their 
spatial properties, and so: i) avoid the impression that I might have been 
equivocating in a way which obscures a salient difference; and ii) make clear 
that, because of the potential indeterminacy inherent in associating spatial  
aspects, a similar notion of mind-independence is implicit in the association of 
aspects under the sortal of space occupying stuff; 
b) show that considering the difference between individuation in terms of spatial 
properties and individuation in terms of functional properties throws light on the 
relations between logical spaces constituted by relations between things of a 
community of a common kind, of the sort which I highlighted in the quotation 
from Schaffer in 2.2.
Here is an example which is like Siegel's Flower-pot example, but where the surprise 
generated by the unfolding experience of the object is caused by what for a moment 
seems like an errant spatial property: I am circling what I take to be a sphere, I walk a 
full circle around it and the appearance appears uniform – this much I expect; I circle 
another few steps further, and, as I do, I am slowly presented with the side of a long 
tube with a semi-sphere at one of its ends. I am surprised, but not by seeing something 
incoherent. For the association of the aspects of the object I have seen is compatible 
with the following sorts of possibilities, which all allow that those aspects being 
associated with each other are internally related as aspects upon spatially unified 
objects: the tube has been rotating at the same rate as me and it has slowed, stopped, or 
my pace has quickened; the sphere itself has suddenly extended. Alternatively, all other 
things being equal, there must have been some other fundamental change in the 
situation.
A Siegel-style example which appeals only to associations between experiences of 
aspects which one ought to expect if one is experiencing something as a spatially 
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unified object is, then, more difficult to articulate, less clearly attributable to any one 
fact, and so less satisfying than Siegel's flower-pot example. 
The example cast in terms of surprising spatial properties is awkward in the 
aforementioned ways because perceiving objects in accordance with the associations 
required to experience that stuff as space occupying stuff is basic inasmuch as it is a 
capacity which is a prerequisite of  a capacity to experience things like functional 
properties. Siegel's example is clearer because the example concerns a kind of 
empirical object which is the kind it is because it is judged to be in accord with some 
criteria we have set – 'being a flower-pot'. This allows that we can switch criteria (from 
plant pot, to city) without creating an incoherence at the level of the associations 
involved in experiencing stuff as space occupying stuff.
For the flower-pot example, we can hold fixed that what we are experiencing at each 
juncture around the apparent flower-pot is still some unified space occupying object 
and dramatically vary its functional properties to surprising effect; we can, in this way, 
use the spatial properties to provide a backdrop to the variance in functional properties. 
From the perspective of the framework of internal relations which allows us to 
experience the object as space occupying stuff the properties 'flower-pot' and  'city' are 
accidental. Whereas, if we are only considering the associations concerned with spatial 
properties as a means of creating the sort of surprise-inducing change in the experience 
of the object found in the flower-pot example, we have no such common backdrop to 
hand, and so we must vary something which is basic in a similar way to spatial 
properties (like whether the object is stationary or not, whether the perceiver took a 
normal path through time; the causal powers of the object perceived; or whether or not 
the perceiver is perceiving aright).
Stressing the basicness of being able to individuate in terms of space occupation serves 
to illustrate a sense in which internal relations are a prerequisite of external relations in 
the way I suggested Wittgenstein endorsed, above (p.16). We may make certain 
empirically informed associations regarding what in particular we should expect when 
we individuate a particular kind of object which is individuated primarily through the 
identification of functional properties (I am not here committing to whether these 
associations are realised in our total phenomenology, or just our visual 
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phenomenology), but the associations in question are only intelligible if mappable onto 
a simultaneously more minimal and more general set of expectations about what we 
can (and sometimes must) expect from any object. 
So, to experience spatially unified objects as spatially unified objects one must be in 
possession of structured but vague expectations regarding what sort of views, other 
than the present one, an object affords. The association which we must be able to make 
in order to experience objects as objects at all are a prerequisite of the more 
determinate associations which would be implicated in our experiential sensitivity to 
particular sorts of objects. 
The more determinate and more contingent set of associations involved in 
individuating functional properties is, then, describable in part, in terms of further 
constraints being placed upon the modal freedom of possible/excluded aspects which 
has already been set by the internal relations governing the association of aspects upon 
some space occupying stuff. For instance, coming to have the ability to recognise 
tomatoes, and then subsequently recognising tomatoes as tomatoes, would be parasitic 
upon first recognising objects, and then experiencing, and so coming to expect, a very 
particular sort of change in those very objects.
Of course, I am not claiming that grasping a more determinate set of associations 
between spatial parts than is required to experience spatially unified objects is all that 
it would take to be able to individuate objects which are individuated in terms of their  
functional properties. One would, for instance, also have to grasp modal properties 
which describe the way we use such objects, or the role the properties we are 
identifying play in a wider system (such as a system in the natural world).  
Also, claiming that the associations implicated in identifying space occupying stuff are 
already implicitly implicated within the identification of objects identified by way of  
their functional properties, is not to claim that such associations are ontogenetically 
prior. (We may, for instance, have to grasp some functional properties in order to grasp 
spatial properties – the capacities involved in experiencing these two different kind of 
properties may co-depend.) Nor is the claim being made that such associations are 
metaphysically prior. (It may be that the existence of spatial properties depends upon 
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the existence of functional properties – that there is a codependency between spatial 
and functional properties). I am making no claims at all in these foregoing respects.
The only claim I am making here is that the associations governing the individuation 
of space occupying stuff ground the norms for individuating space occupying stuff in  
terms of their functional properties. They do so inasmuch as the logical space of space 
occupying stuff – the internal relations indexed to the sortal space occupying stuff – is 
required in order to articulate the functional properties of space occupying stuff.
2.22 Material Entailment and Material Exclusion
In order to experience an aspect of a spatially unified object as an aspect of a spatially 
unified object, we must see that aspect as bearing relations of exclusion and entailment 
to other aspects. Once we have this idea in view we can extract something more 
particular about content of such experiences; we can express this content using a 
subjunctive conditional, and make explicit that they have a modal element,
M: if one were to move to a place which afforded a different point of view upon 
the coin, then one would experience {an appropriate aspect}.
and, in unpacking '{an appropriate aspect}', we can make clear that there is normativity 
at play here,
N: if one has the capacity to experience a spatially unified object as a spatially 
unified object, one ought to associate particular sensory experiences, and not 
others, with what is presently experienced.
 
We can see the normativity in action here once we notice that if one is to experience a 
spatially unified object as a spatially unified object, there are aspects one ought to 
associate with each other and aspects one ought not to associate with each other. 
2.  3  Experiencing and Association 
Now that we are clear that the association of perceived aspects of the coin involve 
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modal and normative information, a clarification of the Dualist position with respect to 
the coin can be made once we ask: in virtue of what do we take what is presented in 
perception at each instance to be appropriately associated with what went before and 
what will follow?
Candidates would seem to be: 1) the way we are viz. dispositions, beliefs, conceptual 
capacities, physiology; 2) the way the coin and/or the wider environment is; 3) our past 
(causal, evolutionary, etc); or, 4) some combination of 1-3.
I want to whittle the above candidates away by distinguishing between two more 
particular questions:
Q1) How are the appropriate associations realised?
Q2) What could ground these associations? 
Remembering A1 and A2 –  that we do at least seem to experience whole objects 
without consciously performing an operation upon any visual data, and that modal and 
normative information is a prerequisite of such an experience – we can, by way of 
excluded middle, say something about Q1: either the modal and normative information 
which grounds the expectation is present in perceptual phenomenology itself, or it is 
not. Thus, we see that Dualism and Monism are two exclusive options which 
correspond to locating the requisite associations in the total phenomenology but not the 
perceptual phenomenology, and in the perceptual phenomenology (and so also the total 
phenomenology), respectively.
I now want to show that what can be an answer to Q1 is constrained by what can be an 
answer to Q2. I will do so by first playing through a simple Dualist account – an 
account upon which the operation which imbues the raw data with normativity must be 
internal to the agent. In subsequent sections I will discuss a more complicated account 
– one upon which the data is normatively imbued, by externalist means, prior to the 
agent's visual experience (yielding a sort of Monism) – and show this to relapse into an 
augmented form of Dualism.
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2.3  1  Simple Dualism 
One way of being a Dualist is to account for the appropriate association of aspects of 
the coin by appealing to a set of dispositions to associate such data. Indeed, such an 
appeal to dispositions (including dispositions to believe or to expect) seems 
unavoidable for the simple Dualist – a simple Dualist who is looking to ground the way 
in which the sensory experience of the object is interpreted by recourse to experiential 
contact with the object itself. Appealing to anything more than a disposition would 
entail some deliberation, which would serve as a way for the subject to separate the 
data from the operation upon it (contra A1); and anything less than a disposition would 
fail to separate the grounds for the operation from the data (contra Dualism). To put 
pressure on Dualism, then, let us suppose that an experience of the coin as a spatially 
unified object is realised in just the following way:
D: our capacity to see an aspect of the coin as an aspect of a spatially unified  
object just is our being disposed to take any sensory experience of an aspect of 
the coin to be a member of a set of possible sensory experiences of aspects of a 
spatially unified object, and to be appropriately associated with other members of 
that same set.
The problem with D is that even if the dispositional account can capture such modal 
commitments as expressed by M, such an account lacks the resources needed to 
explain the required normative information, N. For there is nothing inherent in the 
sequence of dispositions which is capable of being accountable to an external standard 
of correctness, and such accountability is crucial to the possibility of associating an 
appropriate aspect. To see why there is no place for the accountability of the set of 
dispositions to some standard, or standards, of correctness in such an account (viz., no 
way to account for the normative force of a normative authority), consider the question 
'in virtue of what is any one sensory experience of an aspect in a series of experiences 
of aspects of the coin an experience as of an aspect of a spatially unified object?'.
For a proponent of D, the answer to the forgoing question would have to be that an 
experience of an aspect of a spatially unified object as an aspect of a spatially unified  
object is as such because the experiencer is disposed to associate a particular sensory 
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experience with other sensory experiences. However, we now ought to ask what the 
disposition to associate in this way could amount to. 
If we are disposed to associate x with y, and this association is merely causal, then if x 
is in fact not associated with y, our dispositional set affords us no way of 
accommodating this fact, so we would be blind to potentially errant consequences, and 
unable to apply such a set of dispositions in situations in which objects did not accord 
with them. Thus, there is no capacity for normativity here; dispositions can only be 
concerned with what will happen, not with what should happen.
If the association amounts to more than a merely causal association – something like 
an expectation, or a belief – then we need to be able to make sense of the content of 
such an association. The content would surely have to be explicated by appeal to the 
norms which give reason to such associations; and such an appeal would presume a 
command of the normativity appropriate to the objects in question in a way which 
could not be grounded by the objects to which those norms are applicable (cf. 1.43-
1.6). (If one accepts there could be no such grounding, this would entail the denial of 
simple Dualism – the idea that objects ground our interpretation of them).
So, although the proponent of D may have M accounted for,14 if simple Dualism is to 
be maintained, we still have to make clear in what sense the whole set of dispositions 
can be accountable to the object which being disposed to associate experiences thusly 
is meant to put us in touch with. That is, we need to account for N by making those 
dispositions corrigible, in accordance with the object they are meant to allow us 
contact with.
In summary, then: for a set of dispositions to be used to interpret sensory information 
in order to yield an experience of a spatially unified object they would have to have the 
capacity to be corrigible (as we saw just  above). For the proponent of D, however, 
there is nothing more to appeal to as a source of authority for this corrigibility than 
other sets of sensory information and dispositions to associate sensory information. 
What makes any given experience an experience of a spatially unified object just is its 
14 In fact, I think she has not. M represents the form of the relations between appropriate aspects, so to 
account for M we would already need to have access to the sort of relata given by N.
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place within an appropriate web of dispositional associations. So, unless we jump in 
and illicitly imbue one sensory experience of an aspect (or set of sensory experiences 
of aspects) of a spatially unified object (or objects) with the modal and normative 
information inherent in the experience of spatially unified objects as spatially unified 
objects, no experience of an object is better placed than any other to serve as a point of 
comparison. (And even if we did privilege an aspect in this way, this would only serve 
to calibrate a set of dispositions for a particular object).
Without some way of grounding the set of dispositions, then, the simple Dualist 
account is stuck: the required information – that one ought to expect a particular sort of 
counterfactual to obtain – is at best grounded by the propensity of the correct 
dispositions to associate a particular series of perceptual experiences. However, as the 
dispositions are taken to constitute our capacity to experience the spatially unified 
object as a spatially unified object, how they could  be applicable – that is, how they 
put us in experiential touch with the object in such a way as to ground the requisite 
norms – goes unexplained.
So, if we are to be simple Dualists, we need to maintain something like D, but, if we 
maintain D, the normativity required to make sense of the associations of any one 
experience from a point of view with experiences from other points of view (which are 
necessary for the intuitive phenomenological claim that we do seem to see unified 
objects as unified objects to be true) is unavailable. Thus, there is on the simple Dualist 
picture a discontinuity in the relation between normative force and normative authority,  
so to maintain Dualism we must guarantee the normativity of the dispositions 
elsewhere.
2.32 Dualism or Monism: a Vicious Regress or a Privileging  of  Normative 
Authority
I want now to pause to make explicit that the problem afflicting D is one horn of the 
dilemma which constitutes what I am calling a visual rule-following problem:  if the 
grounds for interpreting a particular sensory experience to be appropriately associated 
with others is given by information gleaned from some other experience which is 
thought to put us in contact with some normative authority by way of some further set 
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of dispositions, then the problem at hand is merely pushed back to that point of contact 
with a normative authority.
The other horn of the dilemma is sharpened when we try to solve the problems of D by 
setting a point of comparison in order to stop the regress by grounding the medium of 
the appropriate normative information with a normative authority which does not stand 
in need of interpretation. 
The first way in which we might attempt to blunt the second horn of the dilemma is by 
claiming  that a brute relation to the way that things are in the world calibrates our 
dispositions, the thought being that, through our experience of them, worldly objects 
themselves serve as the grounds of the requisite dispositional associations. It is 
apparent that this idea, as it stands, is a non-starter. It is a variant of the Myth of the  
Given; to buy into this idea would be to assume that we can make sense of “an 
availability [of something] for cognition to subjects whose getting what is supposedly 
Given to them does not draw on capacities required for the sort of cognition in 
question” (McDowell 2008; 1). The sort of capacities in question – those affording the 
appropriate association of aspects – are needed in order that we be in perceptual 
contact with objects at all. So how we could be in the position of bearing an 
appropriate perceptual relation to the object – a relation which would enable the object  
to ground the appropriate associations – is mysterious; that is, it is mysterious how 
merely being in the presence of object-hood could ground the association of aspects in 
such a way as to allow then to be taken to be appropriately unified.
We are now either forced back onto the first horn of the dilemma, or forced to find a 
way of guaranteeing the grounds of the associations expressed by M and N in a way 
which makes no appeal to the subject's phenomenology. In terms of the rule-following 
dilemma presented above, we must find a way of getting a content which does not 
stand in need of interpretation, but which is not an instance of the Myth of the Given. 
Candidates for providing this guarantee fall into two camps: one which looks to facts 
about the perceiving subject and its environment; and another which looks to factors 
extrinsic to any one particular relation between subject and environment viz. an 
externalist guarantee of the normative content. Examples of the first camp are Quine's 
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similarity space (1977) or Campbell's binding parameters (2002) (assuming that those 
sort of hypotheses about our visual systems are taken to be explanatory of our visual 
contact with basic features of the world rather than merely descriptive). Teleo-semantic 
style projects, or indeed any project which attempts to explain the content of 
intentional phenomena by way of a selectional story, fit the bill for the second camp.15
Members of the first camp, if presented as explanations of how our associations are 
grounded, rather than mere descriptions of the basic associations we do make, are 
either doomed, or collapse into the second sort anyway. They are doomed if they are 
taken to explain the capacities grounding M and N because invoking them either: a) 
begs the question inasmuch as we would still be owed an explanation of how the 
required resources were available at this lower level of association; or b) undermines 
the explanatory strategy inasmuch as it seems pertinent to ask why, if we are to assume 
the required resources at this lower level, should we not save a step and do so a level 
up? Thus, even if if we do have reason to invoke a lower level of perceptual 
explanation, we are still owed an explanation of the capacities operative at this level,  
and here we are pushed to consider extrinsic factors. 
  
2.3  3  Selectional Stories 
The second sort of explanatory strategy I just mentioned establishes an apparent 
Monism  as follows. First, we appeal to natural function as a source of normative 
authority which is not dependent on the normativity inherent in our experiential lives. 
Then, we tell a selectional story about how our dispositions were moulded into accord 
with the external world. Then, maybe, we can allow that these dispositions allow us 
access to a more immediate  normative authority: objects themselves, or at least mostly  
veridical representations of such objects.
What I now want to show is, if such a selectional story is being proposed as an 
explanation of our normative sensitivity to the modal properties of objects, the project 
fails. The mode of the project's failure is a relapse into a problematic Dualism 
analogous to that which the adherent of D is committed. I take this to be constitutive of 
15 For instance, Millikan (1984, 1990), Papineau (1993); of course, not all selectional stories need run 
like these do, or posit an explanation of content in the same sense, and inasmuch they are not addressed 
by my arguments. 
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an oscillation: from the regress of grounds for interpretation, viz. the above problems 
with D, to the self-intimating Monist solution, viz. the Myth of the Given, back to the 
regress of interpretation viz. reapplying D's method at a level prior to any perceptual 
phenomenology, then back to a self-intimating solution, viz. the subjects' having 
magical grasp of the normative content of their perceptions despite being radically out 
of touch with the appropriate normative authorities (this last clause is the problem with 
selectional stories which I will now endeavour to articulate)...and so on.
The failure of the selectional account to provide the requisite normative content ensues 
from the proponent of the selectional story either making an illicit passage from talk of 
one sort of normative requirement (an externalist one (cf. ENR, below)) to talk of 
another (an internalist one (cf. INR, below)); or, failing to recognise that they are 
talking about the wrong sort of requirement (viz. the externalist one). 
The result of either of these failures is that the proponent of the selectionalist account 
locates herself within a virtuously circular explanation which she is not entitled to 
situate herself within. This is because she has helped herself to the idea that we have 
the capacity to make judgements about already normative information we are 
presented with, without allowing that we have the capacity for contact with the 
normative authorities which would make sense of such a capacity to grasp the 
information as normative information. Such accounts thus create a disconnection 
within an otherwise potentially virtuous circle.
To unpack the claims I have just made let us now look to the two sorts of normative 
requirement I have in mind:
External Normativity Requirement (ENR): there is a fact of the matter about 
which experiences of aspects of an object one ought and ought not to associate 
with each other when experiencing a spatially unified object as such. Further, this 
fact is realised in the subject in a way which leads her to act in accordance with 
those facts. However, that she does act so because of those facts is not 
immanently present to her.
 
Internal Normativity Requirement (INR): there is a fact of the matter about 
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which experiences of aspects of an object one ought and ought not to associate 
with each other when experiencing a spatially unified object as such. Further, this 
fact is realised in the subject's experience in a way which is immanently present 
to her.
A selectional story, as briefly schematised above, attempts to ensure the normative 
status of our dispositions by ensuring that they are appropriately related to some 
normative facts by an externalist route. Millikan, for instance, does so by first 
distinguishing between distal rules and proximal rules (1990). Distal rules pertain to 
the proper function of an organism within a selectional system. Proximal rules, on the 
other hand, say only what facts about a creature should follow a given state of the 
biological system that constitutes that creature.
The way in which proximal rules are shaped by distal rules is probabilistic: if the 
proximal rules of a creature accord with distal rules (or if the creature has a propensity 
to form proximal rules which have a propensity to accord with distal rules), then those 
proximal rules (or the propensity to form such rules) are more likely to survive. In this 
way, appealing to the norm of proper function looks to explain away the mystery of 
how there is appropriate contact with a normative authority by showing that mystery to 
be illusory: the norm of proper function amounts to a notion of fitness for purpose, and 
“the environment itself creates the illusion of fitness, by getting rid of the unfit” 
(Steiner 2009; 24).16
A Millikan-style selectional story would, then, map onto our coin case in the following 
way: the set of dispositions appealed to in D would be proximal rules; they specify 
what will happen to a subject internally given a particular sensory input; and the 
manner in which these rules can be correct or incorrect just is the manner in which 
they relate to a corresponding distal rule. The distal rule will pertain to the benefit of  
having a phenomenology which represents objects as objects; for instance, a distal rule 
might be something like “if you move around an object, expect it to look appropriately 
different”. The promise of the account is to import the required normativity into the 
16 I quote Steiner here because I think he makes use of the same notion of natural selection explaining 
away the applicability of norms. He does so in a better manner (inasmuch as it sets out to assume 
nothing anormative and so sets out in a way which does not look to disentitle itself to a place in a 
virtuous circle), though still flawed (he still disentitles himself – just in a different way - by assuming 
that there are determinate prerequisites to sense). I will turn to this use later (cf. 2.52).
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content of D's dispositions, and to do so without talking about the normativity of a 
creature's representations (for, it is claimed, all that is appealed to are facts about the 
environment), thus avoiding the Myth of the Given.
To appreciate the power of this account –  if correct –  to explain away difficulties, 
consider how describing the content of perceptual experience in terms of the distal and 
the proximal seems to dissolve a particular problem which can serve to make rule-
following seem mysterious;  namely, given that the relation between any series is 
describable by an infinite variety of rules, what fact about the past instances of the 
application of a concept could determine what should count as a correct future 
application?
The proposed solution is this: taken in isolation from distal rules, proximal rules 
merely express dispositions; as such, proximal rules are not normative, and thus not a 
candidate for deviant interpretation. The normative content of proximal rules only 
becomes apparent when considered in the light of distal rules; and, crucially, as the 
normativity of distal rules falls out of the notion of proper biological function (a bald 
fact of the matter), and as any explanation of the norm of proper biological function is, 
in the sense expressed in the quotation from Steiner, above, retrospective, the notion of 
a deviant interpretation does not apply here either, and the problem dissolves.17
The selectional solution to the problem at hand is, however, premature: the above 
problem only arises once an account of the possibility of the normative content of our 
perceptual phenomenology has been established; yet, I want to argue, it is on just this 
count that the selectional story fails.
The arguments given earlier in this chapter showed that a prerequisite of experiencing 
an aspect of a spatially unified object as an aspect of a spatially unified object is a 
sensitivity to material entailment and material exclusion relations between points of  
view. A further point was that the expectations regarding the relations between 
perceived aspects and unperceived aspects of the present object must be indeterminate; 
the relations must be so in order to allow that the actuality of the object can outstrip a 
17 Whether or not this sort of normativity is unproblematic in this way is by no means settled; for 
instance, it relies upon assumptions about the notion of theoretical simplicity, and a realism about 
norms. I am passing over these issues here as I think the account fails at a more basic level.
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subject's expectations regarding it. Awareness of this sort of outstripping, as we saw, is 
internally related to a notion of a thing's independence of us (cf 2.2-2.22), and thus of 
our notion of there being an independent grounds for the unity of the different aspects 
which we experience and associate when experiencing an object.
In the above respects, it is not enough that the agent be subject to the normative force 
of the environment so as merely to accord with the norms exerted by the environment; 
the subject must have access to normative information regarding any one particular 
perception inasmuch as they must be able to recognise objects as grounds for which 
experiences we ought to associate and which we ought not. For,  if we could not take 
the actuality of an object to outstrip our apprehension of it, we would have no grounds 
upon which to consider it as mind-independent; and, without such grounds, the 
inclusion of a sense of object-hood in our phenomenology (perceptual or total) would 
look mysterious.
For, as we saw when considering D, if we are disposed to expect x to follow y and x 
does not in fact follow y, our dispositional set affords us no way of accommodating 
this fact, so we would be blind to this consequence. Furthermore, if a description of 
what an experience of objects amounts to, by our lights, can be given exhaustively by 
distal rules, it is constituted only by dispositions. So, if this is the case, unless we can 
make appropriate sense of those dispositions through reflection (which is to introduce 
a form of Dualism about how we can relate to something which is already normative 
(see below), we are not automatically in a position from which to make appropriate 
judgements about the requisite accountability which underpins our associations of 
experiences of aspects to other experiences of aspects. 
Thus, by examining the prerequisites of our capacity to realise that the object is not as 
it seemed when it was initially perceived, it becomes clear that an account which meets  
ENR is not strong enough to account for our phenomenology. INR must be met by an 
account of the phenomenology of experiencing objects, and a Millikan-style 
selectional account can only meet ENR.
At this point the selectional story teller may make the following move: the requisite 
normativity of experience only arises because of an agent's reflection upon experience. 
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Thus, by way of reflection, the normative role of the proximal rules is realised 
internally to the subject. To make this move – aside from making trouble for A1, for in 
most novel cases we do not have to exercise reflection at all – is to invoke either an 
occult faculty which reinstates a Dualism, or a transcendental idealist picture upon 
which our judgements, or faculties which make judgement possible, make a 
contribution to what there is to make judgements about.
Thus my diagnosis of the failure of a Millikan-style selectional account is that it  
creates a problematic isomorphism between the norms of proper function which mould 
a creature's dispositions and a creature's relations to the norms inherent in those 
dispositions, which is an analogue of the problematic relations between the objects of 
perception and the dispositions which the Dualist wanted to claim provided an 
explanation of access to the objects of perception.
The problem, then, both for the basic Dualist account, and for Monism about our 
phenomenology supplemented with a selectional account, is that each of these 
depends, in different ways, upon the prior acceptance of there being an external 
relation between normative authority and normative force. For this reason, in order for 
the normative side of the isomorphism to relate to the worldly side, it needs to be 
already appropriately normative, but making sense of that normativity is dependent on 
the prior existence of just such a relation. The issue, then, again becomes a question of 
explaining such a relation without causing the same problems (and with this, we have 
reached C2 of our earlier argument summary (cf.2.11)); as such we have set the scene 
for a return to the idea of transcendental idealism.
2.  4  Summary 
I have shown that given minimal assumptions about the phenomenology of object 
experience, we can see that the total phenomenology must include modal and 
normative information. If we then try to account for the presence of that information in 
the style of the Dualist, we face a visual version of the rule following paradox. Being a 
Dualist instantiates the sort of isomorphism between normative force and normative 
authority which we considered to be problematic in the last chapter. It does so by 
attempting to explain our apparent visual phenomenology in terms of normative 
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authorities and norms which are externally related, or weakly internally related.
In a wider frame, then, the point of this chapter, so far, has been to show that we should 
accept that perceptual experience of objects requires the same sort of normative system 
of synchronic and diachronic relations as descriptive language was described as 
depending upon in Chapter 1; and, that once we recognise as much, we face, in respect 
to perception, the same sort of problems regarding the disconnection of normative 
force and normative authority as we did when describing descriptive language.
2.5 Internal Relations and Arbitrariness; Mathematical Rules and Grammar.
We ended the last chapter with the thought that such content as perceptual experience 
of objects provides is a prerequisite for descriptive language use. One way of thinking 
of the sort of prerequisite perception provides, then, is as a prerequisite of the 
justification of descriptive language: perception provides the access to objects which is 
needed if objects are to make true or false our use of descriptive language. One might 
also think that the sorts of norms I have been claiming are implicit in perception are 
themselves accountable to the task of providing veridical representations of the 
anormative world. Accepting this, however, casts our perceptions of the world as 
externally related to the world in a way which has proved, thus far, problematic. 
Maintaining a position that neither allows for our perceptual experience to be 
constituted by an external relation between scheme and content, nor collapses that 
dualism by allowing scheme-independent content to provide the scheme, requires 
finding a way to think of the objects of our basic perceptual experience as having no 
criterion for correctness which is externally related to our systems of norms; that is, to 
replace the external relation between scheme-independent content and scheme with a 
set of internal relations which are not themselves accountable to anything else (viz., a 
set of internal relations that do not stand in need of justification). We need, then, to find 
a way of thinking of the world we refer to as featuring directly within our systems of 
norms, and of our systems of norms partly constituting the world we refer to; we need 
to think of our most basic apprehensions of the world as apprehensions of role-players 
whose roles are articulated only by recourse to the logical spaces which their role 
playing constitutes (this is the sense which I hoped to draw from the quotation from 
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McGinn, earlier (cf. p52)).
To describe the requisite sense of an unaccountable system of internal relations which 
encompasses parts of the world will take the rest of this and the next two chapters. 
What I aim to show in those chapters is that Wittgenstein makes available a general 
strategy for allowing us to think of our normative systems (grammar) as encompassing 
parts of the empirical world. 
By now looking to the sort of picture Steiner paints of Wittgenstein's view of grammar, 
and an erroneous contrast Steiner draws between canonical and novel rules, we can 
gain a neat overview of what Wittgenstein's view affords us; of how on such a view as 
Wittgenstein's, the empirical world can itself feature in the most basic levels of our 
practices in an non-mysterious way.
 Here is Steiner's account of a distinction Steiner thinks he finds in Wittgenstein:
But what is much more important here than counting the occurrences of ‘rules of 
grammar' is that in RFM Wittgenstein has broadened his conception of what a ‘rule of 
grammar' is supposed to be. In PG, for example Wittgenstein had written:
Grammar is not accountable to any reality. It is grammatical rules that determine 
meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning 
and to that extent are arbitrary. (X, p. 184)
By the time 1939 rolls around, Wittgenstein has very different things to say:
I have no right to want you to say that mathematical propositions are rules of 
grammar. I only have the right to say to you, ‘Investigate whether mathematical 
propositions are not rules of expression, paradigms—propositions dependent on 
experience but made independent of it.' (LFM, V, p. 55)
Even if this (rather ambiguous) passage says that mathematical propositions actually are 
rules of grammar, it also characterizes rules of grammar in ways inconceivable to the 
Wittgenstein of PG. Mathematical theorems, far from being arbitrary, are ‘dependent on 
experience'. Using the current jargon, we can say that mathematical theorems are rules 
which are ‘supervenient' on experience. So although mathematical propositions are 
‘independent of experience', this does not mean that we could decide to make 7 + 5 = 
127 into a mathematical proposition. Whether mathematical ‘rules of expression', as 
Wittgenstein now calls them, are to be called also ‘rules of grammar', is a matter of little 
concern. (Steiner 2009; p10)
Although in the above quotation, Steiner seems to be open to the possibility of 
Wittgenstein thinking that mathematical rules are a part of Grammar, he is open to this  
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thought only inasmuch as we might broaden the category of Grammar to include both 
rules that are internally and externally related to the empirical world. Steiner, for 
instance, elsewhere in the same paper, says that mathematical rules 
...differ from grammatical rules in that the former have an ‘internal' relationship with 
their applications. (op. cit.; 2) 
Steiner's point in the first of the above passages is, then, that because Wittgenstein 
thinks that grammar (that is, grammar excluding the part of grammar which pertains to 
mathematics, or grammar as a category exclusive of mathematical rules) cannot be 
accountable to reality, Wittgenstein thinks that it must be externally related to reality,  
and grammar is in this sense arbitrary. On the other hand, Steiner intends to 
demonstrate that Wittgenstein's view of mathematical rules is that they are grounded in 
the empirical world, and so are internally related to the empirical world, and therefore,  
cannot be arbitrary.
2.51 Steiner's Illustrative Mistake
Steiner's point, I think, must be partly wrong. He is running together grammar's being 
unaccountable to the way the world is and a particular way of thinking of grammar as 
being arbitrary; he thinks a rule cannot be arbitrary if that rule is grounded in 
experience. For Steiner, the arbitrariness of grammar consists in its being an 
autonomous logical space which is externally related to the empirical world; grammar 
is unaccountable to the way the empirical world is only inasmuch as grammar's 
autonomy allows that its propositions do not stand in need of grounding by the 
empirical world it is externally related to. 
In thinking of grammar so, Steiner misinterprets Wittgenstein's use of the word 
'arbitrary'; he takes the relation between grammar and the world to be arbitrary 
inasmuch as it is an external (modally free) relation – grammar could vary and the 
world stay the same, or vice versa. A different, and I think more consistent, way of 
reading 'arbitrary' is as follows: what we accept or do not accept into grammar is not 
dictated, or justified, by the world (and so it is in this sense independent of the 
empirical world); but grammar is made possible by, and in part constituted by, the 
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empirical world, and in virtue of this is internally related to the empirical world (and so 
grammar is in this sense dependent upon our experience of the empirical world). These 
two relations – one of dictating a possibility (and so being a relation which would be 
appealed to in a justification of why some x is the case; for instance, if y dictates x, and 
y is the case, then x is the case), and one of enabling a possibility –  are, then, both 
ways of thinking of grounding as an internal relation, and they ought not to be 
confused: grounding-qua-justification and grounding-qua-enabling.
If we use grounding in the sense of enabling, we can allow that the world shows up for 
us in an already normative way (as it does when it is experienced as being populated 
by spatially unified objects) and so presents us with an open ended choice of parts of 
the empirical world we might take up as criterial (as new parts of grammar). On such a 
picture, we assimilate parts of the world (which are already normatively structured in 
virtue of occupying a place within an already established normative context) into our 
grammar by treating those parts as normative authorities within a new logical space. 
For instance, any stick can be chosen to be the normative authority for attributions of '1 
metre' (what the standard metre is, is in this sense arbitrary); to be able to choose a 
stick one must already have a command of the salient normative nodes within the 
logical space one is selecting from – here the empirical category 'sticks' (in this sense 
the grammar surrounding the concept 'metre' is internally related to the world); and, 
once that particular stick is chosen, it does not make sense to judge it against the 
standard it sets (it is in this sense unaccountable). So grammar can be internally related 
to the empirical world – a choice of a different stick would have produced a similar but 
different grammar – and is nevertheless unaccountable to the empirical world – the 
empirical world in no sense made the selection of a particular stick correct. (We will 
see much more of this example in chapter 4).
So, in opposition to Steiner, I want to illustrate a manner in which a grammar includes 
parts of the world so is in this sense dependent upon our experience of the empirical 
world. Furthermore, I want to show that it is because of this manner of inclusion that 
grammar is unaccountable to an independent way the world is – that when already 
intelligible empirical objects are given a criterial role, they are unaccountable to the  
standards they set. In this sense grammar is independent of the empirical world. This, 
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then, is all consistent with retaining the thought that grammar is autonomous and 
arbitrary: grammar does not bear a  justificatory relation to any independent way in 
which the world is, and the rules of grammar did not have to be as they are (which is 
not to say the same facet of the world could be criterial to a different Grammar, it is 
just to say that different criteria could have been selected (this is the sense in which the 
standard metre stick in paris might have been longer (cf. 4.2-4.25, and the example 
below)).
To cast 'grammar' in this way I will, in chapters 3 and 4, show that there is a clear way 
of saying how grammar is not accountable to the empirical world but is still grounded 
in it. I will do so by showing that empirical objects can take up a criterial role within 
language and can hence be a part of grammar grounded in the empirical world (cf. 4.2-
4.25). This will show that in using objects as criteria, those parts of grammar which are 
constituted by objects are unaccountable to the standards which they serve as criteria 
for (cf. 4); further, showing that what is arbitrary is which part of a given logical space 
is selected to serve as criteria.
Explicating the view I have just been outlining (which will take up the rest of this 
thesis) will make clear that the inference from grammar being unaccountable to the 
way the world is to grammar bearing an external relation to the world, and in that sense 
being arbitrary, is invalid.
This explication complete, allowing objects to feature as a part of both our perceptual 
norms and as part of our linguistic norms, will be unproblematic; furthermore, 
recognising as much will amount to seeing how normative force and normative 
authority are, in particular situations, internally related in a way which precludes the 
explanation of their relation in terms of the accountability of such a relation to some 
external criteria.
I am, then, here, writing promissory notes, to be fulfilled in the next two chapters, for 
filling out the sense in which the normative relations between parts of a logical space 
do not stand in need of grounding-qua-justification by being related to a normative 
authority, or prior set of rules, which is outside of that logical space; but, still allowing 
that a logical space may still be grounded by - qua inaugurated in virtue of the 
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relations already made available by – a different logical space (and this relation of 
grounding can be an internal relation, as the relation between the logical space of 
perceived spatial properties and perceived functional properties is (cf. 2.2-2.21)).
2.52 The internal Relation of Mathematical Rules to the World
What I will now do with the rest of this chapter is to illustrate what is partly, and 
usefully, right about Steiner's account of Wittgenstein's thought: Steiner's description 
of the mode of the internal relation of mathematical rules to the world. Once again I 
want to emphasise that I am not doing so as part of an exegetical case study, but rather 
to elucidate an approach to making sense of criterion-less norms which specifically 
relate to my own concerns.
I will then work through what I take to be a mistaken concern Steiner has regarding the 
application of Wittgenstein's thought. Analysis of this mistake provides an example of 
how to demystify what seems to be, even given the internal relation between normative 
force and normative authority I argue for, still a mystery: the application of rules in 
novel situations (qua situations which they have no internal relation to).
The relation between the empirical world and mathematical rules is, for Steiner,  
internal inasmuch as there could be no change in the circumstances of application 
without a change in the content of the proposition, because physical circumstances 
constrain the possibility of what one can mean mathematically. The mode of the 
constraint is this:
Rather than explaining cases of the application of mathematics, Wittgenstein rather 
explains them away – the applicability of mathematics is an illusion caused by our 
calling 'mathematics' those very rules founded on what we call their application, just as 
natural selection attempts to explain away the fitness of species to their environment; the 
environment itself gets rid of the illusion of fitness, by getting rid of the unfit (Steiner 
2009; 23)
The move which Steiner has Wittgenstein making, which allows us to think of 
mathematical rules and the empirical world as internally related, then, is to unpack the 
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idea of mathematical necessity into the idea of a hardened empirical regularity, where a  
“hardened empirical regularity” is a contingent generalisation endowed the status of a 
logical rule by the way in which it is used.
 
Taking mathematical rules to have developed in this way helps us avoid the following 
way of thinking of a rule as having some mystical quality which adds normativity to 
the empirical. It seems as though rules for the application of mathematical concepts 
have contingent empirical content, so it looks as though if the world had been different, 
so too would be the rules for application. If this were the case, however, one might 
think we should worry about the necessary status of truths like 2+2=4; for, if these 
could have been different we lose the right to think of them as objective standards; 
standards which are independent of our contingent way of life. 
If we could not avoid the above way of thinking, given the perceived lack in the 
empirical world of grounds for the necessity of mathematical rules, we might think we 
ought to look instead to the metaphysical to explain the connection between the realm 
of objective exceptionless rules and the contingent content to which these rules apply. 
The mystery then is this: how do we make sense of the objectivity of the rules and the 
generality of their application, without positing something over and above the natural 
world, and thus inaccessible to empirical creatures like us? This is an aspect of the 
mystery of the synthetic apriori –  'how could norms be empirically founded? and if 
they could not be, how could empirical normative authorities exert normative force?' – 
which in one particular form and another has occupied this thesis so far and will 
continue to do so.
2.53 A Misplaced Concern
Steiner, given the above description of the applicability of mathematical rules, is  
concerned that Wittgenstein's account is inadequate because Wittgenstein's description 
does not apply to novel uses of mathematical rules. Steiner's concern, however, is 
misplaced. The concern rests upon the assumption that novel rule uses must be 
justified by their applications in the same way as canonical rules are. However, that 
this is a confusion can be seen once we resurrect the two senses of grounding which I 
illustrated earlier: grounding-qua-justification, and grounding-qua-enabling. 
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The description of canonical rule application does not apply to novel mathematical rule 
use because novel mathematical rule use does not stand in need of justification by its 
grounds. The grounds in question here are only grounds-qua-enablings not grounds-
qua-justifications. Rules only have grounds-qua-justifications once they are canonical 
because grounds-qua-justifications are just the existent useful applications of rules 
within the logical spaces that are inaugurated by those novel rules, compelling one to 
use those rules more. 
In the wider frame of this thesis, the problem Steiner has with the novel application of 
mathematical rules is of a similar form to the problems I have been explicating 
regarding the application of norms to novel language use and novel sensory 
experiences. So, once again, the hope is that identifying the confusion regarding 
Steiner's idea of grounding will set the scene for a resolution of the wider problems I 
have been discussing, and for making us comfortable with the idea of the bedrock of 
our normative lives being normatively structured and criterion-less. This resolution , 
properly contextualised, will rid us of the anxiety driving the desire to give an account 
of the synthetic a priori. Again, in making the foregoing point I am stressing that I am 
not discussing Steiner with a view to showing that he gets Wittgenstein wrong for the 
sake of such exegetical discussion; rather, I am using Steiner's mistake for the 
following two purposes:
• to demonstrate a way in which holding onto parts of a transcendental idealist 
picture serves to commit one to an incoherent picture of our normative relation 
to the world. 
• to illustrate an aspect of Wittgenstein's thought – his concept of grammar – 
which is useful to the overall project of this thesis: finding a way to allay the 
urge either to identify the roots of normativity, or to appeal to metaphysical 
pictures in order to explain why we cannot identify such roots.
The mystery of the synthetic a priori, whether it is a mystery, and indeed the matter of 
whether there even is a synthetic a priori for there to be a mystery about, will be the 
subject of the next chapter. What I will do now is to show that the problem Steiner 
claims to have identified with Wittgenstein's method – namely, that although this 
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method dissolves the problem of the synthetic a priori for canonical mathematical 
rules it does not do so for novel mathematical rules –  is in conflict with his own 
reading of Wittgenstein. It is important to note, however, that whether or not Steiner 
reads Wittgenstein correctly is besides the point. My suggestion is that a consideration 
of the dialectic here will give the wherewithal to see aright certain aspects of the 
problem of the synthetic a priori that specifically relate to my own concerns. 
Steiner rightly claims,
Wittgenstein's point is...that empirical regularities are pre-conditions for the entire 
institution of rule following, including most aspects of human language. The 
philosopher must simply take these regularities as given, and not try to explain 
them...
It is a brute fact—to explain which is not the business of philosophy (though 
perhaps of other disciplines)—that in many cases, training produces, and is 
intended to produce, a uniformity of behaviour. (Steiner 2009; 6, my italics)
The conflict I wish to point to is as follows. For Wittgenstein's account to have the 
deficit Steiner attributes to it, Wittgenstein would have to be committed to novel rules  
requiring a determinate sense before they are put to use. For this to be true there would 
have to be determinate prerequisites of sense –  criteria which determine the 
correctness for a rule and do so prior to, and so independently of, the rule's use. The 
putative separation between the canonical and the novel in terms of the canonical being 
explicable and the novel being mysteriously inexplicable thus rests upon a desire for 
explanation at the level at which Steiner thinks philosophers ought not to ask for 
explanations; an explanation of the criteria of correctness for a rule prior to that rule 
occupying a role within a practice of holding things accountable to other things.
The point just made is a point I will make over and over in the remainder of this thesis: 
commitment to such an explanation – an explanation of the determinate prerequisites 
of sense –  goes hand in hand with themes which will be crucial to the next two 
chapters. These themes are: thinking of arbitrariness in the wrong sort of way; thinking 
of internal relations as always justificatory; and, crucially (for the problems of this and 
the last chapter), making novel applications of norms seem mysterious through 
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requiring that such norms have a criterion of correctness in order to be efficacious. 
So, I will now expand upon the idea that Steiner requires there to be criteria for novel 
rule application when he ought not, and offer a short diagnosis of why, for him, it 
seems necessary to do so; then in the next two chapters I will take a step back and 
establish the point in a more thorough and general way.
2.54 Mathematical Novelty
Steiner, then, thinks that, with the appeal to the natural selection of rules in hand, 
Wittgenstein is well set to explain away worries concerning canonical concept 
application, but stuck when it comes to novel application. Steiner illustrates his 
thought by giving an example of a mathematical theorem having application in an area 
disparate from its origin (2009; 24). The example is intended to illustrate this point: if 
mathematical propositions are grounded in their empirical application – inasmuch as 
what allows a meaningful mathematical application just “is the underlying regularity  
upon which the theorem is supervenient” (ibid; 22) – then we seem to have no account 
of the grounding of cases in which a theorem applies in areas the contingent 
circumstances of which do not form part of the theorem's grounds.
As I take Grammar to be internally related to the world in a like manner to 
mathematical rules, the above problem with the application of novel mathematical 
rules would also apply to any novel uses of grammar. For the reasons I outlined at the 
end of the last section, however, I do not think that this is a problem. We can make this 
clear by first noting that, just as with the norms governing instances of descriptive 
language use and those governing the perception of particular aspects of individual 
spatially unified objects as such, at some point in each mathematical proposition's life 
it has been novel. Thus, unless we can make sense of our capacity for novelty, we 
cannot make sense of the canonical inasmuch as we cannot make sense of how we 
have any empirical propositions which are candidates for either hardening or falling by 
the wayside. 
We thus return to the idea that we need to be able to make sense of the thought that 
new rules can be applied to the empirical world in order to make sense of how any rule 
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can be applied to the world at all (a theme which we encountered at 1.43 and has been 
constitutive of much of this chapter). We do so now, though, in a different light. For up 
until now I have been presenting the problem with novel rule application as 
epitomising a particular mystery concerning the connection of normative force and 
normative authority: that in cases of novel rule application we can see especially 
clearly that, if we think of rules and their criteria as externally related, there can be no 
unproblematic connection between the rule and its criteria for application.18 I am now 
examining novel applications of rules thought of as internally related to their criteria 
for application in order to show why this is unproblematic.
We must be clear, then, that novel concept application is significant in the current 
context but not because it exposes a lack of an ontogenetic account of a sort which 
would contrast with Steiner's avowal of the fact that no such account is possible within 
philosophy (in the quotation given above). On the contrary, considering the 
problematisation of novel rule application is a way of pointing to a tacit and illicit 
desire for an ontogenetic explanation. It affords us this way of pointing because (as I 
briefly summarised at the end of the last section), if we can only think of the 
application of rules as intelligible to us if there is already a criterion for their correct 
application, novel rule application is a phenomenon for which we desire a criterion of 
correctness, but for which there cannot yet be one. Thus, if we assume that both sorts 
of rule (novel and canonical) can have content only inasmuch as they can be 
accountable to some empirical grounds, we generate a mysterious difference between 
the two sorts of rule; and in generating the mystery, we obscure the actual difference 
between novel and canonical rules.
Why though would the idea that novel rules and canonical rules are accountable to 
some criteria in the same way seem obvious to someone who, prima facie, rejects the 
18 To refresh, novel rule application epitomises an irresolvable problem for any account of an external 
relation between concepts and their applications in this way: even if we had a contingently correct 
bridging principle for all of the hitherto canonical cases of rule application, this would not, in 
principle, work for novel cases. For such a principle to work it would have not only to be 
contingently applicable to all of the previous cases of rule use, but also to be applicable to any 
possible future case. For such a guarantee we would have to invoke more rules to guarantee the 
application (initiating a regress) or invoke instances of the myth of the Given in allowing that new 
cases make obvious to us which rules to use. If we then admit that, to some degree, all descriptive 
language use, or perception of things as things, relies upon norms obtaining in diachronic relations to 
novel situations, we see that this is a problem for any account of an external relation between 
concepts and their applications (cf. 1.43).
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idea that there could be an explanation of the prerequisites of sense? What makes it 
seem obvious is, I think, that internal relations between the empirical grounds of 
mathematical rules and the use of the mathematical rules are taken to be justificatory,  
and they are taken to be so because the internal relation is one of constraint: the 
empirical world constrains what we do by affording certain possibilities and 
disallowing others. It is in this sense that it seems problematic that mathematical rules  
should have novel application – the constraint provided by the empirical grounds of a 
rule ought not to justify one in giving sense to our attribution of what is, in a situation 
which does not share the same grounds, allowed and disallowed to count as being in 
accord with the mathematical rule. This idea of constraint allows us to make sense of 
one part of a logical space being accountable to another part of that same space without 
the introduction of some intermediary object or hypothetical relation. Thus Steiner's  
worry is this: canonical applications of mathematical rules, in virtue of  their being 
constrained by the empirical grounds they make intelligible, are grounded-qua-justified 
by their own application to the world; whilst the sense of novel mathematical rules 
must be justified in virtue of some other hitherto mysterious grounds-qua-justifications 
because such uses cannot be constrained by the empirical grounds from whence they 
currently draw grounding-qua-justification.
Here I think we need to pause and consider two different notions of a rule's relating to 
the empirical world and ask whether it is appropriate to talk of grounding in the same 
way in each instance:
• A rule is grounded by empirical situations made intelligible according to the use of 
that same rule. (For instance, the norms concerning the association of aspects of 
space occupying stuff are grounded by objects made intelligible to us by successful 
associations according to that rule within the same logical space).
• A rule is stipulated by using a part of the empirical world – which is already 
intelligible to us because it occupies an accidental role in an already established 
logical space – as a criterion. The logical space from which the empirical object 
was selected in this sense grounds the logical space inaugurated by the stipulation 
of the new rule. (For instance, if we were to use a flower-pot as a sample of what a 
flowerpot is, and do so in virtue of the accidental functional features it has – 
features which are intelligible to us partly because we recognise the object to have 
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certain spatial properties – the functional properties which we are using as criteria 
in one logical space are in this sense grounded by accidental features of another 
logical space).
Contrasting these two different ways of talking about a rule's grounding makes it clear 
that there is a notion of justification operative in the former case which is not operative 
in the latter. In the first case the empirical situations which ground the applicable rules 
(in the context of this chapter, all the space occupying stuff we have seen), are used to 
articulate what does and what does not count as an internal relation within that logical 
space, and in that sense, empirical items within the same logical space provide their  
own justification. This is the sense in which Steiner's natural selection story applies to 
canonical cases. Canonical cases thus lack an external criterion for correctness in the 
same manner as I claim instances of perceptual experience do.
The worry is that in the second case we have the same sort of application of rules 
going on, but in their first instance there is nothing to justify their application, and as 
the successful application is what gives them content, they are groundless, and so 
contentless, and inasmuch as this is the case, what their application amounts to is a 
mystery. We thus have a problem of the same form we have been exploring in the last 
two chapters – a disconnection between normative force and normative authority.
It is not clear, however, that in the second case it is appropriate to use the term 
'grounding' in the same sense as 'grounding' was used in the first case. For the grounds 
are not applying a constraint upon which empirical object we select to use as a rule, 
they are rather providing an already normatively and modally structured backdrop 
which we can go on to use in various ways, and cannot use in other ways. The grounds 
are thus a prerequisite of an open-ended group of 'ways of going on'19; they enable us 
to go on in a variety of ways, but they do not justify us in taking any one of those ways 
up.
19 This is a term of art I borrow from discussion surrounding Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following 
(PI 143-242). It refers to the indeterminate array of ways of fulfilling any given rule (cf. 1.32) ; these 
are ways of going on. If one accepts, as I do, that neither normative force nor normative authority 
should be privileged, then the term ways of going on also lends itself to a way of talking of particular 
parts of our normative lives – practices, associations, basic judgements, et cetera –  for which there is 
no further analysis to give. If the arguments of this thesis hold, then ways of going on are internally 
related to parts of the empirical world.
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It is, then, in this sense that the enabling grounds provided by a prior logical space are 
arbitrary: there is no sense to the correct or incorrect selection of a new criterion from 
those grounds; the grounds, in virtue of being an already established logical space, are 
only providing candidates which are available for use as criteria in some ways but not 
in others. This then is an internal relation which does not justify: if the grounding 
provided by the prior logical space had not been the way it was, then this particular 
rule would not be available. 
So, if 'content' here means something which is in accord or is not in accord with some 
criteria for correctness, the question of what gives content to non-canonical uses of a 
rule is a non-question; the question of what justifies in the sense of making correct the 
use of a new rule is a non-question. That sense of 'justify' does not apply here, for in 
this situation a new rule is being tried out as a way to inaugurate a useful logical space; 
the role of a novel rule itself is not that of an object to be compared with reality to find 
out if it is representing reality correctly or not. The only sense in which it might be 
justified or not is if we find something to do with it; once we have found something to 
do with it, however, and we talk of this usefulness as grounding the application of the 
rule, we are already talking of 'grounds' in the sense of one part of the same logical 
space grounding another. For the foregoing reason we ought only to give sense to 
talking of grounds-qua-justification once a rule is already on its way to being 
canonised.
Another question is what gives a novel criterion for rule use content in the sense of 
giving it a modal-cum-normative structure. The answer here is simply that it has such a 
structure because it has been selected from a place which is already structured in that 
way – it has been selected from a prior position within an already established logical 
space. If we then ask why the prior logical space had such a structure, unless we will 
be happy with receiving the same sort of answer again, we will slip back into 
harbouring a tacit desire for an external criterion for correctness.
The impulse to confuse the two different uses of the notion of content we have just 
seen distinguished is an impulse for all content to be content only if it is accountable to 
something else. At the level of a whole system of internal relations (systems within 
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which we do make sense of accountability), though, it is not clear that this requirement 
makes sense.
Because it is inappropriate to ask for a grounds-qua-justification for novel usages, 
then, it is inappropriate to ask for an explanation of the applicability of novel rules. To 
ask such a question would be to ask for a criterion of correctness which is externally 
related to the application of the rule. Novel uses are, in successful cases, the 
inauguration of the recognition of the sort of basic empirical regularities which it is not 
the job of philosophy to explain. They are the basis for comparing something already 
modally and normatively structured to something else already modally and 
normatively structured. Once comparisons are made, rules either find a home in 
practices and the world, or they do not. If they do, then these rules are endowed with 
sense, if they do not, then they drop away. How normative authority and normative 
force connect in novel situations is thus explained away, for if no useful comparison 
between the already normatively and modally structured part of the empirical world 
which we are holding fixed and the normatively and modally structured part of the 
empirical world which we are investigating obtains, then the novel rule drops away.
2.6 Summary
The discussion of the 2.4s has been quick and abstract because it is only intended as a 
way to give an overview of the agenda for the next two chapters, and as a promissory 
note written for further description of a way to think of bedrock levels of normativity 
(such as the normativity exhibited by perceptual experience) as being criterion-less, 
and thus escaping from the problems I examined in this chapter and the previous one. 
In summary, Steiner tacitly presupposed the need for an ontogenetic account of the 
applicability of novel rules by: i) presuming that a rule must be grounded-qua-justified 
in order to be intelligible as a rule; ii) creating the apparent need to account for how 
some rules could be given to us in, as it were, a pre-hardened form. Giving such an 
explanation as the apparent need stated in (ii) demands, however, would be to give an 
ontogentic explanation of the sort which Steiner quite rightly asserts that it is not the 
job of philosophy to give.
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This line of thought carries across to norms involved in perception in the following 
way: we know from considering the failings of Dualism that there is no sense to 
thinking of  relation between our experience of the world and the world we refer to as 
external. For if perceptions of objects and objects were externally related, Dualism (or 
bad Monism) would be true. This may at first seem troubling: how could the norms we 
already have be guaranteed to apply to novel experiences; why should they be 
constantly extensible in this way? The answer is that they do not have to come with a 
guarantee and there is no should about it. Objects of perception can be so only 
inasmuch as the norms relating objects to one another already apply, and inasmuch as 
the objects of perception do fit into some logical space, we have been presented with 
some new grounds-qua-justifications for those norms and, potentially, grounds-qua-
enablements for other norms. We are constantly presented with novelty in perceptual 
experience inasmuch as we are constantly presented with candidates for new normative 
authorities – stuff which bears particular modal relations to other stuff largely 
irrespectively of what we do – but this sort of presentation requires no external criteria. 
2.7 A Link to Chapter 3
The agenda is now as follows: in the next chapter I will make explicit the difference 
between:
• The response to the synthetic a priori made by the Kantian transcendental 
idealist – where Kantian transcendental idealism is thought of as a limiting 
case of theories which hold to a sort of scheme-world dualism but deny a 
scheme-experience dualism. 
• The response of those in the lineage of  transcendental idealist who allow 
objects to ground our conceptual scheme and thus appear to collapses the 
scheme-experience dualism and the scheme-world dualism.
• The response of the transcendental idealist who does not oppose scheme to 
content by only talking of scheme, but justifies this move by way of a 
metaphysical picture which tacitly draws bounds to sense.
I intend to demonstrate that none of these responses works. I will then differentiate the 
later Wittgenstein's approach from each transcendental idealist approach by identifying 
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a different notion of arbitrariness as operative in his descriptions of our normative lives 
(a notion which is consistent with the world itself forming part of our grammar and 
which, in being so, affords no space for scheme-world dualisms). 
Following this, in Chapter 4, I will generalise the self-undermining form of the 
problem with transcendental idealism in all its forms, and return to the thought that we 
invoke a version of transcendental idealism if we presume sense to have determinate 
prerequisites in the way in which I suggested Steiner did earlier (cf. 2.5, 4.22-4.25). 
Then I discuss what it means to drop the idea of determinate prerequisites of sense, and 
allow the world itself to play a role in our grammar.
In the final chapter, I will apply these thoughts to the debate surrounding causality in 
order to show that there are norms operative there too. I will show that if we follow the 
same line of resistance to transcendental idealism there as we do in the next two 
chapters, we will see that our concept of causality is unaccountable to any external 
standard and internally related to the empirical world. This move is particularly 
important to make, because making it allays the urge to think of the empirical world as 
essentially merely empirical – merely empirical in that it is bereft of normativity and 
modality – an urge which is bound to reinstate pernicious scheme-content dichotomies.
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Chapter 3: Transcendental Idealism
In chapters 1 and 2 I have described theoretical problems concerning the disconnection 
of normative force and normative authority, identified an underlying cause – the 
presumption of an external, or weakly internal, relation of normative force and 
normative authority – and given a brief overview of what doing otherwise –  treating 
normative force and normative authority as internally related – would amount to.
In this chapter I return to the transcendental idealist picture and suggest we see it as 
mis-picturing of the internal relation between normative force and normative authority.  
For the Kantian transcendental idealist normative authorities sit within the realm of 
normative force because it is transcendentally established that, for there to be 
normative authorities at all, there must already be a normative context in place which 
constrains what the empirical world can be in such a way that empirical world is of a 
form to which our concepts apply. Examining this picture under the aegis of the 
thoughts I sketched in 2.5-2.6 will make explicit the unsatisfying nature of the putative 
solution offered by the transcendental idealist to the problems under consideration.
 
To be a transcendental idealist in the manner of Kant is to hold that:
 
a) we cannot know the world except as it is subject to the prior
structures imposed by the mind.
b) the world we know of – empirical reality – cannot be the world as
it is in itself.
 
What this concatenation of claims inevitably leads us to is some form of a scheme-
content dichotomy, for there are only two ways of reading the relation between (a) and 
(b), either.
 
1) What we experience – the empirical world – is shaped by the
structures referred to in (a).
or,
2) What we experience – the empirical world – is what can be
presented in conformity with the structures referred to in (a).
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 On both 1 and 2, a key feature of the relation between a and b is the exercise of a 
constraint upon the possibility of the form of the empirical world, viz. the world of 
experience. In (1), the constraint is one upon which, for there to be content, that 
content must itself be produced by some prior activity; whereas in (2), the constraint is 
more liberal: the world which we experience and to which we refer is that which 
happens to fit those resources with which we bring the world into view.20
On both accounts, it may appear that whatever does the constraining or organizing 
cannot itself  be a part of the empirical world. This would apparently be so if we held 
to the sort of position we saw Steiner explain away at 2.52. Such a position is that there 
are rules which apply to the empirical and are exceptionless. The rules are 
exceptionless because they express necessary truths. Inasmuch as the rules express 
necessary truths, contingent facts about the empirical world are intrinsically incapable 
of grounding the capacities required to enable us to use such rules.
For the Kantian, then, what the categorical concepts21 express
 
... are structural features of the framework within which alone it is possible to 
apply any concepts, make any judgments, including ordinary empirical 
descriptive ones. (Brandom 2010; 2)
If we are to operate within a Kantian schema, we ought to think that both the norms 
underwriting the command of descriptive language of Chapter 2 (relations of inclusion, 
entailment, and exclusion, between the uses of parts of language) and those 
underwriting the ability to entertain the perceptual content involving objects of Chapter  
2 (the compatibility and incompatibility of points of view upon space occupying stuff) 
are instances of very basic expressions of such general structural features. With regard 
to these norms, we have found their representation to require a modal vocabulary. So 
with regard to the possession of these categorial concepts, we ought to be able to say 
that
20 I take the following schematisation and characterisation from Sacks (2001; 198-204).
21 'Categorical concepts' is a Kantian term of art. It refers to the sort of prior system of norms I 
summarised in 1.32. These are the (for Kant essential) structures of the mind which are the 
prerequisite for all human cognition (of the empirical world or otherwise). For a fuller description of 
Kant's picture of the relation between the categories, the empirical world and substance see 5.1.
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 ... in being able to apply any ground-level empirical concepts [or even in being able to 
simply perceive objects in space], one already knows how to do everything one needs to 
know how to do in order to apply the categorial concepts. ... [T]here are no particular 
empirical descriptive concepts one must be able to apply in order to have implicit 
mastery of what is expressed by categorial concepts such as the modal ones (though 
perhaps one must have some descriptive concepts or other). (Ibid) 
 
As such, because the categorial concepts are independent of any particular empirical 
concepts, acceptance of either reading of what the efficacy of the categories amounts to 
within a Kantian picture – (1) or (2) – seems to necessitate a transcendence of whatever 
it is that does the constraining relative to the result of that constraint. What the Kantian 
picture then leaves us with is a clear difference in kind between the framework that 
allows the possibility of empirical experience, and the results of empirical experience; 
or put differently, between matters of fact and matters concerning the very possibility 
of facts; namely, we are left with the epitome of a scheme-content dichotomy.
If we do accept this sort of difference in kind between the framework which allows 
empirical experience and what is empirically experienced, a promising feature of 
pursuing the transcendental project comes into view: the promise of finding a way of 
saying how our normative scheme has application to the world of objects by making 
our normative scheme a constitutive prerequisite of the world of objects. This appears 
to demystify the idea of the synthetic a priori by telling a story about how the two 
different kinds may be in harmony with one another within the empirical world. The 
rules apply because they are partly constitutive of the instances of the empirical 
concepts to which they apply. The way in which they constitute the empirical is by 
bringing into view particular aspects of substance. 
Thus, on such a picture, a weakly internal relation between our empirical concepts and 
the world we experience is created by way of a prior external relation or weakly 
internal relation between the categories and substance.22 The categories and substance 
22 Which sort of relation applies here depends on whether we think the relation between the categories  
and substance is necessarily the way it is if both relata happen to exist – for Kant the relation is not 
necessary, so the relation is external. If the reader is in doubt about this, or in doubt about my general 
characterisation of the Kantian transcendental idealist, it is worth skipping ahead to read 5.1-5.2 and 
then returning here. I only omit discussing the matter here because it present a lengthy digression 
from the current aim of the text (which is only to establish the general form of a problematic 
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are independently extant and of distinct metaphysical kinds, and the empirical world 
results from the fact that they happen to relate. The form of the empirical world, then, 
is so because of the relation between the categories and substance. The resultant form 
of the world stands in a relation of isomorphism to the form of our thoughts about the 
world. As such, we could not have thought about the empirical world unless the 
empirical world already had the form it did, and if we do have such thought it is 
necessarily possibly applicable to the empirical world; but, that the empirical world has 
the form it does is dependent upon the prior constraints imposed upon the form of the 
empirical world by the categories.
 
Once we take full stock of what positing this difference in kind between the categories 
and substance amounts to, though, a key problem with a straight-forward Kantian 
position emerges. Glock articulates the problem here:
 
Kant tried to demarcate what we can know (phenomena or possible objects of 
experience) from what we cannot know (things in themselves that transcend all possible 
experience). From Jacobi to Bradley this has provoked the complaint that one cannot 
draw the distinction between the knowable realm of appearances and the unknowable 
realm of things in themselves without tacitly presupposing some knowledge of the latter. 
(Glock 1997; 291)
 
The problem is: in order to accept Kant's ingenious solution we must come to think 
that the referent of our talk of the empirical world is just what of the anormative realm 
of substance has been brought into view by our normative constraints, and so is of a 
form to which norms are de facto applicable. Yet, to talk of a constraint in the first 
place, we must picture what is being constrained, and this is self-undermining: we 
must have an intelligible conception of the constrained, which is ex hypothesi outside 
of the bounds of intelligibility. Furthermore, we must also have an intelligible idea of 
rules which provide their own criteria for application in order to make sense of the 
categories. 
A Kantian transcendental idealist picture thus provides us a starting point by both 
responding to the problems we have been surveying regarding the association of 
response to the problems brought out in chapters 1 and 2).
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normative force and normative authority, and also epitomising such problems. They 
collapse both scheme-experience, and a kind of scheme-world, dualism but only at the 
cost of instantiating a deeper scheme-world dualism. (For a fuller explication of Kant's 
view of the relation between the categories and substance cf. 5.1; I pass over the details 
here because I am presently only interested in establishing the form of the 
transcendental idealist response to the problems surrounding the applicability of norms 
to the world).
3.1 Collapsing Dualisms
As we saw by briefly looking at Steiner's account in the last chapter, a promising way 
to avoid the problems just expressed is to find a way of showing that it is a mistake to 
think that normative force must ensue from something of a different kind to the 
empirical. 
To do so one might maintain, as Steiner thinks Wittgenstein does for mathematical 
rules, that we can account for a sort of necessity sufficient to explain why the empirical 
world is bound by rules which do not themselves seem amenable to revision in the 
light of empirical experience, without, in doing so, mentioning anything but our 
empirical situation; that is, we must find a way to describe the existence of such rules 
as grounded in, but not identical to, contingent empirical regularities.
 
Sacks' conviction is that the later Wittgenstein tries to make just this sort of move when 
moving from the idea of simples in the Tractatus to the idea of samples in his later 
philosophy; a move from holding that there are basic determinate constituents of 
language which are prerequisites of the possibility of sense, to parts of empirical 
reality being prerequisites of sense within particular logical spaces. (Consideration of 
what Sacks' has to say will be fruitful in illustrating the transition from the straight 
forward Kantian transcendental idealism to the more subtle forms I listed under 
'Confusion 3' on page 8.)
This move, according to Sacks, promises to avoid the problems of appealing to a realm 
which is different in kind from the empirical whilst retaining the transcendental idealist  
project. By Sacks' lights, Wittgenstein attempts to fulfil this promise by holding onto 
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the idea that our experience of the empirical world is dependent upon some prior 
structure while gaining more clarity about the concept of a limit – of why we cannot 
refer to the prior conditions on empirical experience by using the same conceptual 
apparatus that we use to refer to the empirical world.
 
The kernel of this idea, according to Sacks, is found at the very beginning of the 
Tractatus. It is found in a recognition of the problem with Kant's method reflected in 
the self consciously self-undermining claims of the Tractatus. The idea is this: the idea 
of a limit to thought cannot be the drawing of a boundary; this is because if we are to 
make sense of talk of a boundary then we would have to talk about things being one 
way or another on both sides, but as we are talking about the limits of language here, 
and language and the possibility of things being one way or another come together, any 
notion of reference to the other side of the boundary fails tout court.
 
If this Tractarian thought was all Wittgenstein had to give, it clearly would not be 
enough. On a metaphysical reading of the Tractatus, upon which there is  a mirroring 
relation between the form facts can take and the necessary structures of our language – 
 
[a] proposition must be determinate because there must be a precise configuration of 
simple elements which either verifies or falsifies it. The logical requirement that the 
sense of propositions be determinate mirrors the metaphysical nature of facts, and 
implies that the analysis of all propositions terminates with logically proper names 
which stand for indestructible simple objects. A proposition can depict a precise 
configuration of elements only if its ultimate constituents stand in a one-to-one 
correlation with these elements. Otherwise, the fact that its ultimate constituents are 
combined in a certain way does not depict a specific combination of things. (Glock 
1996; 99)
 
– It is clear that in the supposition of the picturing relation between facts and potential  
configurations of simple objects a remnant of Kant's problem still stands. As Glock 
puts it:
 
Kant explains the possibility of empirical and mathematical knowledge and the 
impossibility of the transcendent knowledge sought by dogmatic metaphysics. But he 
fails to explain the possibility of his own transcendental insight into that demarcation, 
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especially since that insight seems to draw the bounds of sense at the limits of empirical 
knowledge. (Glock 1997; 296)
 
In like vein to the Kantian-style transcendental idealist, then, the Wittgenstein of the 
metaphysically-read Tractatus fails to explain his insights into the limits of sense 
because the articulation of those limits would require the intelligibility of the relation  
between the determinacy of sense and the set of possible combinations of simple 
objects. This relation, however, is a prerequisite of the possibility of sense and 
inasmuch as it is this, is outside of the realm of the sayable. The demand for the 
guarantee of determinacy at the level of the prerequisites of sense thus generates a 
difference in kind - between the realm of sense and the realm of the prerequisites of 
sense - which is as problematic as Kant's. 
So far, then, Sacks' idea is that there is a common form in Kant's approach to the 
preconditions of Knowledge and the metaphysically-read early Wittgenstein's approach 
to the prerequisites of sense: in each case it is recognised that for a particular sort of 
conceptual activity to be possible there must be a commensurability in form between 
our conceptual capacities and the way the world is – the two must be internally related. 
For both Kant and Wittgenstein, the explanation of mind/world commensurability 
invokes a metaphysical determinacy which is a prerequisite of the relation of norms 
and substance, and which ought, according to their own constraints (upon, respectively, 
the possibility of knowledge and  the possibility of sense) to be, respectively, 
unknowable of and so unspeakable of, and simply unspeakable of.
For the Kantian transcendental idealist, then, this determinacy ensues from a 
metaphysical external relation between the categories and the realm of substance, 
whereas for Wittgenstein metaphysically-read there is no such theorising about the 
nature of the relation: it is simply a prerequisite of the possibility of sense that such a 
relation between language and the empirical world must be so, and for the reasons 
afflicting the Kantian account, we can not directly say so. What both do, however, is 
invoke determinate criteria for sense which stand apart from the relations which, they 
hold, would give talk of those criteria sense.
We ought to pause to consider if this is indeed what is going on in the Tractatus. For it 
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would be odd to respond to a problem by self consciously instantiating it, unless this 
instantiation itself had a further role. Also, as we will see at 3.12, taking the 
metaphysically-read Tractatus to be the picture the later Wittgenstein is reacting 
against may well lead to misinterpretation of his later work.
3.11 Moving from a Metaphysical Problem to a Methodological Problem
At T 6.54 Wittgenstein states
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes 
them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must 
so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
Wittgenstein metaphysically-read, thus still has to be read as being well aware of the 
problematic isomorphism identified in 3.1, and thus as seemingly taking Kant's 
“critical stance one step further, with the self-refuting result that critical philosophy 
falls foul of its own strictures” (Glock 1997; 296).
 
If Wittgenstein had some self consciousness about “critical philosophy falling foul of 
its own strictures” (ibid.) in this way, making a metaphysical reading of the Tractatus 
may seem a poor choice; it may instead seem prudent to find a way of reading the 
Tractatus such that its arguments display the way “critical philosophy falls foul of its 
own strictures” (ibid) as a way revealing that the very idea of a determinate relation 
between extra-conceptual facts and conceptual facts is nonsense.
 
Resolute readers of the Tractatus take up the project of maintaining that Wittgenstein 
was not trying to show some metaphysical truth despite his avowal of the incoherence 
of doing so; and they do so in a particular manner. Their strategy is to deny that the 
seemingly metaphysical propositions of the Tractatus make any sense at all. The role 
of such propositions is thus purely therapeutic inasmuch as they “reveal (through the 
employment of mere nonsense) that what appears to be substantial nonsense is mere 
nonsense” (Conant 2000; 196). Thus, on this sort of view, rather than nonsense being 
acceptable because it somehow allows us a glimpse beyond the restrictions of our 
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conceptual scheme in order to show us a substantial metaphysical truth, the nonsense is 
useful because it patently reveals the incoherence of the former project.
 
The problem a resolute reading of the Tractatus has to face is making sense of the 
efficacy of mere nonsense.
 
[T]hey face a difficulty in explaining how the Tractatus could contain-or give expression 
to-any insights into the logic of language (for example, concerning the non-
representational character of logical constants). Accordingly, for example, Hacker 
blames Conant and Diamond (rightly or wrongly) for throwing away the logical insights 
Wittgenstein expresses in connection with his critique of Frege and Russell: "Throwing 
away the ladder is one thing, throwing away the baby together with the bathwater is 
another." (Kuusela 2008; 62)
 
The reader of the Tractatus now looks to have a stark choice to make between 
endorsing either self-contradiction or ineffectual nonsense. To avoid seeing these 
unappealing options as exhaustive McGinn, Kuusela , and others have suggested that 
we might re-construe what the propositions in question are intended to show by 
making an elucidatory-reading of the Tractatus. On such a view the propositions in 
question are re-construed as aimed at revealing neither the mereness of substantial 
nonsense nor some ineffable truth about the realm beyond language. Rather, the 
propositions are intended to elucidate relations which are internal to the way in which 
we represent the world, and, for that reason, have nothing to do with facts about a 
language-independent world. Key to making sense of this position is embracing a view 
of the Tractatus upon which the concept of an object operative within it is that of a 
normative role player. This brings us back to the idea of objects which guided the last 
chapters treatment of objects of perception.
 
...the concept of an object is properly understood as an intensional one, which emerges 
in the context of understanding the role that is played by the logical constituents of 
propositions, and it cannot be understood independently of this. (McGinn 2006; 5)
To accept such an idea of objects is already operative in the Tractatus, and so to 
untether the idea of simple objects from the view of them as metaphysical rather than 
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logical entities, then, we need a way of seeing the Tractatus as taking a step towards 
doing so by treating objects in the way found in the Investigations, where
 
...the ostensive definition of a name, which we give on a particular occasion and in 
which we point at an object while pronouncing the name, employs the object as an 
instrument of language. The ostensive definition, Wittgenstein suggests, can be seen as 
the expression of a rule for the use of a sign, and the object that we gesture towards in 
giving the definition is used as a means to express the rule. In this case, the object itself 
is employed within the symbolism: it is ‘not something represented, but ... a means of 
representation' (PI 50). (McGinn 2006; 301)
 
For, on such a reading of the Tractatus we can embrace part of the positive project 
which McGinn, in the passage below, claims Pears attributes to the early Wittgenstein 
(that upon which Wittgenstein's logical analysis reveals that names of simple objects - 
objects of which it makes no sense to talk of existing or not existing - are prerequisites 
of the description of contingent states of affairs), and we can do so without buying into 
the isomorphic picture which goes along with taking those objects to be both outside of 
language and somehow essentially related to it; a picture which would require an 
explanation of the relation between concepts and objects qua extra linguistic items is 
avoided. 
Here, then, is what McGinn takes to be Pears' overly metaphysical view:
 
..according to Pears, Wittgenstein's early view is that the possibility of factual discourse 
depends upon the existence of simple objects, each with its intrinsic set of possibilities 
for combining with other objects in states of affairs. These simple objects correspond to 
the simple names in a fully analyzed proposition. A name is ‘first . . . attached to an 
object in something like the way envisaged by Russell', but it continues to represent the 
object ‘only as long as the possibilities presented by the proposition in which it occurs 
are real possibilities for that object' (Pears, 1987, 103–4). A name's possibilities for 
combining with other names to form propositions must mirror the intrinsic possibilities 
of the object for combining with other objects in states of affairs. Thus, the logical 
structure of language is imposed on it from outside ‘by the ultimate structure of reality' 
(Pears, 1987, 27). It is in virtue of this isomorphism between the logical structure of 
language and the independently constituted structure of reality that the connection 
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between language and the world is made. (McGinn 2007; 200)
What is left if we can drop the idea that the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus thought that 
names are ‘first . . . attached to an object in something like the way envisaged by 
Russell” (ibid), then, is a way to avoid the Kantian problem of talking about the 
bounds of sense, and the dropping of anxieties about the relation between what lies 
outside and what is inside that boundary. We are left with a view upon which simple 
objects are individuated only by their place within logical space, and, importantly,  
upon which the existence of such simple objects cannot be considered as a contingent 
matter (cf. 4.24). The existence of simple objects cannot be contingent because they 
are a prerequisite of contingency – of the possibility of finding propositions to be true 
or false –  and, likewise,  the logical connectives cannot be representational because 
only pictures represent and the logical constants are prerequisites of picturing.
 
But making space for insights into the non-representational character of logical 
constants, and the non-contingency of whatever it is that provides a framework for 
contingent judgements, whilst not transcending a place within language, is only a step, 
and it is important to see that the reason that it is only a step is that the Tractatus 
maintains a metaphysical view of language itself. It maintains a view upon which 
simple objects (which we need to remember  are no longer to be thought of as extra-
linguistic qua non-intensional) are essentially determinate. 
Here we again see a problem of the same form as the problem with Kantian style 
transcendental idealism – a prima facie metaphysical problem – revealed as a more 
general methodological problem. For, although the transcendental constraint in 
question has now become a purely logical, rather than metaphysical, matter (viz. a 
concern about the essential structures of language rather than essential metaphysical 
structures), it is still a transcendental constraint: the presumptions of the common 
essence of concepts –  Kuusela's characterisation of this presumption is "Every 
proposition says: This is how things stand." (2008; 106) -  and of the determinacy of 
sense – that every assertion of how things stand corresponds to some configuration of 
simple objects - represent necessary facts about the nature of language and the 
prerequisites of descriptive uses of language.  As such, even if we drop the 
metaphysical interpretation of the Tractatus, and take the early Wittgenstein to be 
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engaged in nothing but an investigation internal to language, a close relative of Kant's 
problem still stands. 
Importantly, though, the aforementioned problem stands in the elucidatory-Tractatus in 
the form of a dogmatic presupposition about how language must essentially be, which 
is much easier to miss the import of than it would be if the problem stood in the form 
of an isomorphic relation between two metaphysically different kinds (an isomorphism 
between simple objects and names of the sort which the metaphysically-read Tractatus 
asserts). So, if we take Wittgenstein to be taking on a dogmatic view of language, 
rather than the metaphysical picture he explicitly takes to be problematic, we do not 
have to read Wittgenstein quite so uncharitably.
More importantly still: as we will see in the next section, given an elucidatory reading, 
the presumption of the determinacy of sense can be dropped in a way which leaves 
much less conceptual baggage than dropping the view that sense is determinate 
because there is a metaphysically grounded internal relation between language and the 
world. For, dropping determinacy from the elucidatory-Tractatus – a view upon which 
the empirical world and logic (or grammar) are already internally related in a way 
which does not stand either in need of further explanation (or stand in need of our 
acceptance of an explanation being unavailable for merely epistemological reasons) – 
does not tempt us to find a substitute for the explanatory work that a mirroring relation 
between language and the world was doing in the metaphysical-Tractatus, or to accept 
the incoherent idea of an epistemological veil created by languages inability to reveal  
how things are in themselves (a temptation we saw Steiner succumb to in his treatment 
of novel mathematical rules (cf. 2.5-2.6)). 
3.12 The Transition to the Investigations
I want to stress again thatI am not here concerned with matters of pure exegesis. I am 
looking to the shift between the early and later Wittgenstein's treatment of the 
prerequisites of sense, because attending to some of the details of the shift affords us a 
demonstration of a way of opting out of the transcendental idealist problems without 
invoking more problematic metaphysical pictures. 
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In the transition from the Tractatus to the Investigations we see the commitment to the 
prior determinacy of the structure of language dropped. Given that the problems 
afflicting the Tractatus that are salient for our concerns (whether simples were extra-
linguistic or not) were of a Kantian pedigree, we can cast this move as follows 
(remembering that 'world' can be read intensionally, or,  given a non-metaphysical 
reading, non-intensionally):
 
Wittgenstein's later reaction against [the Tractatus] is, in effect, a reaction against 
scheme-world dualism. One area in which the reaction is explicit is his discussion of 
following a rule. Wittgenstein argued that the world does not have a determinate 
structure, in virtue of which one thing (or one use of a word) is, absolutely objectively, 
the same as another or not. So it is a mistake to think that what counts as going on in the 
same way is determined by the real nature of things, absolutely independent of what we 
find it natural to class together, once trained; how we find it natural to go on plays some 
part in determining the categories we grasp and, therefore, in fixing what counts as 
going on in the same way. (Child 1994; p60)
 
Given that Wittgenstein's “later reaction against [the Tractatus] is, in effect, a reaction 
against scheme-world dualism” (Ibid), and that there are two broad ways to read the 
Tractatus, we ought to pause and note how the dropping of the assumption of the 
determinacy of sense may be factored into a story about the transition between the 
early and later Wittgenstein's work for both metaphysical and non-metaphysical 
readings of the Tractatus. 
Here it is important to be clear that what follows is hypothetical. It is a claim about 
why it would be easier to slip from reading the Tractatus metaphysically into missing 
the wider import of the Investigations. It does not preclude someone reading the 
Tractatus metaphysically for exegetical reasons whilst still reading the Investigations 
aright. I am thus presenting this etiological hypothesis only as an heuristic tool with 
which to examine the relation between certain philosophical errors, in the hope of 
clarifying a way of moving away from the picture which motivates such errors.
 
For the metaphysical reader, the dropping of the determinacy of sense is very closely 
tied to the dropping of a picture on which a mirroring relation between simple objects 
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and language is a necessary prerequisite of sense. If one takes sense's determinacy in 
the Tractatus to ensue from the necessity of language's propensity to picture language-
independent-facts, and one takes such a mirroring relation to be what Wittgenstein is 
referring to when he refers to a internal relation between language and the world, then 
it is all too easy to take a turn away from determinacy to be the same as a turn away 
from sense being internally related to the way the world is. That is, it is all too easy to 
construe Wittgenstein's turn away from the determinacy of sense as a turn away from 
the view that grammar and the empirical world are internally related, and as a turn 
towards the sort of view of grammar upon which grammar is arbitrary because it bears 
an external relation to the empirical world. (That is, it might motivate one to take up 
the sort of view we saw Steiner attributes to Wittgenstein at 2.5; and the sort of view 
we saw at 2.5-2.54 is not necessary to hold if we accept the the world is internally 
related to the possibility of parts of grammar but does not determine sense).
 
The dropping of the commitment to a mirroring relation, for such a reader, frees 
Wittgenstein from a commitment to any metaphysical claim about a relation between 
epistemology and ontology which is conceptually prior to language use. Once the 
relation is dropped, we are seemingly free to construe the logic of language as not tied 
to any essential way the world is, but rather as formed through a reciprocal relation 
with the way the world is. The problem then, however, is of the same form as Steiner's 
problem with mathematical novelty (cf. 2.54): we seem to lose contact with the world, 
for how could we make sense of such a reciprocal relation without invoking a 
conception of rules which are binding prior to their application to the objects to which 
they apply, or objects which tell us how to apply rules to them?
For the non-metaphysical reader, on the other hand, there was no mirroring relation on 
the scene in the first place; the dropping of the determinacy of sense amounts only to 
the dropping of an unwarranted assumption about the way language must be. (Which 
is, as we saw (2.5-2.54), and will see in more detail (4), is also to drop a prerequisite of 
the view that all rule use must be accountable to a criterion of correctness). Thus, in a 
similar way to the transition from the metaphysically-read-Tractatus to the 
Investigations, we lose any sense to there being a difference in kind between the way 
we go on and the reference of our talk about the world.  The idea of the norms of 
language exerting constraint on anything extra-linguistic (in the sense of anormative 
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stuff), however, is not retained, for once we take on an intensional view of objects, the 
opposition between language and its objects is taken out of play.
 
This split in approaches represents what I take to be a deep divide in philosophical 
method, and, importantly for this thesis, the difference between seeming to have 
excised rid of destructive scheme-content dichotomies and actually having excised 
destructive scheme content dichotomies. On one side a metaphysical relation between 
scheme and content is dropped, but in doing so the scheme is left problematically 
disconnected from its content inasmuch as the content must either be interpreted in 
order to be available to the scheme or be deemed unavailable from the point of view of 
the scheme; whilst on the other side there was never any mirroring relation to drop.
I will now work towards making this divide clearer by using a series of examples 
starting with what I take to be Sacks' misreading of Wittgenstein; I do this because I 
take the manner of this misreading to contain a subtle mistake which instantiates the 
above link between reading the Tractatus metaphysically and and taking the later 
Wittgenstein to be asserting that grammar and the empirical world are arbitrarily-qua-
externally related. Once again, I am suggesting that whilst considering these exegetical 
matters may seem otiose, nevertheless it is worthwhile to consider such issues because 
they bring out a way of fruitfully turning away from the transcendental idealist picture.
 
3.2 Sacks' Reading
Sacks takes a metaphysical reading of the Tractatus, and so takes the later 
Wittgenstein's work to be responding to the metaphysical Tractatus: for Sacks, the later 
Wittgenstein is attempting to retain the Kantian promise of avoiding the problem of the 
synthetic a priori by claiming that there is a necessary harmony between mind and 
world (because what “can count as an object of experience” is in part determined by 
whatever normative context is a prerequisite of that sort of reference), without buying 
into a metaphysical scheme-content dichotomy by requiring the normative context to 
be intelligible independently of the empirical world. Rather, scheme and content are of  
the same kind: any given content is likewise capable of serving as a prerequisite of the 
possibility of sense and any prerequisite of sense was once an empirical fact.
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For Sacks, the later Wittgenstein thus looks to have a chance of reinvigorating the 
Kantian picture: with the notion of a metaphysical distinction between scheme and 
content excised, it looks like we no longer need to face the problems Kant faced 
regarding saying the unsayable, for any given prerequisite of sense will be a 
prerequisite of sense because it itself is sayable within a different normative context.
Given the new role for the empirical in making the empirical intelligible, we can also 
tell a certain sort of story about the centrality of the notion of practices to 
Wittgenstein's thought. Practices – our customary ways of going on – are at bedrock 
the holding of certain arbitrary sets of empirical facts as indubitable in order that they 
might support the production of sense, and the possibility of empirical experience, 
elsewhere. And thus, we get to the thought that,
 
...in the absence of the possibility of any such external source of transcendental 
necessities, it is the empirical that itself determines – rather than merely reveals – what 
appear to be transcendental limitations: which moves are possible within our form of 
life, and which are not. (Sacks 2001; 212)
 
Sacks crystallises this difference between the Kantian and the Wittgensteinian 
approaches by contrasting transcendental constraints with transcendental features:
 
...a transcendental constraint indicates a dependence of empirical possibilities on a non-
empirical structure, say, the structure of anything that can count as a mind. Such 
constraints will determine non-empirical limits of possible forms of experience. This 
gives us the direction of determination that runs..from the mind...to empirical forms of 
experience which can be actualised. A merely transcendental feature...is significantly 
weaker. Transcendental features indicate the limitations implicitly determined by a range 
of available practices: a range comprising all those practices to which further 
alternatives cannot be made intelligible to those engaged in them. (Ibid; 213)
 
The consequence of holding that Wittgenstein is operating with transcendental features 
rather than constraints, then, seems just to be that we take Wittgenstein's Grammatical 
statements to be, in the way I endorsed in the last chapter, engaged in a recursive 
relation with the world. 
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With this kinship and subtle difference between Sacks' Kant and Sacks' Wittgenstein 
demonstrated, Sacks' further claim is that we see transcendental idealism transformed, 
between Kant and Wittgenstein, from a position characterised by the undesirable T1 
(for the reasons given at 3-3.12)  to a position characterised by T2:
 
(T1) There are transcendental constraints imposed by the mind on what can count as an 
object of experience, such that we can know (experience) objects only in conformity 
with these constraints. (2001; 201)
 
(T2) Anything that is a possible object of experience is ultimately an expression of our 
activity – where that is taken to include human concerns, interests, actions, beliefs. (ibid; 
206)
So far this all seems fine. It seems to accord with the account of the relation between 
norms and the empirical world I sketched at the end of the last chapter (cf. 2.4-2.5).
Sacks' account of the later Wittgenstein, though, does only seem fine. Sacks' image of 
the reciprocal relation between norms and the stuff of the world we experience which 
is found in the later Wittgenstein's work requires there to be determinate prerequisites 
of sense in the manner which made problems for Steiner's account of novel 
mathematical rules in the last chapter. 
We can see this problem in action, as we did with Steiner (cf. 2.53), by identifying a 
concern Sacks has with Wittgenstein that he ought not have if he were to take to heart 
the idea that grammar and the world are internally related. By identifying the concern 
as a specious one we are thus identifying a symptom of tacitly retaining the 
transcendental idealist style mistake of allowing that there are norms which provide 
their own criteria for application and that such norms are required to ensure we are in 
touch with an objective world – a concern which could only take hold on a picture 
upon which norms are externally related, or weakly internally related, to the world (cf. 
2.54).
3.21 Sacks' Misplaced Concern
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Sacks is concerned that T2 suffers from a closely kindred affliction to that of T1. 
Whereas T1 carries a tacit commitment to an unacceptable idea of the boundary 
between whatever does the constraining and the stuff which constitutes the empirical 
world, T2 evades this commitment at the cost of an “unrestrained empirical relativism” 
(2001; 216) which is incurred by abandoning such boundaries altogether. The idea is 
that, because, in the way outlined above, the transcendental features which serve as the 
prerequisites of any given experience of the empirical world are themselves contingent 
upon there being a set of things which are themselves made intelligible only by 
recourse to further practices, contingent empirical facts ultimately set the horizons of 
the possible, and this is somehow problematic. 
If the concern is that without some non-empirical basis for a scheme, we would loose 
the very possibility of sense because any one thing could, under a different description, 
be a different thing, such a concern would obviously have missed the point. For 
allowing that empirical objects serve as criteria within a particular scheme relativises 
the content of a claim being held true to that scheme. So there is no sense to the 
possibility of two different schemes expressing the very same content.
The more cogent concern23 is that allowing that there are no transcendental constraints 
in our conceptual scheme stops us from meaningfully talking about the relative value, 
or status, of different human practices; that without some way of marking out different 
human practices as aimed at things more or less attached or detached from our 
interests, we have no way of distinguishing between the value of claims of, for 
instance, shamans and physicists. So, the thought would go, transcendental features, if 
workable, still need to be subject to some transcendental constraints. 
Williams, in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), makes a very clear case for an 
23 Which does appear to be Sacks' concern for he later endorses trying out various transcendental  
features as part of project of “cognitive tourism” (2001; 305) which is the practice of picking up 
other cultures' transcendental features, and is aimed at discovering likely transcendental constraints 
by seeing which transcendental features are the most well used. So it seems Sacks' does think we can 
have practices which are unrestrained from our epistemic point of view, but are in fact somehow 
guided by the world.
The charge of relativism is not articulated very clearly anywhere in Sacks' work, however, which is  
why I turn to Williams (1985) (see below); I think we will see that ideas like cognitive tourism are 
confused when we assess Williams' views, so I will not pursue them overtly.
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absolute conception of the world being a necessary precondition of the process of 
acquiring objective knowledge; so to play through Sacks' worry in the most charitable 
way I will now look to that work, and to a criticism McDowell makes of Williams' 
thought and Williams' opposition of his thought to that of Rorty. Doing so will show 
the more cogent concern I just expressed also to rest upon a tacit acceptance of either 
the anormative world guiding our concept application, or of rules which give their own 
criteria for application. Such theoretical entities are, as we have seen, symptomatic of 
an acceptance of grammar bearing an external, or weakly internal, relation to the 
world.
Here, though, matters become tricky: I also want to use the same interchange to 
illustrate a way in which Rorty, by attempting to explaining why there is no 
requirement for a transcendental constraint (given by a rule which intimates its own 
application or a part of the world which is a normative authority prior to having a place 
within a practice), ends up reinstating the very same transcendental idealist picture he 
is trying to eschew. 
The ideas the examination of this dialectic will bring out will be the focus of the next 
chapter. There I will show that, for the reasons explored so far, while we want to avoid 
thinking that there are determinate prerequisites of sense (by allowing there are rules 
which provide their own criterion for application, or criteria for correctness which are 
so prior to their engagement with a system of rules), we do not want to justify doing so 
by opposing the realm of sense to some anormative realm and then arguing that the 
realm of sense must be autonomous with regard to to that anormative realm (rather, in 
the way I suggested at 2.5-2.6, logical spaces are autonomous in a way inclusive of the 
empirical world considered as already normative).  
3.3   A World Already There: McDowell and Williams 
Williams' idea is roughly this: in order for us to recognise ourselves as making claims 
which are accountable to the world, we must conceive of the world as robustly separate 
from our practices. Thus the conception of the world we must aim at is non-
perspectival in a way of which Williams takes scientific knowledge to be paradigmatic.
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The basic idea behind the distinction between the scientific and the ethical, expressed in 
terms of convergence, is very simple. In scientific inquiry there should ideally be 
convergence on an answer, where the best explanation of the convergence involves the 
idea that the answer represents how things are; in the area of ethics...there is no such 
contingent hope. (1985; 136)
 
The problem with such a view of the ends of objective inquiry is not that it requires us 
to actually have access to any actually non-perspectival truths. Williams is very clear,  
in his recognition of the following “effective line of objection” (ibid) that we can have 
no such access. The objection is
 
..that no convergence of science, past or future, could possibly be explained in a 
meaningful way by reference to the way the world is, because there is an insoluble 
difficulty with the notion of “the world” as something that can determine belief. There is 
a dilemma. On the one hand the world may be characterised by our current beliefs about 
what it contains (ibid)
 
but in this case,
 
...our conception of the world as the object of our beliefs can do no better than repeat the 
beliefs we take to represent it.(ibid)
 
Whilst on the other hand, if
 
we try to form a view of some idea of the world which is prior to any description of 
it...then we have an empty notion of something unspecified and unspecifiable.(ibid)
 
There is something very sensible about this assessment inasmuch as it mirrors the 
worries with the (broadly) Kantian pictures. Williams' solution is to take the role of the 
idea of the non-perspectival then, not as an actual check, but as an ideal which we gain 
by
 
forming a picture of the world as “already there” in terms of some, but not all, of our 
beliefs and theories. In reflecting upon the world that is there anyway, independent of 
our experience, we must concentrate in the first instance not on what our beliefs are 
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about, but on how they represent what they are about. (ibid)
 
Which, again, seems absolutely right. The best we can do is work with the beliefs we 
have by comparing and contrasting them in order to see how they fit and do not fit with 
each other. Our idea of 'the world' just is whatever we use to hold each other to account 
when performing this procedure (which is not idealist – the world is not such because 
of our activities – rather, we should recall, objects are intensional in the sense McGinn 
brought out (see above), and as such there is no sense to use of 'objects' which ignores 
their intensional role ). So what is the problem?
 
The problem is this: the notion of the world as already there is being conflated with the 
notion of a world which is bare of normativity. We can see this if we return to 
Williams' use of the notion of the world as already there: that some facts have more of 
a non-perspectival character than others is being taken to play an epistemic role – that 
of allowing us to separate off matters where there are objective facts from those where 
there are none. To see that this role is being played, however, we must be able to tell 
which are which in some principled way. Yet, to have a principled way, one would 
have to be able to judge which facts had less reliance upon perspective than others, 
which seems to involve a privileged access of the sort which it was virtuous for 
Williams initially to avoid.
 
To play through the idea, let us start with a way in which ethical cases cannot be non-
perspectival. McDowell suggests that we might think of ethical objectivity in the same 
way as we think of the objectivity of proof in mathematical cases. In such cases we 
think of the best reason to believe a claim as a reason which leaves us with 'nothing 
else to think on the matter'. In such cases,
 
...the explanation cannot be neutral as to the cogency of the proof; if it turned out that a 
supposed proof contained a mistake, one might still have an explanation of why people 
had converged on the belief, but it would not be the explanation one thought one had 
before the mistake emerged...Since such an explanation is thus committed to non-
neutrality on the excellence of the reasons for the belief explained, it seems to warrant a 
version of the idea that the belief is held because the fact that things are as it represents 
them impresses itself on the converging believers. The fact impresses itself by way of 
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the reasons alluded to: one might ask how else it could do so, if not by way of reasons. 
And why should we not suppose the idea can be similarly warranted where, as in ethics, 
the persuasiveness of the reasons by which beliefs are explained falls short of proof? It is 
the non-neutrality of the explanations, rather than the inexorability of the reasons they 
appeal to, that matters. The idea of a fact impressing itself on a believer by way of 
reasons for belief need not require that anyone exposed to those reasons can be 
guaranteed to be persuaded by them. If the reasons are good ones, anyone exposed to 
them and not persuaded must be missing something: an explanation of the relevant sort, 
since it depends on the reasons being good ones, would force notions like that of 
insensitivity on us for the case of non- ignorant dissenters, and would not obviously 
stand in need of an independent theory of error (1986; 379)
 
Thus, when we see that, in the mathematical case, non-neutrality and the efficacy of 
good reasons go together, we can also see that, in ethical cases,
 
[t]he cogency of the reasons for belief to which these non-neutral explanations would 
appeal would not be acknowledged except within an ethical outlook partly characterized 
by the beliefs explained; so there might seem to be an air of bootstrapping about the idea 
that one might assure oneself of objectivity on these lines. (op. cit.; 380)
 
Here, we might think, is a case in point of Williams' criteria for objectivity proper: 
ethics must admit of some bootstrapping, whilst science need not. Now, though, the 
true problem with Williams' use of the non-perspectival – which I outlined above – 
comes into clear relief:
 
[in] affirming the perspective-freedom of scientific concepts, one shows that the correct 
application of those concepts is simply dictated by the world itself, rather than needing 
to be judged by standards of reasoning that are not independent of scientific knowledge 
as it stands, a human construction at a particular juncture in its historical development. 
This is to picture science as a mode of inquiry in which the facts can directly imprint 
themselves on our minds, without need of mediation by anything as historically 
conditioned and open to dispute as canons of good and bad scientific argument. But this 
picture embodies a philosophical fantasy of truth, and of science as an approach to truth. 
(op. cit.; 380)
 
Which is to say that the sort of emptiness which constitutes one side of Williams' 
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dilemma, above, is just as much of a problem for the idea that we can be guided toward 
the non-perspectival as it was for the idea that we can reach the non-perspectival. And 
further, it turns out that our paradigm case of objective knowledge – scientific 
knowledge – is objective in broadly the same sort of way as ethics, viz. in a way which 
does not depend on anything which is entirely practice independent. So the cognomen 
'non-persectival' is inappropriate.
 
Once we realise that this is the case – that possessing a notion of objectivity does not 
require us to have a conception of anything non-perspectival, and in fact relies on the 
sort of perspective-relative properties which make a reason a good one – we can feed 
this finding back into our thought about the paradigm case: scientific enquiry. Feeding 
the thought about the content of ethical objectivity back into thought about our 
scientific practices allows us to see that in talking of the objective, we cannot be 
talking of anything practice-independent; rather, we are talking of the accountability 
which occupying a reasonable role allows. All of which allows that we can hold onto 
the notion of something independent of any one perspective, but that we need not do so 
by talking about that something as being intrinsically anormative.
 
3.31 Interlude
The point so far is this: that the idea of a world already there guiding our practices, if it  
is anormative, viz. if it is the  practice-independent way the world is, is unintelligible:  
it engenders a scientism which is a version of the myth of the given, or a conception of 
rules which contain the criteria for their own application. Sacks, in wanting a 
transcendental constraint to adjudicate transcendental features, makes just this sort of 
mistake, because the only thing that would necessitate a transcendental constraint is an 
anormative world which stands in need of the correct interpretation. Such a world is a 
world externally related to scheme – as we have seen, picturing the world in this way, 
leads to the problems afflicting transcendental idealism .
 
To set the scene for the claims of the next chapter I want briefly to follow up the above 
dialectic by showing a particular way in which one could seem to hold on to the 
thought expressed by McDowell and yet still tacitly admit a problematic scheme-
content picture.
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3.32 Rorty's Explanation of Why the World is Not Already There in a Way Which 
Guides Our Practices
 
Part of the motivation for Williams' arguments for our conception of the world having 
to be a conception of an absolute source of objectivity was a dissatisfaction with a 
family of philosophical pictures exemplified by that espoused by Richard Rorty in 
such statements as this:
It is less paradoxical . . . to stick to the classic notion of “better describing what was 
already there” for physics. This is not because of deep epistemological or metaphysical 
considerations, but simply because, when we tell our Whiggish stories about how our 
ancestors gradually crawled up the mountain on whose (possibly false) summit we 
stand, we need to keep some things constant throughout the story.
(1980; 344–345 )
 
Williams claimed that Rorty's position is self defeating: it makes claims about the 
contingency of describing the world as if it is “already there” (1985; 137) but it cannot 
do so if “it is not going to assume an already existing physical world in which human 
beings come into existence and develop their cultures” (ibid) and further that in 
denying such a world as Physics describes as 'already there' Rorty is,
...trying to reoccupy the transcendental standpoint outside human speech and activity, 
which is precisely what he wants us to renounce. (op. cit.; 137). 
McDowell's rejoinder on Rorty's behalf was that Williams was invoking the myth of 
the given, because of his
 
pictur[ing of] science as a mode of inquiry in which the facts can directly imprint 
themselves on our minds, without need of mediation by anything as historically 
conditioned and open to dispute as canons of good and bad scientific argument. [Which] 
embodies a philosophical fantasy of truth, and of science as an approach to truth. The 
point about causation makes no difference to this: it would be an illusion to suppose that 
when a body of belief is such as to warrant a causal gloss on the idea of the facts 
impressing themselves on us, it thereby contrives to prise itself apart from the province 
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of reason. (1986; 380)
 
McDowell thus concluded that when confronted with a philosopher who tries to cast 
off scheme content dichotomies Williams errs by refusing to hear them saying anything 
except “Even in science, there is no content, only scheme.”.(op. cit.; 381)
 
I now want to show that McDowell's criticism of Williams does not vindicate Rorty, 
for either Rorty does indeed require more of the anormative world than it can give, or 
he is forced to endorse a scheme-content picture upon which “Even in science, there is 
no content, only scheme”(ibid). Evidently Rorty does not do so explicitly – this is 
something he explicitly rejects. The claim I want to make is more subtle: it is that the 
possibility of Rorty's articulation of his claim that there is no world already there relies 
upon a set of philosophical assumptions which are antithetical to that claim.
 
In Pragmatism and Romanticism Rorty makes this claim,
 
[T]here is no difference between the thermostat, the dog and the pre-linguistic infant 
except the differing degrees of complexity of their reactions to environmental stimuli. 
The brutes and the infants are capable of discriminative responses, but not of acquiring 
information. For there is no such thing as the acquisition of information until there is a 
language in which to formulate that information. Information came into the universe 
when the first hominids began to justify their actions to one another by making 
assertions and backing up those assertions with further assertions. There is information 
only where there is inferential justification. (2007; 113)
 
On such a picture there is the by now familiar assumption that something normatively 
bereft becomes something normatively imbued only by being set amidst an already 
extant normative context. Mere sentience becomes sapience when parts of the causal 
realm are used in practices of justification by a community of language users. 
To make sense of how we move from the mere differences in discriminative faculties 
to differences represented as differences which bear upon one another within in an 
informational structure, Rorty is moved to introduce the Imagination as a faculty which 
imbues the raw causal data with normativity. Thus, he claims further that,
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 ...the imagination is the source of freedom because it is the source of language. ... It is 
not that we first spoke a language that simply reported what was going on around us, 
and later enlarged this language by imaginative re-description. Rather, imaginativeness 
goes all the way back. The concepts of redness and roundness are as much imaginative 
creations as those of God, of the positron, and of constitutional democracy. Getting the 
word 'red' into circulation was on a par with Newton's persuading people to start using 
the term 'gravity'. For nobody knew what redness was before some early hominids began 
talking about the differences in colours of things... (op. cit.; 114)
 
That is, the imagination is the means by which parts of the causal order are represented 
as having salient relationships with one another by agents who can already use a means 
of representation. If we grant this thought for a moment we can see, through the sort of 
Steiner-esque move discussed in chapter 2, how such a faculty is thought to work: we 
take the imagination to be introducing a candidate claim for a particular relation 
between parts of the causal order through a sort of contentless doing, then 
pragmatically explain the informational systems that we do end up using as the end-
product of a process of natural selection.
 
I think there is something right in the thought that imagination goes “all the way back” 
(ibid); namely, that there is no hope in looking for a level of concept use at which there 
is a semantic fixity determined only by the way the world is, and no sense to the idea 
of providing an ontogenetic account of our capacity to make novel use of concepts. 
The problem is that pairing this picture with the idea of an opposed anormative realm 
leaves us with a version of the idea that there is a way in which the world is in itself 
which we either cannot get to, or which tells us how it is.
What I am intending to say, then, is that Rorty fails in the same way as Steiner's 
Wittgenstein did: if we wanted to maintain an account such as Rorty's, we would have 
to make sense of the role of the imagination's propensity to produce norms for non-
canonical cases. Whatever fulfilled the role would have to do the job of yielding the 
initial content needed in order that there can be candidates for a Steiner-esque 
selection. Prima facie, there are, given an anormative/normative distinction, two modes 
by which to do so: creation and discovery. That is, the faculty must either be – in some 
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quite radical sense - the source of the content, or it must afford a special ability to 
model the way things could be; the imagination must either provide rules which are 
binding prior to their application or the structure of the information provided by the 
anormative world must guide our normative imaginings.
 
As I have stressed in relation to various other similar claims, pointing to these 
undesirable features does not rely upon requiring Rorty's claims about conceptual 
dependency to provide an ontogenetic account, nor does it involve contesting the claim 
that a normative context is required for demonstrative definition; rather, it points to an 
internal incoherence in Rorty's manner of showing that the imagination (construed as 
providing a normative context) and imaginativeness go all the way back (ibid) (in the 
sense of being conceptually prior to parts of the anormative world becoming 
intelligible as falling under some particular novel concept).
 
The idea is simply that the imagination cannot provide us with such a normative 
context because to make sense of it doing so would require the intelligibility of a 
picture of mind and world as, respectively, embodying the normative and the 
anormative, and such a picture  creates a demand (in much the same way as Steiner's 
treatment of Wittgenstein did (cf. 2.54)) for an ontogenetic account of the transition 
from anomative to normative which could never be given. None of which is to say that 
if there already is a normative context, it is not useful to describe the extension of such 
a context by reference to the imagination.
 
To show more clearly why thinking of the imagination as playing the role of extending 
our normative context is problematic I now want to attend to the aforementioned split 
in the ways in which we might conceive the imagination picking out structure from the 
causal order once it is placed within a normative context. The key problem with both is 
that the anormative environment must cause us to have beliefs which are then justified, 
or not, by holding a place within the already normative field of what we do; but for 
such a picture to work our normative context would have to already apply to the 
information given by our causal relation to the world, or the causal information would 
have to be already normatively structured.
On the one hand, if the imagination is a mode of discovery, it requires in us a special 
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ability to model the way things could be. If this is so an account of how we have the 
materials with which to do the appropriate sort of modelling is vital. Here, if we are 
holding tight to the image of the pre- and non-linguistic as dispositional in the merely 
causal sense, we again have two options. Either we acquire the materials by way of 
some privileged access to the way things are (which is to beg the question by assuming 
what the imagination is meant to enable access to, or, at the very least, to render the 
role of the imagination redundant), or we posit something like the metaphysical 
isomorphism of the metaphysically-read-Tractatus in order to guarantee our command 
of some possible ways the world could be, with which to construct complexes which 
we could then test.
 
On the other hand, if the imagination creates in some sense which does not commit us 
to a problematic idealism, it must be in a sense which allows for the creation to be 
made out of the structured information given to us in experience. Thus the question 
'how did the hominids ever recognise the relevant differences among colours in the 
first place?' would have to be answered by saying that the differences were not relevant 
until we endowed the differences with a role in things that we do. Yet this now seems 
to collapse into either:
• an incoherent conventionalism upon which differences are not really 
differences in the world, but only in our scheme; 
• or the discovery picture, upon which we pick and choose parts of the 
causal order which already are appropriately related and either show us so, or we 
have an ability to imagine that they are so prior to any normative engagement 
with such parts of the empirical world.
 
In summary, the troubling thought amounts to this: even if the experience elicited by 
environmental stimuli is the end of a merely causal process, if, for instance, 'red' things 
were to show up in experience as differentiated from the rest of the environment in 
such a way as to be picked out as such, there must have been information present in 
experience sufficient to relate what is presently experienced to an array of other 
possible experiences, otherwise we could not make sense of the information being 
placeable within the normative context we provide (this would be an instance of the 
modal myth of the given cf. 1.51). So the relations inherent in the beliefs we are merely 
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caused to have looks to be already informational in Rorty's richly normative sense: if 
one has an implicit command of the modal relations one experience bears to others, 
then one already has at one's disposal the reasons one would give if being held 
accountable for one's actions. 
Thus, at best, Rorty's mode of making sense of the idea of our relation to the world 
tends towards accepting a disingenuous version of transcendental idealism:24 a version 
on which we take the world to be an anormative substance which we can only bring 
into view in virtue of normative activity, whilst being debarred from any useful notion 
of either the applicability of the norms which bring the world into view because we 
cannot get outside of meaningful activity in order to describe them, or the substance 
itself.
At worst Rorty is claiming both that the world provides us with only anormative 
information and allowing that that information is present to us in an already normative 
way. In which case he offends against the myth of the given.
McDowell's rejoinder to Williams on Rorty's behalf was that Williams had erred by 
refusing to hear those who did not subscribe to the idea of science aiming at absolute 
objectivity as “saying anything except 'Even in science, there is no content, only 
scheme'.” (1986; 301) In seeing the matter like this, we can make a fortified version of 
Williams' criticism of Rorty. In either case, Williams' take on Rorty as McDowell 
scathingly casts it is correct: 
• In the best case, for Rorty the role of science is constrained to the description of 
relations internal to our conceptual sphere, where our conceptual sphere is 
opposed to the realm of the merely causal. 
• In the worst case for Rorty the causal world is infused with an intrinsic 
normativity that Rorty would like to be available only to concept users.
 
24  Kant actually takes a much more radical view towards causality than Rorty takes up; a view upon 
which causality is a normative part of our practices. I think Kant is right to do so, and it is thus a 
mistake to characterise the causal in opposition to the normative, anyway. I bring this out in 5-5.2.
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3.33   A World Problematically Already There 
We have seen that on Rorty's picture a path is carved between the given and 
conventionalism only by implicitly invoking an equally mysterious Kantian picture: a 
picture upon which there is a world which plays no role in our inferential lives apart 
from a merely causal one. Such a picture requires a notion of an anormative world 
which is incompatible with the sort of view of the world as made up of intensional 
objects that we found McGinn's reading of the Tractatus to exposit, and it requires 
such a notion in order to articulate the view of our reference to the world being limited 
to just those sorts of intensional objects (cf. the quotations of McGinn featured at p.51; 
p.105). Thus Rorty tacitly retains a scheme-world dualism between norms and the 
merely empirical world, but collapses scheme-experience dualism and in so doing 
gives the impression of rejecting scheme-content dualisms (cf. p.30 for my use of the 
scheme-world/scheme-experience distinction drawn by Child (1994)).
Williams' criticism of Rorty now seems quite sensible: Rorty does indeed privilege 
scheme at the expense of content, and to do so tacitly requires an illicit 'world already 
there'. 
 
Rorty's rejoinder would here be, I think, that the criticism I am making both gets him 
wrong, and worse, does so by pushing beyond the bounds of sense in a way he is trying 
to warn against. Rorty would claim that his aim is not to show that there is no such 
thing as objectivity, but rather that there is no conceptual unity to our use of 
'objectivity'; that treating our uses as if they are conceptually unified is to impose upon 
them a generality which can only be gained by abstracting the notions from the 
concrete circumstances which lend them sense. 
Rorty's reply would then be that I have missed this nuance and taken him to be 
engaged in a substantive dispute with Williams, when there is in fact no substantive 
dispute to be had, and that there is no substantive dispute is his original point. My 
objection, however, is not to this meta-philosophical thread in Rorty's thought; rather, 
the objection is to the expression of that meta-philosophical thread. 
 
My objection is aimed at the incoherence of justifying a picture of a lack of conceptual 
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unity by appeal to a picture of mind and world as externally related realms of inference 
and cause in order to show that, there can be no extra-normative determinates of sense 
(which I agree there cannot be). Thus, my claim is simply that Rorty does not take his 
metaphilosophical thought sufficiently well to heart. He forwards a metaphysical 
picture which problematises any relation between norms and the world, and because of 
this remains in the same philosophical game as Williams and thus vulnerable to 
Williams' criticisms. 
Furthermore, Williams justly criticised Rorty's position: it does rely upon illicit  
theorising about the relation between mind and world. Generalising an objection of the 
form of Williams' to Rorty will be the purpose of the next chapter; showing that if one 
gets involved in the project of explaining why concepts like 'objectivity' have no unity 
by describing norms and the world as modally free relata, then one buys back into the 
very problematic one is seeking to avoid. 
3.4 Some Links to the Next Chapter
If we attend to the notion of grammar being used in the following long section of 
Philosophical Investigations (496-500), we find a very different sort of notion of the 
relation of normativity to the world to that which Rorty espouses. A notion which has 
no space for an external relation between norms and the parts of the world to which 
they apply, and that has no such space for the sorts of reasons which were brought out 
in opposition to Steiner's views of grammar. Grammar is related to a particular notion 
of arbitrariness: an idea of the world and language already affording us a normative 
structure which we can take or leave.
Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its 
purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and 
in no way explains the use of signs.
The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary", if that is to mean that the aim of the 
grammar is nothing but that of the language. If someone says "If our language had not 
this grammar, it could not
express these facts"—it should be asked what "could" means here.
When I say that the orders "Bring me sugar" and "Bring me milk" make sense, but not 
the combination "Milk me sugar", that does not mean that the utterance of this 
combination of words has no effect. And if its effect is that the other person stares at me 
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and gapes, I don't on that account call it the order to stare and gape, even if that was 
precisely the effect that I wanted to produce.
To say "This combination of words makes no sense" excludes it from the sphere of 
language and thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it 
may be for various kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or 
otherwise, the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may also 
be part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may 
shew where the property of one man ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I 
draw a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for.
When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a 
combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation.
 
To appreciate the difference between Wittgenstein's position and the positions of those 
like Rorty, we need to ask how description is being opposed to explanation in PI 496. 
One way of opposing explanation and description is this: to describe is adequately to 
represent a state of affairs, to explain is to give some species of reason why things are 
or are not, or could or could not be, or should or should not be.
 
This, however, is not a sharp distinction: such descriptions as feature in the above 
characterisation can sometimes serve equally well as explanations, and explanations 
can sometimes be the best way to describe a state of affairs. For instance, if asked how 
I navigated a strong current of the river Trent using only a coracle and a stick, it is hard 
to imagine a better explanation than a rich description of the techniques I deployed in 
order to do so; likewise if my audience still failed to see how this made my survival 
possible an explanation of how the techniques I deployed helped would serve only to 
better represent the states of affairs I encountered.
 
I am not pointing to this bluntness of this distinction between explanation and 
description in order to point at a problem; rather, I am pointing to these uses of 
description and explanation in order to show that they are not Wittgenstein's. For 
description in the sense in which it is interchangeable with explanation, is hypothetical  
– possibly true or possibly false – and Wittgenstein is quite clear that,
 
There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with 
all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its 
light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, 
not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our 
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language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of 
an urge to misunderstand them. (PI 109)
 
I will leave further explicating the issues surrounding why there should be nothing 
hypothetical in philosophy, and the impulse behind the urge to misunderstand, until the 
next chapter. Presently, I just want to bring out the sense of 'description' which 
Wittgenstein is operating with here. I am doing so because clarifying Wittgenstein's 
notion here is going to be of great help to making perspicuous how to think of objects 
playing a role in our grammar.
 
How, then, are there descriptions which are not statements which could be true or 
false? Kuusela points to a difference in the use of the word 'description' present when 
we are using rules to do the describing,
 
I may define a unit of measurement, let us call it a "unit," by picking up a stick from the 
ground and saying, "this is one unit long." By doing this I am stating a rule that 
determines what it is to be one unit long and defining this particular stick as a standard 
of the length of one unit. However, it is important to note that with this definition I am 
not giving a correct or incorrect description or making a true/false statement about 
anything, in particular the length of the stick. This comes to light in that had I picked up 
another stick with a different length and defined it as one "unit," I would not have made 
a mistake or said something false but merely defined "unit" differently. (2008; 113)
 
The idea coming to the fore here is one that I introduced at the end of the last chapter 
(2.5-2.6), and will make much much of in the next chapter; it is that when we describe 
a way of going on by using a rule to stipulate what counts as going on in a certain way, 
'description' is here being used in the same sort of way as when  “defining rules for a 
calculus, or stating rules that constitute a calculus, I describe a system for the use of 
signs” or when “stating rules for a game, I describe a game.” (Kuusela 2008; 115). 
Such descriptions, in the same way as the description of the 'unit', above, are not being 
used to make truth-apt statements.25 They are selections of criteria made from an 
already established logical space – not comparisons to such sections.
 
25 At least not in the context in which they are being used to describe a way of going on; matters are 
however sensitive in this area and require more careful treatment (cf. 4..23-4.3).
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The point I am bringing out here is that the rules being given by such stipulative 
descriptions are descriptive inasmuch as they are constitutive of a way of doing things 
– of particular language games –,  or constitutive of a model of a way of doing things, 
and that attending to this sort of distinction affords a way to distinguish between a 
sense of description which is truth-apt and a sense of description which is not. Further, 
such descriptions serve to outline practices within which truth-apt judgements make 
sense.
We can further elaborate upon the last paragraph by relating it to internal and external 
relations. When the metre stick is chosen as a standard, and the activity one might do 
with it is described by way of a demonstration, a strong internal relation is established 
between this description and its object. It is a strong internal relation inasmuch as 
“what is described does not exist independently of the description” that is, here, that 
the object 'the metre stick' only exists as a metre stick, and can only be identified as 
such and feature in truth-apt descriptions of it insofar as we are in accordance with the 
rule we used it to inaugurate.
 
Returning now to the paragraph I quoted earlier (1.1; p. 16), I now want to add to the 
claim I made there that examining this difference in uses of ‘description', then, further 
elucidates the sense in which Wittgenstein,
 
...should like to say, if there were only an external connection no connection could be 
described at all, since we only describe the external connection by means of the internal 
one. If this is lacking, we lose the footing we need for describing anything at all – just as 
we can't shift anything with our hands unless our feet are planted firmly. (PR 66)
 
Such elucidation requires, as I have stressed in relation to Rorty, a sense of ‘internal 
connection' which does not equate internal connections with normative connections if 
normative connections are thought of as being - in opposition to causal connections - 
merely conceptual (qua part of a normative scheme which is externally related to the 
empirical world). For such a picture has built into it a scheme-content dichotomy: there 
is a world of anormative stuff which is structured by, or has its structure reflected by, 
concepts which are articulable by way of internal-qua-merely-conceptual connections. 
My claim is that this is a move that ought not be allowed sense: the ultimate 
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requirement of such a picture is that the internal connections consist in either the 
empirically groundless conventions of the describers, or in a relation to some 
intangibly transcendental essence. Either way, a pernicious scheme-content dichotomy 
is instantiated.
 
The sense of an ‘internal connection' which is required, then, is one upon which 
internal connections represent an unproblematic relation to an already normatively 
structured bedrock which we and the world embody together: our feet are firmly 
planted inasmuch as there is no possibility of going deeper, but the fixity of our feet in 
no way dictates an essential way of using concepts. In explicating the firmness of ones 
feet, then, I think we are likewise explicating a way of language use being arbitrary 
which avoids both relativism and the transcendence of the Kantian picture.
3.41 A Link back to Chapter 2 and on to Chapter 4: Arbitrariness and Criteria
It is worth reminding ourselves here that the aim of the thesis is to find a way to allay 
the urge to explain how normative force and normative authority relate. The effort to 
meet this aim is bipartite: 
• First, showing that either explaining the relation between norms and the 
empirical world in the manner of the transcendental idealist, or explaining why 
there is no need to explain such a relation by adjusting the transcendental  
idealist picture (as Rorty did (cf. 3.33)), is self undermining.
• Secondly, showing that we have to make no such explanations or modifications 
of explanations if we allow: that the world already has a normative structure; 
that accountability is always internal to logical spaces; and, that novel uses of 
that structure do not stand in need of criteria for correctness. (And that these 
claims all come together).
In this chapter I have been unpacking the first part by showing how different efforts to 
move away from the Kantian picture merely serve to reinstate its problems. Opposing 
the later Wittgenstein's idea of grammar to the sorts of pictures of our systems of 
norms which we have seen in this chapter – systems of norms which could not relate to 
the world unproblematically because of the structural features they share with the 
transcendental idealist – makes a start towards filling out the constituents of the second 
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of the above parts, and also of relating the two parts.
The distinction between the two senses of 'description' I have been outlining affords us 
a different way of thinking of arbitrariness to that of Rorty and Sacks; it also affords us 
a way of thinking of the prerequisites of sense such that they are not determinate or 
ineffable. The distinction affords these ways of thinking because through stipulative 
description an already normative item is taken up for a different use (so there is no 
movement from the anormative to the normative), and, crucially, there is no criteria for  
correctness for which items we choose to take up or how we take them up (so there is 
nothing predetermined).
We can see this different conception in Wittgenstein's ‘milk me sugar' example, which 
is given straight after the remarks about description and arbitrariness which are quoted 
at the beginning of the previous section:
When I say that the orders "Bring me sugar" and "Bring me milk" make sense, but not 
the combination "Milk me sugar", that does not mean that the utterance of this 
combination of words has no effect. And if its effect is that the other person stares at me 
and gapes, I don't on that account call it the order to stare and gape, even if that was 
precisely the effect that I wanted to produce. (PI 498)
One point here is that the reaction elicited by “milk me sugar” may well serve as the 
basis for a novel and useful part of language – we can, for instance, imagine it being 
exclaimed to lament the ills of an addiction to putting too much sugar in one's tea 
milking the life out of one; or we can imagine the confusion it invokes being used as 
part of a lesson in grammar. This is not, though, in the manner of  Rorty, to bring 
something anormative into the sphere of reasons (which is not to say that Rorty would 
not endorse this open-ended feature of language, it is just to say he is not seeing its 
significance aright), for whatever reaction is elicited by the novel phrase is parasitic 
upon there already being an established use, and that use already having a place within 
a particular empirical and normative practice.
Saying “milk me sugar” is then, in the manner expressed in PI 498, not necessarily  
senseless; rather, if it is senseless it is so because its possibility is currently excluded, 
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and to bring it into circulation would be to use the pre-existing modes of use to do 
something new with language. Issues arise here which will usefully be followed 
through in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The Problem With Either Explaining, or Explaining Why One Cannot 
Explain, the Relation Between Normative Force and Normative Authority
We have seen a motivating purpose for the Kantian transcendental idealist picture to be 
the justification of the the thought that the empirical world as internally related to our 
conceptual scheme: the existence of our categorical concepts is taken to be an essential 
prerequisite of there being things to experience and speak of. 
In the the previous chapter, I rehearsed this now familiar point: the transcendental 
idealist project ultimately “falls foul of its own strictures” (Glock 1997; 296). The 
overarching purpose of showing this was to provide a way to start talking about the 
inescapability of variants of this particular problem for the transcendental idealist's  
extended family (this extended family being comprised of philosophers who continue 
to illicitly draw bounds to sense in one way and another (for a brief summary cf. 
Introduction, 1.31-1.33)). The problem is inescapable because a common feature the 
members of this family share is that of a conception of the relation between norms and 
the empirical world which allows a problematic degree of modal freedom (I have so 
far situated Rorty, Steiner, and Sacks in this family). 
The particular way transcendental idealism thus conceived  “falls foul of its own 
strictures” (ibid) is that the picture of mind and world required in order to articulate the 
idea of mind constraining, or organizing, what we can take the world to be, in turn 
requires acceptance of the very sort of relation which it was the raison d'être of this 
picture to avoid. At the deepest level of the Kantian picture is an external  relation  
between some unconceptualised stuff – substance - and the means of its 
conceptualisation – the categories (cf. 5-5.2). Description of such a relation commits 
one to thinking of the existence of unconceptualised stuff, and the existence of the 
prerequisites of bringing this stuff into view – the categories and substance – as 
intelligible independently of one another (cf. 1.31-1.33 ). Such thoughts are, however, 
empty: the sense of such thoughts is unaccountable for by recourse to the sort of 
internal relation which it was hoped would allow us to make sense of how our norms 
connect with their criteria. There is, then, a clear sense in which, so conceived, the 
antithesis of Kant's schema plays an essential role in its thesis.
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We can add further articulation to the problem in question by describing the Kantian 
transcendental idealist's move as a sort of gerrymandering which shifts the domain of 
the intentional objects which we wish to account for our ability to talk of. A problem is 
(or problems are) caused by a picture of mind and substance as externally related. The 
transcendental idealist solution is to posit that the external relation of mind and world 
produces an internal relation. On such a picture, the form of the empirical world is the 
product of the categories constraining, or organizing, substance, thus the form of the 
empirical world depends upon whatever does the constraining or organising. Through 
this manoeuvre, the target of intentionality is shifted from substance to the 
transcendentally ideal, yet empirically real, empirical world. (We will pay closer 
attention to this move in chapter 5).
An important point in the dialectic summarised above, which will now motivate this 
chapter, is that although Kant's problem was prima facie a metaphysical one, this 
appearance was only one particular guise of a deeper problem. My strategy has been to 
get to grips with such problems through attention to the relatively similar problems 
faced by the early Wittgenstein. That there is a deeper problem at play becomes 
apparent if we once again turn our attention to the difference between the metaphysical 
and the elucidatory readings of the Tractatus. For, although, on an elucidatory reading, 
it was possible to re-conceive the Tractatus as making no claim about anything but 
language use and its logical prerequisites, a prerequisite of telling the elucidatory story 
was a commitment to the “crystalline purity of Logic” (PI 107-108)26 – viz. to 
language language possessing a particular essence –   it turned out this was merely to 
replace talk of one sort of prerequisite which cannot be talked of intelligibly with 
another prerequisite afflicted by the same problem. 
The problem which I am claiming to be manifest under different guises can now be put 
into the form of a dilemma. If we attempt to secure an internal relation between 
normative force and normative authority by explaining how they are so related, then 
we either, on the one hand, we presume a further external relation or weak internal 
relation in order to explain the relation between grammar and the world, and in so 
doing  merely push back the problem at hand; or, on the other hand, we presume a 
26 Wittgenstein uses this phrase to refer to the picture of sense as essentially determinate which is 
operative in the Tractatus.
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deeper internal relation of the same kind as we are interested in establishing, in order 
to underwrite the relation between grammar and the world, and in so doing render the 
transcendental move superfluous. 
The above dilemma, I want to suggest, is a pernicious methodological trap: accounts 
which seem to give us an explanation of how they have excised external explanations 
of mind and world, are in fact buying back into the same problematic under a deeper 
guise or leaving it untouched.
Once we have clarified this problem, then, we need to turn to how to avoid this trap. It 
may seem like adopting an extreme quietism is the only option left, because making 
any claim regarding the relation between norms and their empirical criteria, even the 
claim that the two cannot be modally free of one another, requires talking of norms and 
the world as independently intelligible things.27 
I intend to argue that extreme quietism is not the only option. The sort of view 
expressed in the previous paragraph depends upon retaining parts of the transcendental 
idealist picture according to  which the prerequisites of sense are determinate and so 
ineffable, and also intrinsically normative. 
We can, then, make a methodological shift which frees us of being trapped between 
senselessness and silence by following the later Wittgenstein in a thoroughgoing 
rejection of the determinacy of sense whilst retaining a form of the saying/showing 
distinction which is present in the Tractatus. Doing so enables us to escape the clutches 
of transcendental idealism without justifying doing so with a further metaphysical 
picture.
In making the move away from determinacy we will see that all the explaining we 
need to do with regard to what something means is to give a description of its 
normative context  (of the logical space which it inhabits). Considering such 
descriptions shows that any explanations which appeal to some determinate beyond 
such a logical space, or anything intrinsically normative (something within that logical 
27 Cf . The criticism Williams made of Rorty (3.2-3.33), also Cassam (1986 ) clearly expresses this 
view.
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space which is determinate despite any relations within that space), are superfluous in 
the same manner as for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus,
‘Laws of inference', which are supposed to justify inferences, as in the works of Frege 
and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfluous. (TLP 5.132)
The thought here (which will be expanded upon in 4.11-4.3) is that substantive logical 
relations are superfluous if reified into things externally related to propositions because 
a prerequisite of the possibility of any one proposition is its internal relation to all other 
propositions, and the laws of inference are already expressed by these internal 
relations; that is, logical relations are shown by internal relations.
What undermined this claim of Wittgenstein's, as we saw in the last chapter, was the 
substantive basis he invoked in order to show that there must be one unified set of 
simples and thus, one logical space constituted by internal relations between simples – 
the determinate form of language. 
The challenge of this chapter, then, is to show that we can retain the idea of a logical 
space, and the thought that there is no need to appeal to anything external to a 
particular logical space, in order to describe the accountability of normative role 
players within that space to each other. Furthermore, a further challenge is to show we 
can do so without committing ourselves to dogmatic claims about the prerequisites of 
sense. I will suggest that in order to meet these aims we must put models of what we 
do with language created by stipulating their substantive prerequisites to work in order 
to talk about how we do use concepts (cf. 4.3). 
Further, I will suggest that it is because one must use seemingly substantive language 
games to discuss relations of accountability within a logical space that one is easily 
fooled into thinking that one has principled reasons for eschewing external explanation 
– that one has identified a level of meaning at which things simply display their 
intrinsic normative status. In being seduced into such a thought – that there is a level at 
which normative relations are determinate and require no interpretation – one 
reinstates a scheme-content dichotomy in the same way as the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus did. It is herein that the perniciousness of scheme-content dichotomies lies.
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Thus, in sum, I want to make a distinction between two ways of proceeding. We will 
henceforth call philosophical pictures which straight forwardly talk of norms and the 
world as independently intelligible things external explanations, and distinguish the 
following two responses to external explanations:
• Eschewing external explanation upon principled grounds. 
• Eschewing the idea that we can provide principled grounds for eschewing 
external explanation;28 and avoiding external explanation by showing its 
problematic nature by using seemingly substantive languages.
I want to show the first method to be self undermining. The manner I adopt of showing 
the first method to be self undermining will serve, in turn, as an example of the second 
method.
I will term the practice of deploying seemingly substantive languages a mythological  
method. I name it so because to use such seemingly substantive languages one must 
treat a particular logical space as if it is intrinsically normative in a sui generis way; 
that is one must act as if one is accepting into one's account instances of the myth of  
the Given. 
Thus the name 'mythological method' is intended as a mnemonic; a way of keeping 
present to mind that such languages only seem to be substantive because they are 
stipulated into existence in order to model our use of concepts. (A mnemonic to help us 
to avoid the circle of confusions sketched on p.11).
4.1 An Example: Diamond's Treatment of Kripke
An example of the sort of strategy I characterised above can be found in the 
background argument to Cora Diamond's recent criticism of Kripke's view of the 
nature of the normative authorities which enable practices like measurement. Diamond 
summarises the import of her argument as follows:
28 And  doing so because any such explanation reinstates an analogue of the problem with external 
explanation in the manner which looked to lead to quietism, (cf. above).
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If [...] we suggest, as Kripke does, that how long something is is determined, 
not by comparison with the rod in Paris, but by comparison with the length 
which it had at a particular time, it is now much less clear what language game 
is being played. How am I to compare some objects I now want to measure 
with the length the rod in paris had 5 years ago? My point is not that there is 
no way to answer the question […] The point is rather that […] talk of a length 
used as a standard […] hangs in the air unless there is some context, either one 
that actually exists or one we can imagine, in which we can see what it is to 
count as making comparisons with the standard length. (Diamond 2001; 105)
The thought here is that without a normative context, a standard of measurement 
cannot exert the normative force which would allow us to make sense of it playing the 
role of a normative authority. The argument for Kripke's criterion for metrehood being 
unable to exert normative force targets an underlying assumption, or way of construing 
the object of investigation, which is structuring Kripke's investigation in such a way as 
to render the object of investigation radically out of touch with the normative context 
(or practice) which allows it intelligibility. 
The assumption of Kripke's which is in question is that of a clear division between 
facts about meaning and facts about what we do with meaning, or, more generally, a 
clear division of facts pertaining to meaning in metaphysical and epistemological 
domains. Making this assumption compels one to think that the object of investigation 
– here, our concept of a metre – must be a normative authority which is externally 
related or weakly internally related to the normative contexts within which we use it.  
Making sense of such a relation requires that the normative authority is intelligible as 
such a potential normative authority independently of its occupation of a place within a 
normative context. If we take this last thought to be obviously true, we are in a position 
where the normative force of the normative authority within the normative context 
needs to be accounted for theoretically, and the independent intelligibility of the 
normative authority to us needs to be accounted for also.
If one loses sight of this motivation and takes Diamond to be engaging with Kripke 
upon grounds internal to such a philosophical picture as he assumes, it will seem 
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obviously right to think that there is no difference between Diamond and Kripke's 
thought which is neither a matter of comparing the relative merits of two theories of  
meaning, or merely verbal. 
What might seduce one into thinking that the dispute between Kripke and Diamond is 
upon common ground is that it seems that Kripke can maintain, with Diamond, that the 
idea of length does indeed depend upon there being a practice of measurement, whilst 
only differing in opinion about the theoretical description of how the normative 
authority for a particular concept has come to exert normative force upon applications 
of, or tools for the application of, this concept, within such a practice. 
What I want to elaborate throughout this chapter, then, is that Kripke can maintain that 
the idea of length depends upon there being a practice of measurement, but only in a 
deeply different way to Diamond. This will depend on two core points. 
• First, Diamond is striving to bring out a sense of dependence which falls out of 
there being no clear distinction between facts of meaning and what we do with 
facts of meaning. For Diamond it is a prerequisite of the possibility of 
measurement that the ongoing material practice of performing a particular sort of 
measurement and the concept of that particular sort of measurement are internally 
related. It is a prerequisite because if there were not this internal relation, we would 
have to provide some criteria external to the system of measurement which ensures 
all of the measurements within such a system are responsible to each other, and, as 
we have seen, once we picture meaning in this way we meet with the sorts 
problems which have been the subject of this thesis so far (for a summary cf. 1.31-
1.33).
• Secondly, the sense of dependence Kripke trades upon requires a clear distinction 
between what we do with facts of meaning, and facts of meaning already being in 
place. Kripke maintains that, once set by our practices, there is a determinate fact 
of meaning concerning what a metre is which is intelligible independently of how 
we go on to use the notion of a metre. Kripke dogmatically presumes that sense 
being given to a determinate criterion of correctness for the attribution of metre-
hood is contingently dependent upon our practices for its existence, but, once 
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existent, metaphysically independent of our normative practices. The tell-tale sign 
of this is that Kripke's criteria of correctness for concepts are intrinsically 
normative; they can reflexively exert normative force upon themselves.
In this manner Kripke does a disservice to the force of the rule-following 
considerations (cf 1.32): he bypasses rule-following problems, or at the very least least 
makes their problematic indeterminacy appear merely epistemological (in making it  
seem like it is just a problem about how we do in fact know about whatever stands as a 
normative authority in a given normative context), by smuggling in a philosophical 
picture upon which it must be the case that the facts of meaning are, once set, 
determinate.
To bring out the difference between Kripke and Diamond's approach I will show why 
Kripke is not  entitled to the sort of distinction between facts of meaning and facts 
about what we do with meaning that he requires. To do so I will draw on the way of 
reading the later Wittgenstein – namely, that offering a substantive solution to the same 
problem as Kant faced was not his project, which I sketched at the end of the last 
chapter. Wittgenstein, rather than engaging in the Kantian project, sought to resist the 
philosophical picture which motivated the Kantian problematic – a picture of the realm 
of the conceptual and the world to which it applies as bearing an internal relation to 
one another but only because of a prior external, or weakly internal, relation – by 
showing that there is no sense to thinking of concepts which are not embodied in an 
empirical situation.
Diamond, then, claims that the way Kripke is conceiving of a key part of any 
description or explanation of measurement (a standard of length) renders that standard 
of length superfluous in regard to the practice of actual measurement (in the sense of 
'superfluous' I drew from the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, above).The superfluity of 
the standard of length is missed because Kripke is taking for granted a philosophical 
picture upon which “a standard length can be defined completely in advance and 
independently of our engaging in some activity of carrying out comparisons of 
lengths” (Diamond 2001; 105); that is, a notion of length in conflict with the picture of 
the embeddedness of concepts within empirical situations we find in the later 
Wittgenstein's work. 
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Shortly, then, I will make much more of Kripke's sharp distinction between 
metaphysics and epistemology. We first, though, need to be more particular about how 
and why the word 'superfluous' ought to be used, so that we might be more clear about 
how the notion of superfluity  connects to the faulty view of concepts which is at the 
centre of the criticisms which Diamond aims at Kripke.
4.11   Superfluity and Super-Pictures 
The idea of superfluity is clearly an important one, so I will take some time to unpack 
it. For a neat illustration of superfluity consider this passage from David Egans' 
Pictures in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy:
Mental pictures can be as clear and unambiguous as the pictures that we encounter 
outside our heads, but no more: the aspiration for a super-picture is not just that it 
be clear enough for all practical purposes, but that it be superlatively clear, with no 
room for doubt or variance.
At PI §139, Wittgenstein asks how a mental picture of a cube might reflect an 
understanding of the word “cube.” Cubes are prisms, so a picture of a cube is 
equally a picture of a prism: the same picture could equally well be projected so 
that it connects with the word “prism.” At best, Wittgenstein says, the picture of a 
cube did “suggest a certain use to us” – suggest that we associate the picture with 
the word “cube” – “but it was also possible for me to use it differently.” For the 
picture not only to suggest a particular use but to compel it, we want the picture to 
contain instructions for its own application. But any such instructions must be 
applied along with the picture that contains them, so they cannot be the link that 
joins the picture to its application. (2011; 59-60)
The above passage describes our want to find 'super-pictures'29 – pictures which leave 
us no room for misinterpretation – in order to put an end to the need for an 
explanation. We are tempted to introduce super-pictures to settle what the facts of 
meaning are when it seems that, from our point of view, many facts of meaning could 
29 The term 'super-picture' is used by Wittgenstein in his Lectures on Religious Belief (c.1938) to 
describe the idea of mental pictures which need no 'method of projection' to be understood; that is 
they do not need to be, in the manner of a normal picture, connected with an application in order to 
be understood as a picture. In what follows I use the term in a more general way: to describe 
anything which is intrinsically normative and intimates to us that it is so.
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fit a state of affairs equally well.
The idea of a super-picture is, then, that of a picture which is intrinsically meaningful 
in an unambiguous way: there is a determinate fact of meaning concerning what it 
pictures. Furthermore, the super-picture intimates this determinate fact to us. Part of 
the point of Wittgenstein's consideration of super-pictures is, I take it, to show one that 
they are superfluous to any explanation of concept application because the very idea of 
a super-picture is the idea of a picture disconnected from an appropriate normative 
context. In a wider philosophical frame, Wittgenstein's considerations show that 
structuring an investigation around identification of the essential qualities of such 
superfluous entities is pernicious inasmuch as it is bound to lead one to make empty 
explanations.
Super-pictures are superfluous because they are imbued with the capacity to intimate 
their normative significance to us, and such a property is useless (aside from being 
incoherent in the same way as instances of the myth of the Given are). For, all that is 
useful about such pictures is already embodied in the normative relations they, as 
normal pictures, would bear to our practices and other things within our practices. This 
uselessness is a superfluity, then, because of the double articulation of the normative 
significance of such pictures: the normative significance is displayed by the picture 
holding a place within a normative context, and it is also thought to be, in some way, a 
property of the picture itself. In this way, one might come to think that things like 
pictures could be things like pictures independently of their use within a practice of 
picturing; one might then come to think of the normative significance of the picture as 
a reflexive property.
The idea of a super-picture can be used in the following dilemma which sums up the 
import of the thesis so far. If we think of meaningful things as being meaningful in 
virtue of an external, or weakly internal, relation between scheme and content we are 
either on the one hand, committed to there being a level of content which is anormative 
and thus end up imbuing our ways of going on with the problematic powers of the 
Kantian categories (i.e we privilege normative force), or on the other hand, we take 
things to be intrinsically normative (i.e. to offer us an absolute source of normative 
authority), in the sense that that thing is to be interpreted in a particular way and tells  
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us so. On this second horn we are thus left with super-pictures (which are superfluous). 
We find this idea of the normative inertness of theoretical entities which exhibit this 
sort of superfluity further developed at PI 374:
 
The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one 
couldn't do. As if there really were an object, from which I derive its description, but I 
were unable to shew it to anyone.
 
This quote comes from Wittgenstein's treatment of private languages. The point in 
context is that one ought not treat sensations as radically private objects which can 
still, despite their being hidden from public view, somehow serve as  normative 
authorities for descriptions of our inner lives. One ought not because sensations thus 
conceived are both necessarily removed from the normative context which allows 
something to exert normative force (this is the sense in which they are radically 
private), and are required to serve as a normative authority and so exert normative 
force.
The thought that any concept of sensation is incoherent if it is a concept of something 
radically private has a straight-forward external analogue: an idea of things-as-they-
are-in-themselves is incoherent if these are things which are both radically inaccessible 
and yet still set the standard of correctness for our outward ostendings. For, such a 
picture rests upon this analogous mistake: allowing that something which is incapable 
of exerting normative force can be an ultimate source of normative authority.
 
In making the above more general application of the form of the private language 
concerns clearer, then, I also want to make clearer that Wittgenstein does not want to, 
and does not have to, paint a picture upon which, if we were not limited by the 
resources we have with which to bring the world into view (our conceptual scheme), 
we could reveal the sorts of things which, upon a Kantian schema, we cannot (namely, 
things as they are in themselves).
 
We can avoid assimilating Wittgenstein's method of dealing with such concerns to 
Kant's method – and so maintain the usefulness of Wittgenstein's thought to meeting 
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the aims of the thesis –  by understanding that central to the private language argument 
is that private mental entities, such as sensations, cannot be sources of normative 
authority because of something like the following thought:
 
The concept of sensation is defined by our ordinary technique for talking about 
sensations, and, if we are to be justified in calling ‘S' a concept of sensation, it needs to 
be shown that ‘S' constitutes a technique of this kind. It is not enough that the private 
linguist assures us, on the basis of his act of introspection, that he is naming a sensation, 
for being a name of a sensation means being a concept of a certain kind, i.e. having a 
particular use or grammar. It is only by showing that ‘S' has the characteristic use of a 
sensation concept that we could justify calling ‘S' the name of a sensation. But given 
that the private linguist sets up the connection between name and object simply by 
turning his attention inwards and saying ‘S', there can be no question of justifying the 
claim that ‘S' names a sensation by reference to its possessing the distinctive use that 
characterizes our concepts of sensation. For it is part of the description of the example 
that ‘S' does not connect with our established techniques for talking about sensations. 
(McGinn 1997; 132)
 
That is, the sensation cannot be a normative authority, but not simply because there is 
no way to verify that, whatever the criterion for application of a concept is, it is the 
same over time, nor because of any other sense in which an external check upon it 
having an accessible criterion of identity happens to be lacking. Rather it cannot be a 
normative authority because sensations, thus conceived, are not the sort of thing which 
could exert normative force. They could not exert normative force because “there can 
be no question of justifying the claim that ‘S' names a sensation by reference to its 
possessing the distinctive use that characterizes our concepts of sensation” since “it is 
part of the description of the example that ‘S' does not connect with our established 
techniques for talking about sensations.” (ibid). The point is that the criterion qua 
private sensation cannot be checked, but this obstacle is no contingency (such as each 
of us possessing a private epistemological realm would be). Rather, under such a 
description the criterion thus conceived is, inasmuch as it “is part of the description” 
(ibid) that sensations are radically disconnected from the realm of normative force, 
essentially uncheckable.
 
In summary, then, the particular problem with sensations conceived of as essentially 
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inner and only contingently correlated to worldly phenomena is that sensations thus 
conceived could not be a candidate for serving as a criterion in the first place. They 
could not because, thus conceived, they are, when considered in isolation, normatively 
inert and so superfluous to explanation.
The problem here is not that ‘S' refers to something that is (can be) introspected, but that 
the private linguist tries to determine what ‘S' refers to by a bare act of introspection, i.e. 
by ‘concentrat[ing] my attention on the sensation—and so, as it were, point[ing] to it 
inwardly' (PI 258). (McGinn 1997; 131)
4.12 Differentiating   Ways of Going On and  Bedrock from Conventions and Super- 
pictures
I have been taking on some phraseology developed by Wittgenstein. I will now take on 
some more: his use of 'ways of going on' and 'bedrock'.30 Being clear about how, and 
why, I am using such phraseology of Wittgenstein's will help us to be clear about how I 
intend to meet the aims I set out in the introduction; namely, avoiding the problems the 
transcendental idealist responds to without re-instantiating those very problems. 
Wittgenstein uses such phrases to picture what we are doing when we use, and talk 
about, parts of language and things we do which, in some particular contexts, it makes 
no sense to treat as being correct or incorrect because, in those contexts, they support 
the possibility of such judgements. Making sense of such phraseology of 
Wittgenstein's, then, will, if possible, help us to make sense of, and of how we can talk 
of, the sorts of relations between the notions of arbitrariness, autonomy, justification, 
and internal relations which I sketched at 2.4-2.6. So, to be clear, we are not engaging 
in exegetical matters here for their own sake, but rather, in order to maintain and 
display the usefulness of such uses of these phrases in helping us to avoid the 
transcendental idealist picture.
I have just been criticising the view that things can be intrinsically normative in a 
determinate way; and, as part of the dilemma detailed above (p.142), I paired this view 
30 For ways of going on cf. n.19 . I have not yet used 'bedrock' as Wittgenstein's term of art but I now 
will. The term 'bedrock' appears in PI 217 as designating the place in a series of justifications which, 
when reached, does not stand in need of further justification.
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with the sort of view we found in Rorty (3.32-3.33): that our practices bring 
normativity to the anormative world. The broader frame within which these criticisms 
fall includes an explication of the ills of any project which seeks to explain how 
normativity features in our lives by attributing the possibility of the exertion of 
normative force to the existence of some particular (or, as I have been metaphorically 
putting it, to an added ingredient). Both sides of the aforementioned dilemma 
constitute ways of thinking of normativity arising in situations which are anormative 
by way of adding some ingredient; this way of thinking, in the way drawn out in 
chapters 1 and 2, and in the precious section, disconnects normative authority and 
normative force.
As a precursor to appreciation of the depth of Diamond's criticism of Kripke, I now 
want to carve out a way of using terms like ways of going on, and bedrock by making 
clear that using them in the way I advise does not place one within the above dilemma 
(p.142). To do so, given my contention that normativity is not an 'added ingredient', I 
evidently need to avoid interpreting these terms in either of these ways:
• 'Ways of going on' is a term which designates a way of acting which makes 
stuff, which would otherwise be anormative, normative.
•  'Bedrock'  is a term used to designate a level of intrinsic normativity.
Such a position as I endorse, however, also needs to be carefully delineated from the 
erroneous thought that, because it makes no sense to talk of norms as if they were 
underwritten by a relation to an intrinsically normative substantive or underwritten 
only by an appeal to what we do, we ought not to talk of bedrock levels of normativity, 
or basic ways of going on, at all. 
To allow us to avoid both of the forgoing pitfalls we must not treat terms such as 'way 
of going on' and 'bedrock' as only playing a useful role within our talk of what we do 
with language if they serve to point towards some particular which would feature in an 
explanation of the connection between normative force and normative authority (that is 
to norms which provide their own criteria for application or to intrinsically normative 
parts of the world, respectively), and ultimately useless if they do not function in this 
way. 
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What is to be established, then, is that because ways of going on articulate normative 
contexts – contexts which include the objects in question rather than themselves 
providing a way of getting into touch with anormative objects – and bedrock articulates 
a level of normativity within a normative context for which there is no further 
explanation to give – appeals to ways of going on, or bedrock, are, in the same sense as 
Kuusela's stipulative descriptions (3.34-3.341), not up for assessment in terms of truth 
or falsity.31
4.13   Not a Something, But Not A Nothing Either 
We have just reminded ourselves that one could, then, easily divest the terms way of  
going on and  bedrock of their usefulness by taking them to represent, respectively, 
rules which are intelligible as such prior to their application, and a level of normativity 
which is intrinsically so in a determinate way. The point I will develop now is that the 
usefulness of the phraseology of Wittgenstein's I am taking on can also be mitigated if 
we take Wittgenstein to be using such phrases only to demonstrate that these phrases 
are, so used, useful only inasmuch as using them so serves to show that they do not 
refer to anything. This point bears direct relevance to my aims. If such phrases serve 
only to show that they do not refer to anything, then they do not provide a way to make 
sense of talk of what is criterial to a logical space, or to make sense of such talk 
illustrating that what is criterial to a logical space is unaccountable to its normative 
prerequisites (cf. 2.5-2.6).
Read's Throwing Away the Bedrock (2005) is an example of the sort of mitigation of 
the usefulness of Wittgenstein's phraseology which I described, above. He maintains a 
tacit commitment to treating 'ways of going on', or 'bedrock' or whatever term plays an 
analogous role, as referring (supposing they refer at all) to rules intelligible prior to 
their application, or, respectively, to an essentially determinate normative authority. He 
maintains this tacit view inasmuch as he thinks that if 'ways of going on', or 'bedrock' 
do not so refer, then they, ultimately, have no use at all.
31  Egan puts an analogous point nicely point nicely; that, for Wittgenstein, the most basic ways in 
which we picture the world “are not stand-ins for a more direct, literal expression of the same thing 
but are rather the most direct way of expressing what it is they express”. (2011; p68)
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Read claims that if we take Wittgenstein's use of terms like 'bedrock' in any other way 
than a way which is aimed at self-consciously undermining itself in order to show the 
folly of talking in such a way as instantiates the confusions I bullet-pointed above, we 
are readmitting the problems of the metaphysically-read-Tractatus by merely making
...gnomic gesture[s] toward the aspects of human life which, strictly speaking, cannot be 
said, as part of the background which we can foreground only by violating the limits of 
language” (Read 2005; 89)
For instance,
...when we do say 'this is simply what we do' we must be aware that the whole point is 
that there is no spelling out of the 'this'. Any further spelling out would indicate that we 
had not in fact reached bedrock. (Ibid; 86)
So saying 'this is simply what we do' would be empty, on Read's reading of 
Wittgenstein, because, as we saw with the act of naming in Chapter 1, and the content 
of demonstratives in Chapter 2, any spelling out of the 'this' would require another 
layer of normative context (more things we do), of which explication would, in turn, 
cause the same problem, thus undermining the claim that we have reached bedrock – 
that there is nowhere to go in producing further explanation.
The bottomless regress of normative contexts is, then, for Read, a fact about our 
conceptual lives which Wittgenstein tries to show us: committing to a picture where 
normative contexts bottom out represents a tacit commitment to a picture which again 
has a place for external explanation viz. a commitment to the existence of some 
determinate ineffable prerequisite of sense – 'bedrock' – which, from our epistemic 
position, can only be gestured at and not explicitly described. Read thinks that such an 
ineffable thing could never be pointed out; so, no sense can ever be given to any term 
which refers to this sort of determinate prerequisite of sense.
The upshot of taking this worry on board, for Read, is that we must charitably read 
Wittgenstein's use of such terms as 'bedrock' as exploiting their self-undermining 
nature, and that this exploitation is a form of showing something about language. 
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I take this thought of Read's to provide a valuable, though incomplete, insight into 
Wittgenstein's method: that terms like 'bedrock' are self undermining if they are taken 
to refer to essential and determinate set of things provides a way of demonstrating that 
claims about prerequisites of sense cannot be descriptions in the truth-apt sense. 
Further, I take this neatly to illustrate the point around which this chapter is structured: 
attempts to eschew external explanation upon substantive grounds only reinstate the 
same sort of problem – a dilemma between senselessness and silence –  at a deeper 
level. However, this is only half the story. 
The reason it is only half the story is that there is still a major confusion here: 
demanding that uses of terms like 'bedrock' ought to be used only as a self-consciously 
self-undermining device, and so ultimately ought to be ‘thrown away' once one has 
seen the point of them being so undermined, only makes sense if in so using 'bedrock', 
one thinks that one must be referring to an essential and determinate set of things as 
intrinsically normative. For it is only if we are trying to identify such ineffable 
prerequisites of sense (super-pictures), and if we realise that the very act of talking of 
'what is at bedrock' must take a new normative context as its prerequisite if it is to 
make sense, that we are forced to realise that the requirement for a normative context 
makes this a never-ending process which is destructive to the possibility of any talk 
about ineffable prerequisites of sense having a sense at all. 
In presuming that Wittgenstein's talk of 'bedrock' must be referring to a set of things 
which are the determinate prerequisites of sense, Read's worry operates within the 
same framework as Sacks' worry with the later Wittgenstein, which we explored in the 
previous chapter. Read offers the alternative solution within that same framework. In 
order to avoid the search for a self-undermining transcendental constraint – an 
ineffable something which structures sense – Read suggests (that Wittgenstein suggests 
that) we simply 'throw away the bedrock' once we are suitably enlightened.
My suggestion is that Read is mistaken in his reading of Wittgenstein because he 
misconstrues the role of prerequisites of sense in the later Wittgenstein's work. 
Between the earlier and later Wittgenstein there is agreement that certain sorts of 
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concept use require that there is something held fixed as a criterion.32 However, in the 
Tractatus, that requirement is taken to be a backdrop of determinacy because 
propositions are there taken to be expressions of thoughts, and thoughts are there 
dogmatically supposed to have sense only if they picture a determinate way the world 
could be. Given this assumption, and given that thoughts must be internally related to 
the way the world is in order for such depiction to be possible, what can be simple 
must be similarly determinate.
From this position there is a clear link to the sort of problematic way of thinking of the 
prerequisites of sense which Read buys into, and, more generally, into thinking that 
whatever serves as a prerequisite for language use must be ineffable. If there are 
simples, then one cannot directly speak of simples: for there to be any sense to there 
being complexes, simples must occupy distinct places in logical space, for if their 
individuality were to be independent of their place, simple objects would have to be 
intelligible apart from their location in that space, and in that case, would not be 
simple. In this way, simples are differentiated by nothing more than being the 
determinate grounds of being able to articulate any differences at all. Determinate 
simples are prerequisites of complexes, and only complexes are capable of expressing 
claims of truth and falsity; as all meaningful language use is thought to be comprised 
of claims capable of truth or falsity, the possibility is not open of describing simples by 
appeal to anything but their relations within complexes. 
For the early-Wittgenstein, then, there is a sense to there being determinate relations 
between simples, and so too a sense to a basic system of difference which structures 
the prerequisites of sense and so sets the parameters of what is sayable (of what 
complexes there can be); but we can say nothing of this system of difference, because 
saying just is the use of complex propositions; rather, we can only put the 'crystalline 
structure of language' (PI 107-108 (cf. n.26)) on display by comparing complexes. 
For Read, as we has seen, this idea of there being ineffable prerequisites of sense 
survives the loss of the conceptual unity of language.  
32  Recall that there is only one sort of concept use in the early Wittgenstein's work because of the 
assumption of the conceptual unity of language.
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The idea of the essential and determinate prerequisites of sense is, then, in any guise, a 
variety of super-picture because it is the idea of a level of something which is 
intrinsically normative independently of language use. Looking to pictures which 
feature determinate prerequisites allows another way of exemplifying a means of 
disconnecting normative force and normative authority from one another because, by 
the lights of one who buys into the idea of there being determinate prerequisites of 
sense, those prerequisites cannot be spoken of without transgressing the bounds of 
sense. 
The charge I am making against Read, then, is that he suffers from a problem of a kin 
with the problems that I, in the previous chapter, I claimed to afflict Sacks and Rorty. 
(Diamond identifies the same problem in Kripke's notion of a normative authority for 
attributions of metre-hood). Read instantiates a species of the problem which afflicts 
those who aim to show that external explanation is unintelligible by providing 
substantive grounds for the conclusion that external explanation is unintelligible. The 
deeper philosophical picture upon which Read's criticism rests instantiates precisely 
the sort of problem he is trying to avoid, because his criticism only works once it is 
tacitly assumed that a part of language can play a normative role only if there is a 
criterion for its correct use. 
For these reasons, I think that Read provides a clear case of a philosopher attempting 
to apply the method I earlier used Diamond as an example of – attacking an underlying 
philosophical picture rather than a claim within that picture – but failing to press the 
attack home because of a failure to shake off the central commitments of the target 
philosophical picture.
From examining Read we see the the folly of talking about such criteria as if they were 
themselves metaphysically essential determinate things, or nothing at all. I now want 
return to Kripke to concentrate on how we ought to talk about what is criterial to a 
description.
4.2 Embeddedness
At PI 50 Wittgenstein claims that
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There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not 
one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. – But this is, of course, not to 
ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the 
language-game of measuring with a metre-rule.
Kripke objects that the idea that a physical stick has no length in metres is obviously 
too absurd to be accepted (1980; 54). His solution is to explain away the standard 
metre-stick's apparent odd property by providing a clear distinction between the 
metaphysical and epistemological elements of the stick's role in our practices of 
measuring. He attempts to draw such a distinction by claiming that Wittgenstein is 
confusing the means of fixing reference with what is referred to; or put otherwise, the 
length of the metre-stick in Paris is not a normative authority for our judgements 
concerning metres, it rather merely serves, or, more particularly, has served, as a means 
to establishing a normative authority.
What fixing the reference amounts to for Kripke is the entrance of a concept into our 
repertoire through 'baptism': a concept is brought into currency by making use of the 
accidental way one's environment currently is as a backdrop from which to draw 
demonstrative content. We pick out from the environment an instantiation of 
something with particular modal qualities (for example, in the current case, in all  
possible worlds, fitting exactly inside a particular set of things), and by doing so, free 
our ability to attribute those particular modal qualities from their instantiation in the  
accidental features of the environment. 
On Kripke's picture, then, the stick's length is merely an accidental means to 
determining the essence of the concept we are after; as far as Kripke is concerned, this 
means that 
...even though [Wittgenstein] uses [the metre-stick in Paris] to fix the reference of his 
standard of length, a metre, he can still say, ‘if heat had been applied to this stick S at to' 
then at to stick S would not have been one metre long. (1980;55) 
And so, given that we can make sense of the falsity of “S is one metre long”, we can 
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also make sense of its truth. It then seems clear that,
...the metaphysical status of ‘S is one metre long' will be that of a contingent statement, 
provided that ‘one metre' is regarded as a rigid designator: under appropriate stresses and 
strains, heatings or coolings, S would have had a length other than one metre even at to. 
(ibid; 56)
Thus, for Kripke, the sentence 'S is 1 metre long at to' is knowable as true a priori – for 
we do not in any sense have to investigate the status of the stick to verify it – and this, 
for Kripke, explains away the sense in which we cannot doubt that S is a metre long at 
to; but this is merely because the stick is one metre long by stipulation. So we are 
certainly not committed to the stick necessarily continuing to be one metre long – it  
was only a priori one metre long at the moment it was used in the baptism of a concept 
because of a contingent fact about its epistemological role. More importantly, once we 
are clear about this separation between epistemology and metaphysics, we can see that 
once we have baptised the concept of a metre, we are perfectly free to say that the fact 
'S is one metre long at to' may well have been false, it may well inasmuch as we can 
make sense of the sort of counterfactuals which describe ways in which the stick could 
have been different.
It now may look as though common sense has shown Wittgenstein's claim – that the 
stick itself, when used as the metre stick, is a prerequisite of any thing's being a metre 
long, so it itself can be neither a metre nor not one metre – to be unsustainable. If we 
follow Kripke, then we ought to think that the fact that we make use of physical 
objects in particular ways, viz. in bringing certain categorial tools into use, in no way 
commits us to the stick itself being in some sense unaccountable to the system of 
measurement. To do so would be to fail to distinguish sharply enough between the 
stick itself – a contingent way the world happens to be – and the way in which we 
carve the world up. Further, to do so would be to deny the reflexivity of the relation of 
measurement: it would be to deny that the act of measurement could be applied to the 
measure.
The matter, however, is not quite so neatly resolved; furthermore, it is clear that an 
examination of the resolution is going to help us to make sense of the role of objects 
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within our grammar. To see why the matter is not so neatly involved we have to 
uncover the fact that if we read Wittgenstein and Kripke as engaging upon a common 
philosophical framework – one upon which there is a clear division between 
metaphysics and epistemology –  then we have already attributed to Wittgenstein the 
sort of thesis he is trying to resist. For, as we saw at the end of the last chapter, what is 
at issue here is, as we saw at the end of the last chapter, is what makes the contingent 
properties of things like the stick, and indeed the notion of contingency itself, 
intelligible to us at all. For Kripke, I will argue, the answer must involve some species 
of super-picture, whereas for Wittgenstein, it cannot.
4.21 Clarification
Before we examine Kripke's conception of what the normative authorities for concepts 
like 'metre' are like in more detail, we ought to first get clear about a claim 
Wittgenstein is not making. Wittgenstein is not claiming that the metre stick in Paris 
has no length in metres determinable by measurement because the stick itself has no 
determinate length. Attributing such a claim to Wittgenstein would place Wittgenstein 
and Kripke on a common philosophical frame, and also lead us to misread Kripke's 
claims against Wittgenstein.
The claim that the standard metre-stick has no determinate length in metres because it  
has no determinate length is worth considering for, although it is false, there are in a  
certain light good reasons to think it true. Considering those reasons in that light brings 
out both important complexities concerning what measuring the metre stick amounts 
to, and, further, certain  key methodological considerations which will later serve to 
distinguish Wittgenstein from Wittgenstein-as-Kripke-reads-him.
More particularly, it is useful to consider this claim for two related reasons: 1) because 
it will help to sharpen our picture of the particular essentialist presumption Kripke has 
which commits him to an idea of 'super-pictures'; 2) because it points to a use 
Wittgenstein was making of the idea of the metre stick in Paris which Kripke (because 
of (1)) could not be open to (and so sets the ground for describing how Kripke actually 
misreads Wittgenstein). Once again, identifying a misreading of Wittgenstein is going 
to show us a particular way in which one can invoke a metaphysical picture in order to 
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connect normative force and normative authority. It is probably clear now, in general 
terms, how this is going to proceed.
To see why someone might end up thinking that the length of the metre stick in Paris is 
not determinable by measurement because the stick has no determinate length, let us 
start with the thought that merely recognizing that we can deploy different systems of 
measurement with regard to the same object might allow us grounds for separating the 
epistemological (our methods of measurement) from the metaphysical (a contingent 
fact concerning the stick's objective extension). 
One might think, for instance, that by using a concept like 'inches' to talk of the length 
of the standard metre-stick, we come to see that the property 'length' outstrips any 
particular practices of measurement we may deploy; that it is because 'length' is an 
objective property which is independent of any practices of measurement that the 
length of an object can receive varying yet commensurable determinations. 
The picture invoked is then one of a content being taken up by various compatible 
schemes in the sense which Davidson found passable; that is where the relation of 
scheme to content is as 
the existence of various scales for recording temperatures or lengths is to the reality or 
objectivity of temperature or length (Davison 2001; 215).
So, if we do take this attitude to magnitudes of extension, or lengths, we might think 
Kripke is giving a short answer to Wittgenstein when he says:
If the stick is a stick, for example, 39.37 inches long (I assume we have some different 
standard for inches), why isn't it one metre long? (Kripke 1980; 53)
Such a quick answer, though, might be thought to reveal the mistaken assumption of 
essentialism about concepts I am imputing to Kripke (although it does not), for if we 
take it that the measure of an inch is also determined by some physical standard,
[t]o posit an equivalence between metres and inches can never amount to anything more 
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than approximation, if the two units are truly independent and their equivalence not 
merely stipulative. We must then ask whether we can ever get exact equivalences where 
entirely different units are concerned. Perhaps not, again, if they are independent, 
because even in principle we can only physically compare them, and physical 
comparisons and judgments of coextension are inherently approximative. (Jacquette 
2010; 61)
That is, unless there is something which is essentially a metre, or an essentially an 
inch, then definition of one in terms of the other – ultimately by way of physical 
comparison –  merely serves to reinstantiate the same problem. Further, as our 
discussion of the superfluity of super-pictures showed, even if there was such a thing 
as the essential inch, it would be of no use to us anyway.
So, it now looks as though it may be right to say 'the metre stick in Paris has no length 
determined by measurement because the stick has no determinate length'. Following 
through this thought, though, ought to make us think that neither does anything else, 
for any straightforward measurement by way of one of the standards is approximate in 
the same way as was a problem for the measurement of the standard in terms of the 
standard. 
Here, we can start to get a flavour of why the thought that 'the metre stick in Paris has 
no length determined by measurement because the stick has no determinate length' 
cannot be Wittgenstein's point (nor the thesis Kripke takes Wittgenstein to hold). This 
is because for this to be Wittgenstein's thesis – that the length of the metre stick is 
indeterminable – Wittgenstein would have to share in the idea of determinacy, and 
more particularly what it is to be determined by measurement, which is operative in the 
above discussion.
Wittgenstein does not share this view of determinacy; rather,
For Wittgenstein, the buck stops with the criteriological role of a unit of measurement, a 
sample, set aside as an archetype in terms of which other things are judged, but for 
which there exists no fully exact independent standard for meaningful pronouncements 
of whatever property or predication for whose application it is supposed to provide a 
practical test. (Jacquette 2010; 62)
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That is, determinacy is to be thought of in accordance with the degree of exactness 
required to meet whatever practical tasks we have undertaken which require measuring 
and measurements.33 To think of the determinacy which is required as defined by 
something else over and above the practical ends of a particular practice would be to 
buy back into either using a super-picture as source of normative authority for claims 
of determinacy or to take our scheme to be imposing determinacy upon the world. It is 
thus perfectly fine to attribute determinate measurements to things if one is not doing 
so in a manner which assumes a absolute notion of determinacy.
Once we make the shift to a less absolute view of determinacy, we can allow that the 
length of the standard metre stick is measurable – we can measure it in inches and, 
with sufficient determinacy, convert this measurement to metres (we might even check 
the constancy of the inch standard in this way if we , for instance, thought it might 
have been left out in the sun for too long). To do so, however, is not to do anything 
towards determining the length of the standard metre-stick in metres, nor towards 
measuring the standard metre-stick in metres, for, as we will see below (cf. 4.22), the 
standard metre-stick is the determinator of measurements in metres (although, if we 
were, say, adjusting the metre-stick in order to make the metric and imperial 
measurement systems more easily comparable, it could be so determining, but then we 
would not be using inches only to measure the metre-stick, we would be determining 
the concept 'metre'). 
What this discussion is intended to bring out is that if one is committed to a sort of 
absolute determinacy then this is at odds with the sense of measurements determining 
lengths that we can be happy with. Kripke, we should be clear, never claimed that the 
standard metre stick's length was determined by measurement, he only claimed that it  
was one metre long, that the metre had been determined so by stipulation, and that 
nothing about these facts excluded the possibility of its measurement – this is the 
whole point of considering it to be knowable a priori that the standard metre stick is a 
metre long. My previous discussion of the relation between inches and metres was 
intended merely to fill out, so that we might refute it more clearly later, the proper 
33 Avital (2008) brings this out nicely (cf. 4.25), although she undermines this account by making the 
mistake of bringing determinacy into her argument in the way I am arguing one ought not to in this 
section. I deal with the confusion caused by treating determinacy in this way in 4.24.
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sense of the apparent platitude Kripke appeals to: that if a metre has an equivalent 
measure in inches, and we can measure the metre stick in inches, then we can also 
measure the metre-stick in metres.
I do, however, think the faulty view of determinacy identified above is implicit within 
Kripke's claims about the truth-aptness of claims about the metre-stick being a metre 
long; and I also think that this view of determinacy relies upon an unwarranted 
assumption of a clear distinction between facts of meaning and what we do with facts 
of meaning. To get to this lurking determinacy we need to get clear about what the 
measurement of the standard upon the metric it establishes – even via a conversion to 
inches – could amount to.
Although dropping the idea of absolute determinacy (as opposed to the demands of 
particular practices giving sense to the use of 'determinate') is not the same as dropping 
the idea that there are determinate prerequisites of sense, the two ideas are closely 
related. If one thinks that there are determinate prerequisites of sense then one does 
buy into a form of absolute determinacy, for one must imagine that there is a sort of 
determinacy governing language use which is intelligible in abstraction from that 
language use. Likewise, if one believes in absolute determinacy, one believes in a 
particular sort of standard which both stands beyond our practices and makes 
normative demands upon our practices. 
Part of dropping either absolute determinism or commitment to determinate 
prerequisites of sense is coming to see criterial objects as embedded within a logical 
space, and becoming so by being selected from another particular logical space. As 
such, dropping the idea of absolute determinacy leads one to see that anything held as 
criterial is so held because it is responsive to the practical demands of the logical space 
within which it is used as a normative authority, and as such is always liable to be 
modified in accordance with those demands.34
34 The standard metre stick in Paris, for instance, gave an appropriate degree of determinacy for certain  
tasks. Now it does not, and so we use the distance light travels when shifting from one part of the 
spectrum to another as a criterion (I demonstrate this sort of claim in more detail later (cf. 4.24-4.25)).
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4.22 Kripke's Super Metre-Stick
Diamond's treatment of Kripke's conception of the role of the standard metre in Paris 
revolves around a difference between transitive and intransitive uses of language 
which she finds in Wittgenstein's Blue Book. 
Now the use of the word "particular" is apt to produce a kind of delusion and 
roughly speaking this delusion is produced by the double usage of this word. On 
the one hand, we may say, it is used preliminary to a specification, description, 
comparison; on the other hand, as what one might describe as an emphasis. The 
first usage I shall call the transitive one, the second the intransitive one. Thus, on 
the one hand I say "This face gives me a particular impression which I can't 
describe". The latter sentence may mean something like: "This face gives me a 
strong impression". These examples would perhaps be more striking if we 
substituted the word "peculiar" for "particular", for the same comments apply to 
"peculiar". If I say "This soap has a peculiar smell: it is the kind we used as 
children", the word "peculiar" may be used merely as an introduction to the 
comparison which follows it, as though I said "I'll tell you what this soap smells 
like:...". If, on the other hand, I say "This soap has a peculiar smell!" or "It has a 
most peculiar smell", "peculiar" here stands for some such expression as "out of 
the ordinary", "uncommon", "striking". (BB; 158)
As Diamond reads it this is, roughly, a description of a difference between cases in 
which we express something by comparing something with something else – transitive 
cases –  and statements where we are simply expressing – intransitive cases. Or we 
might say it is a difference between statements claiming an object's accordance with a 
standard and statements which are used to establish an object as a standard.
The way we normally make sense of something's being a metre or not is clearly 
transitive: we do so by comparing a thing with an object which instantiates metre-
hood, and take it this thing also instantiates metre-hood because it has a particular 
normative significance in virtue of a further transitive relation which it bears to the 
standard metre-stick. That is, we make sense of something's being a metre or not by 
asking if the relevant comparison to the metre intransitively defined would make a 
transitive statement true or false. 
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If Kripke is maintaining that the sentence “the metre stick is 1 metre long at to” is true 
in the same sense as an ordinary claim that some length is one metre is true, it is made 
true by a transitive relation. What, though, can the comparison be between when we 
are referring to the baptism of the concept? In the absence of anything which is 
essentially a metre prior to the baptism of the concept, the comparison can only be 
between the metre stick and itself. If this is the case there here lies  concealed 
nonsense. Diamond exposes this nonsense by comparing the idea that we can know it 
to be true that the metre-stick is a metre at to because it is the same length as itself to a  
case where we,
Imagine someone saying: "But I know how tall I am!" and laying his hand on top of his 
head to prove it. (PI 279)
That is, Diamond exposes the claim that 'the metre-stick is one metre long at to' a case 
of a “non-comparison represented as a comparison” (2001; 120).
Recognising that Kripke thinks that the source of normative authority for our practice 
of measuring in metres is this particular reflexive relation instantiated at a particular  
point in time allows us to see clearly why a standard thus conceived could not function 
as a standard.  A claim made true by comparison to a standard,
...hangs in the air unless there is some context, either one that actually exists or one we 
can imagine, in which we can see what it is to count as making comparisons with the 
standard  (op. cit.; 105 )
And Kripke's standard for the application of the concept of a metre is, once 
inaugurated, contextless. It is part of Kripke's description of the normative authority 
for the concept of a metre that it does not connect with our established techniques for 
talking about measuring in metres.
Thus, (as we saw in Diamond's argument summary in 4.1) Diamond is not claiming 
that Kripke's indexing of the normative authority of the standard to a point in time (to) 
is in itself problematic, for it is quite possible to imagine a situation in which doing so 
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is useful, and, as Diamond pointed out (cf. 4.1) if the standard had normative force 
there is nothing in principle stopping us making a comparison to how a thing was at a 
time in the past. The problem is that the relation between a stick and itself at a 
particular time, inasmuch as it is contextless, lacks a capacity to exert normative force 
– it can play no role in the ongoing material practice of comparing things lengths.
So, on Kripke's picture we end up with a criterion which is normatively inert and 
which can only be brought to life by endowing it with the role of a super-picture – by 
stipulating it to be essentially and intrinsically normative, and, after baptism, a 
determinate prerequisite of sense. Considering the status of the concept of a normative 
authority for the concept 'metre' in Kripke's picture, then, shows Kripke is still in the 
grips of the Kantian dilemma: he is trapped between senselessness (appealing to a 
comparison between a thing and itself – an empty reflexive relation), and super-
pictures (something which is essentially a metre but superfluously so). 
What we need to do to avoid this dilemma is to find a way of transitioning from the 
idea of a conceptual framework constituted by determinate prerequisites of sense (be it 
categories of the understanding, simple names, or essential metres), to an idea of a 
framework which is  arbitrary in a particular sense which appears in this quotation 
from Zettel:
Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of 
grammar arbitrary? Because ‘cookery' is defined by its end, whereas ‘speaking' is not. 
That is why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and 
washing are not. You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than 
the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are playing another 
game; and if you follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not 
mean that you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else. (Z320)
On this understanding, the grammar of a logical space is autonomous and any 
etiological story there is to tell about the prerequisites of the grammar of a particular 
logical space is like a story one would tell about the movement from playing chess to 
playing a similar but different game. To explicate the significance of this notion of 
arbitrariness, I want to characterize a part of Diamond's method as a response to a 
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rebuttal which might currently look available to Kripke.
4.23 Reflexivity and Super-pictures
The problem Diamond has identified with Kripke's treatment of the standard metre-
stick is that it invokes an idea of an essential metre, or a metre's essence, which is 
superfluous as far as capturing the role the metre stick plays in our practices of 
measurement goes. Kripke's best chance at offering a rebuttal, then, would be be to 
show that his account in fact allows something vital to the role of the standard metre-
stick.
Thus, Kripke might say something like the following: our best way of describing 
meaningful behaviour is giving a truth-conditional analysis. However, if we cannot 
attribute truth conditions to claims regarding the length of the standard metre-stick in 
metres, we have, as it were, a hole in our account of logical space; and if we have a 
hole in logical space, we cannot account for the sort of exclusion and entailment 
relations which we are committed to in using concepts. So if we are to capture the role 
of the standard metre-stick we must, somehow, find a way to make claims like 'the 
standard-metre stick is one metre long at to' come out true.
Kripke, then, would claim that accepting the truth of the claim that the standard-metre 
stick is a metre long at to, whilst in an important sense empty, is very useful indeed; 
and that as our only candidate for a truth-maker for the standard metre-stick is the 
standard metre-stick, the truth of the claim 'the standard metre-stick is one metre long 
at to' depends upon the reflexive relation of identity, and it is necessary that it does.
I do not have the space or scope to provide an explication or analysis of Kripke's views 
upon essence and identity here. What I would like to do instead is to: 
1) Reinforce the thought that the idea of reflexive relations exerting normative 
force is closely linked to the disembodiment which makes super-pictures 
superfluous;
2) Describe a sense in which it is appropriate to treat a reflexive relation as true 
simpliciter because treating it in this way allows us the use of an object of 
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comparison – a language game with which we model some aspect of how we 
already use language.
With regard to (1), consider Diamond's summary of part of her paper: 
In much contemporary philosophy of language, 'reflexive' examples are treated as if they 
were not themselves possible indications of philosophical fishiness. By “Schnee”, we 
say, the Germans mean snow, by “snow” we mean snow. A transitive use is put first to 
make our intransitive use appear like a special case of the transitive use. Or we have: 
“Schnee is weiss” is true-in-German if and only if snow is white, and “Snow is white” is 
true-in-English if and only if snow is white. My argument in this part of the paper has 
been that we should bethink ourselves of this similarity between saying “I know what 
the sentence 'Snow is white' means, it means that snow is white” and saying I know how 
tall I am, I am this tall!” while laying one's hand on ones head. The emphasis on “this 
tall”doesn't make the words and gestures give one's knowledge of one's height; mental 
concentration on white snow (or anything else) doesn't make the words “It means that 
snow is white” state something about meaning that one knows. My height can be used to 
give you someone else's height, an English sentence to give you the meaning of a 
German one, or of another English sentence, but repeating a sentence and taking its 
quotes off is putting your hand on your own head. (2001; p132-133) 
As with super-pictures, then, the problem with the idea of the relation of the standard 
metre-stick to itself making it true that the standard metre-stick is a metre at t o, is with 
the expectation that the simple recognition of a reflexive relation adds something to 
our knowledge of a concept because it expresses something essential about that 
concept. Rather, the relation considered in isolation is normatively inert (in the way 
illustrated at  PI 430). The reflexive relation is thus superfluous to description of the 
role of the standard metre-stick in the same way as putting 'emphasis on “this tall” 
doesn't make the words and gestures give one's knowledge of one's height' (ibid).
The problem, then, is not that we cannot allow that we give sense to the attribution of 
truth to the standard-metre stick being a metre in any context. The problem is peculiar 
to the situation in which we do use metre-sticks to measure things: if such a reflexive 
relation grounds the criteria for metre-hood we use in our practices of measurement, at 
best it does not contribute to our understanding of the standard metre-stick playing the 
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role within our normative lives which it does, and at worst it makes an unnecessary 
mystery of its role.
Wittgenstein stresses this at PI 50 when he qualifies his claim about the attribution of 
truth and falsity to claims about the standard metre-stick as regards its length in meters,  
with the further claim that to claim the inapplicability of truth and falsity in this  
context is just to mark the peculiar role of that particular stick within the practice of 
measuring in metres. The peculiar role of the standard metre stick in the context of our 
practice of measurement is that of an arbitrarily selected unaccountable criterion in the 
manner I first introduced with regard to mathematical novelty in my discussion of 
Steiner (cf. 2.53-2.54).
The last few paragraphs have been an attempt to reinforce the point that reflexive 
relations are not founts of normative force. In the following sections I want to show 
that this in no way stops us from imagining a normative context in which we do 
attribute truth or falsity to ascriptions of a property to the sample which is a criterion 
for that property in a way which it is not appropriate in its normal context of use. I 
want to do so to emphasise that the use of counterfactuals with regard to a criterion (in 
imagining contexts in which it is true, and contexts in which it is false, that an object is 
the criterion for the property we do take it to be a criterion for) is a useful enterprise 
which is not debarred by anything I have asserted, or assented to, so far. Furthermore, I 
want to make clear that if we do debar this possibility, we would buy back into a 
picture in which sense is determinate. 
That reflexive relations are not founts of normative force does not stop us from 
appealing to normative contexts in which the role particular samples play can be 
treated as truth-apt. Showing as much will serve to show that, even if a truth-functional 
analysis is our best tool for describing some aspects of concept use (such as entailment 
and exclusion relations), there is nothing in recognising that the standard metre-stick is 
one metre long or not one metre long when used as a criterion for measuring in metres 
which hinders making such descriptions. Nothing stops us from giving sense to the 
claim that 'the length of the standard metre as essentially one metre long at to' in 
particular contexts.
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Although there is nothing stopping us creating and using a language with seemingly  
substantive prerequisites in order usefully to describe our practice of measurement in 
metres, it is, however, important to keep in mind that this practice is parasitic upon 
what we do when we measure in metres, and does not present a prior constraint upon 
our practice of doing so. That is, to reiterate the point of the thesis which I summaries 
in the introduction (cf. p.11), it is important not to confuse what is an object of 
comparison and what is an object of investigation in any given instance of 
investigation. For doing so both encourages one towards the failings of transcendental 
idealism, and obscures the object of investigation.
4.24 Avital's Misplaced Concern: Arbitrariness Again
Earlier on we examined the intuition that the metre stick had no length which could be 
determined by measurement because it had no determinate length. Here are two more 
related intuitions: 
• the standard metre stick cannot change size; 
• if the standard metre stick changes size then so does the length of a metre. 
These three intuitions are related by a common assumption: whatever plays a criterial 
role, is, once inaugurated, fixed as such. Because of this common assumption, all of 
these intuitions are at odds with the sentiment of Zettel 320 (see above); and, more 
importantly, they all engender an idea of our conceptual framework which is more 
Tractarian than is desirable.
The general idea underlying these bad intuitions is this: if the metre-stick is the highest  
standard of authority as regards what we can count as a metre then:
1) it makes no sense to say of the metre-stick that has changed size (for it is the 
measure of size).
2) If the highest standard of authority for what counts as a metre changes, then 
we cannot make sense of the metre not changing if the standard does. We cannot 
drive apart the size of the stick and the length of a metre.
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Another way of characterising the relationship between these intuitions, then, is that 
they are all anxieties about the use of counterfactuals with regard to the role of a 
particular criterion.
Key to Diamond's account, however, is that she does not disallow the usefulness of 
counterfactuals which express the possibility of things we take to be playing a criterial 
role having been different. Rather, part of Diamond's method of showing that Kripke 
still retains a commitment to the sort of nonsense which I have been associating with 
super-pictures relies upon the sense of such counterfactuals: they are vital to showing 
that, whilst we can make sense of the sample of a metre having been different, this 
does not allow us to make sense of an object's normative force by comparing that thing 
with itself – by stating what appears to be a concept's essence.
More particularly, a part of Diamond's argument involves imagining a person, Susan, 
and a possible Susan-had-she-taken-her-vitamins standing next to one another, and 
then comparing their heights upon an imaginary drawing board. This imagining is a 
tool intended to show the difference between imagining measuring Susan with a 
Susan-metre (that is, where Susan taken as a standard of measurement), and imagining 
measuring a Susan-had-she-taken-her-vitamins with a Susan-metre. In the way 
established in section 4.22 we can make sense of the latter, but not the former, for the 
latter is a genuine comparison whilst the first is a non-comparison dressed up as a 
comparison.
Avital claims that Diamond's method is flawed:
[s]he uses her drawing board to simulate a Platonic universe of a sense, since she can 
now locate in this space the height she reads off Susan. This being the standard Metre 
(the height read off or abstracted onto the page), she can now test the height of Susan-
had-she-taken-her-vitamins against it, considering that in the counterfactual scenario, 
there is no Susan-had-she-not- taken-her-vitamins, whose height could serve as a 
standard against which to compare the counterfactual-Susan (I suspect this would be 
very much Malcolm's point against a position such as Diamond's). Now, if this is the 
exercise that Diamond is trying to carry out, then it is equally applicable to the scenario 
of setting Susan's height against itself, against the standard of height abstracted off her, 
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which she indeed fits perfectly, in fact, a priori, however, as Kripke puts it, only 
contingently. Hence, falling back onto Kripke's reconstruction of the difficulty seems 
unavoidable. (2008; 327)
At first there seems to be something very gripping about this criticism: it looks like 
Diamond is making use of the very sort of super-picture that her argument aims to 
show is unintelligible. Diamond has invoked a backdrop against which to judge true or 
false claims about the relative heights of Susan and Susan-had-she-eaten-her-vitamins.
It seems, then, that even to entertain the idea of a comparison of criteria in order to 
show that Kripke is helping himself to a metaphysical determinacy where he ought not 
be, is to make the mistake of thinking we can make sense of a Susan having a length in 
the absence of a wider practice of measurement; of Susan being a Susan-metre in the 
absence of any normative context. For to make sense of Susan having been different 
we must tacitly accept the idea of a neutral framework against which to compare the 
two Susans. Yet if we accept this we seem  also to be forced to accept the idea that it 
makes sense to attribute truth and falsity to criteria.
This criticism, however, holds only if we ignore the wider methodological significance 
of the movement from absolute to practice-dependent determinacy; from the Tractarian 
conception of simples to the Investigations' (I) criteriological objects. It only holds if, 
in the way I showed is true of Read's reading of Wittgenstein in the last section, we 
move to a way of thinking of sense such that we can ground a practice using a criterial 
sample whilst still tacitly maintaining a presupposition regarding language use having 
determinate prerequisites.
The reason why counterfactuals are essential to Diamond's method and acceptable as 
such, is, then, the same reason that, if missed, makes Diamond seem to be buying back 
into Platonism (by allowing a backdrop to the Susans which does not stand in need of 
explanation). The reason is this: to articulate things about criteria – whatever 
constitutes the bedrock of a particular language game – and not just to articulate 
criteria (as one would by way of intransitive definitions), one must find a way to talk 
about criteria. To talk about criteria one must locate them amidst a wider normative 
context (or logical space), which allows one to treat them transitively. The articulation 
168
of such a space is enabled by the use of counterfactuals; that is, counterfactuals are 
required to articulate the possibility of the selection of a sufficiently different item 
from a logical space which includes the sample we are interested in talking about. We 
thus compare possible candidates for samples which have largely the same salient 
modal properties by invoking a common context from which different candidates for 
being a normative authority could be selected.
This counterfactual articulation is only problematic if we take talk of criterial things  
like bedrock and ways of going on to be making reference to some absolute 
transcendental feature – but to do so would to be to make the mistake Read made (cf. 
4.13). It would be tacitly to assume that if there is meaning there is a substantive object 
of meaning. If there is no such determinator of meaning, we are free to hold some parts 
of things we already do fixed, whilst varying others, in order to explore the role that 
criterial objects do play. In doing so we are merely talking about how we might have 
used some different, but importantly similar, language games of which different but 
importantly similar objects are used as criteria.
What Diamond's use of counterfactuals trades upon, then, is the sense of 'arbitrary' 
which I first pointed to in my discussion of Steiner (cf. 2.5-2.6). The criterion for a 
given logical space is arbitrary inasmuch as it is selected from a prior logical space, 
and there is no sense in attributing a judgement of correctness or incorrectness to that 
selection. Once we have this idea of arbitrariness in mind we can  pair this idea with 
the thought brought out in Zettel 320: by using a chess board and chess pieces in a 
different way we play a different game which is nevertheless comparable to chess 
because of the internal relation it bears to chess.
To consolidate this point, let us cast Kripke's confusion as a confusion between 
something internal to the enterprise of measurement and a prerequisite of the enterprise 
of measurement. Kripke confuses a logical space within which differences are 
articulated by internal relations (which are best expressed as counterfactuals), with the 
criterial role of objects which are used to inaugurate such logical spaces. Thus, Kripke 
misses that from the point of the inaugurated logical space, the rules could not be 
different (viz. counterfactuals could not be applied to them). The way this confusion 
manifests, then, is in:
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...an unclarity concerning the distinction...between factual statements and statements of 
a rule. Briefly, Kripke seems problematically to assume that a (token) sentence could 
play the roles of a factual statement and a rule simultaneously. (Kuusela 2008; 31)
This is a confusion which we can avoid by firstly, getting clear that something cannot 
meaningfully be both criterial and, at the same time, subject to judgement made by 
reference to that criteria; and secondly, seeing that just because our use of metre is 
accountable to a particular criterion, there is nothing stopping us imagining that our 
use of 'metre' could have been accountable to different criteria for a different end (but 
one sufficiently closely related to warrant us calling both uses of  criteria uses of the 
concept 'metre').  There is nothing stopping us imagining a different normative context 
because the logical space from which the standard metre stick was sampled is 
accessible to us, and we are free to imagine having used a different part of that space as 
a criterion for the attribution of the property 'metre'.
Diamond's invocation of Susan-had-she-eaten-her-vitamins, then, is an exercise of the 
open-endedness of grammar in order to show that, because there is no ultimate 
conceptual unity underwritten by a determinate set of criteria, there is nothing stopping 
us from imagining particular criteria within a wider context in which it can be 
compared to similar things. The only thing which would stop us imagining in this way 
would be if talk of bedrock transgressed what is sayable in the way Read worried 
about, and the only thing which would allow such a worry a foothold in the case of the 
concept of a metre would be buying into the thought that there is some criterion for the 
use of the concept 'metre' which outstripped the worldly context in which measuring in 
metres is useful.
The relation of this section to point 2) of the last section is making clear that it that it is  
legitimate to prise apart:
• accepting that there is no sense to the standard metre-stick being a metre long 
or not a metre long in the usual context of making measurements in metres;
• accepting that we cannot talk about the standard metre-stick having a length in 
any context. 
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We can prise these claims apart because we can set the criteria for the attribution of 
metre-hood against a context (imaginary or otherwise) which allows us to talk of it as 
happening to be a particular way, or set out other possible ways it could have been by 
identifying other possible candidates for being the same sort of criterion.
One such context allows us to treat natural language as accountable to an ideal of an 
all-encompassing logical structure. We might entertain this thought in order to bring 
out some interesting structural features of what we do with language, like the mapping 
of entailment and exclusion relations which featured in my imagined retort from 
Kripke (cf p.162). We may do so for any number of other reasons too. 
However, if we lose sight of the fact we are entertaining the idea of language having a 
particular sort of conceptual unity for the purposes of making an object of comparison, 
we risk taking a dis-analogy between language use and description of that language use 
to be presenting us with an actual problem standing in the way of our meaningful use 
of language. 
I'll return to these themes – particularly to the idea of a substantive language ('the 
crystalline purity of logic'(PI 107-108)) being a requirement of investigating actual 
language use – in a more general way in the final section of this chapter. Before that I 
will bring out the relations the claims of this and the previous chapter bear to the 
claims I made about relations within and between logical spaces in 2.4-2.5.
4.25 Avital's Insights
Once we undermine Avital's attack upon Diamond in the above manner, and so also 
undermine Avital's questionably metaphysical claims concerning the necessarily fixed 
size of the metre-stick in Paris, we can nevertheless salvage some of Avital's insights in 
order to make in a fuller way the claims I have been making since my discussion of 
Steiner (2.4-2.5), about the inauguration of, and transition between, logical spaces. 
Avital draws connections between the arbitrary nature of samples, the relations of 
samples to things which are held normatively accountable, and the idea that in such 
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logical spaces normative force can be exerted by way of modal relations between 
things of a common kind (of the sort we examined in chapter 2 of the thesis (cf. 2.2-
2.21)). The connection rest upon what Avital terms the 'Same Logical Type Maxim' 
(henceforth, SLT):
SLT, in fact, could be given a rather formal presentation. The object of 
comparison is a sample. The very idea of sampling here is presupposing the 
following two assumptions: (i) There is a sample space from where the sampling 
takes place, and (ii) The sampling is arbitrary. To these two assumptions, we 
could now add the rule  that says that the standard cannot be applied to itself: 
(iii) The sampled object is the standard, and therefore, the statements, which are 
now made possible and are applicable to all members of the sample-space, are 
not applicable to the standard, e.g. asserting or negating that the standard is 
satisfied makes no sense when the standard itself is the object in question. (2008; 
336)
The idea of a 'sample space' from which we arbitrarily pick samples featured in (i) is 
then the idea of a pre-existing logical space from within which we can pick out objects 
– made intelligible by virtue of their place within that logical space – in order to 
inaugurate a new logical space. This is the idea which  I drew upon in the last chapter 
in order to spell out a notion of arbitrariness and which dispelled Sacks' worries about 
relativism (cf. 3.31-3.41), and in this chapter I drew upon to show that appeals to a 
level of understanding at which interpretation is not needed is not to appeal to super-
pictures or conventionalism (cf. 4.12).
The useful work which Avital does with this formal presentation of what it takes to 
enter into novel logical spaces is to give a solid example of how the internal relations 
which are constitutive of a newly inaugurated logical space are parasitic upon the 
internal relations of the sample space; and further, that the internal relations which are 
constitutive of a sample space include the sort of modal relations we appeal to when 
individuating things of a particular empirical kind. 
Avital shows this sort of dependence in the case of the case of the standard metre-stick 
by first asking us to
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... assume that we are in possession of a perfect rod, the ethereal or Platonic one unit of 
measure as established by points A and B.We may do this by way of exploiting the 
contingency of the fact that rod S's edges approximate at a time to the points A and B. 
Let us further assume that the point of the exercise is to fit a drawer into a desk, both 
made of the same material substance,in this case platinum. We now use a measure or a 
ruler to determine whether the objects fit or not. But if our ruler is the ethereal or 
Platonic rod (|AB|), which we may term a “transcendental measuring-rod,” we would 
soon find it to be of no use.The point is that we may assume that the two objects 
produced (the desk and the drawer) match in length. We measure one of the objects with 
the transcendental measuring rod and it measures one metre in length. We then go on to 
measure the second object, but the difference in temperature between the two instances 
of time when the measuring takes place are such that the material objects extend in 
length, perhaps, say, they double in length. The transcendental measuring rod is not 
material and, therefore, is not “corrupted” by changes in temperature. It would read now 
for the second object the number of two units of measure.We may then conclude that the 
two objects do not measure the same length, although in fact they do. But if we had a 
ruler made of platinum, the futility of the measuring exercise described above would, of 
course, have been avoided. (Avital 2008; 329)
What the example is intended to show, then, is that for the standard metre to be useful 
the standard-metre must be internally related to the things it measures by virtue of 
sharing a salient set of modal relations with those things (in the above example, the 
same sensitivity to temperature). So, if we want to measure platinum in a way useful 
for certain platinum-relative ends, then we inaugurate a practice of measurement by 
sampling from the logical space of platinum that we once inaugurated by sampling 
platinum as an exemplar of certain modal properties.
In this way, given that the standard metre is of the same kind under some description as 
the stuff it is used to measure (that is, given that there already a set of salient internal 
relations which both share), there is no question about how the normative force of the 
normative authority is realised because,
...  the sampling of an object is responsible for the construct of a concept or a measure  
(a  function),  such  that  all  objects  in  the  sample  (in  the  role  of  arguments  of  the 
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function) have values assigned to them as the outcome of the measure. (op. cit.; 335)
And the values in question are assigned to to the relevant objects in the same way as a  
force is distributed through a field, by way of an internal relation; that is, it is in the 
same sense as in the Tractatus a
...proposition  does  not  exist  and  then  have to  be put  in  logical  relations with other 
propositions.  Rather,  insofar  as  a  proposition is  a  determination  of  logical  space,  it  
already stands in logical relations to the totality of propositions that constitute the whole 
of  logical  space:  ‘A  proposition  can  determine  only  one  place  in  logical  space: 
nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it'  (TLP 3.4).  The  
logical relation between a proposition and the rest of logical space is not one that has to 
be established. An internal relation between a proposition and the whole of logical space 
is intrinsic to the system of representation to which a proposition essentially belongs and 
which constitutes it as the proposition it is. (McGinn 2006; 216)
That is, the relations of responsibility within a particular logical space are nothing over 
and above the internal relations which are intrinsic to that particular space; which are, 
in turn, nothing over and above the properties of the things within a certain sample 
space.  To  think  relations  of  responsibility  within  a  particular  logical  space  are 
something over and above the internal relations at play is to invoke something both 
superfluous and metaphysically problematic (cf. 2.5-2.6).
Considering Avital's account of inaugurating logical spaces, then, allows us to retain 
the  useful  sense  in  which  simples  were  internally  related  to  one  another  in  the 
Tractatus, whilst freeing us from the thought that if there are simples which are are 
essentially  internally  related, they  are  as  a  consequence  beyond  the  realm  of  the 
sayable. If we, however, followed Avital in demanding that criterial items, from the 
point  of  view of  a  practitioner,  could  not  be  different,  then  we  buy  back  into a 
modified idea of Tractarian determinacy, and lose the connection between the criterion 
and its arbitrary selection from an empirical context.
Importantly in all of this, we have lost the need to look for a criteria of correctness for  
judgements within a particular logical space from outside of that logical space. And, 
relatedly,  we have  lost  the  need to  see one  sort  of  logical  space  being built  upon 
174
another as a relation of justification, and so have retained an important sense in which 
each logical space is autonomously normative.
4.3 The Use of Mythological Method
The points which I initially made in the overview given in 2.5-2.6  have now been 
filled out. Objects themselves – considered as normative role players – can play a 
criterial role, and so form part of our grammar. Objects could not play the roles they do 
if they were not already part of a logical space. And, if such objects do play a criterial  
role, then they ought not normally be held accountable to the standards which they set. 
The rejection of the determinacy of sense, and the adoption of the right sort of idea of 
arbitrariness, frees us to use languages which we stipulate to have particular 
determinate prerequisites. The use of such determinate prerequisites constitutes an 
acceptable, non-metaphysical, form of using a scheme-content dichotomy. It does so 
because we are applying an artificial scheme to an already normative content, and we 
are doing so with a view to describing and not explaining. Filling out the overview of 
2.5-2.6 has thus afforded us a way of talking about the applicability of concepts to the 
empirical world which does not fail in the same way as transcendental idealism does.
I have been using Wittgenstein's transition from the Tractatus to the Investigations to 
illustrate a movement from a tacitly transcendental idealist picture to a picture which 
avoids the problems which motivate transcendental idealism. So to summarise the 
method I have endorsed, I want to take as a point of comparison Wittgenstein's 
description of the difference between his early and later work.
The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole 
examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be 
rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.) (PI 108)
The turn is away from the Tractarian thought that the project of philosophical analysis 
is a project of elucidating the 'crystalline purity' which must be inherent in natural 
language – the determinacy of its sense –  by attending to how language is actually 
used, and using what is found as an immanent basis for transcendentally establishing 
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language's essential nature. That is, away from the thought that,
[w]hat is needed is not an ideal language that replaces natural languages, but an ideal 
notation which brings out the underlying logical structure which sentences in the 
vernacular possessed all along. (Glock 2007; 39) 
Once the turn is made, what, on the Tractarian picture, was thought to be the 
uncovering of a natural 'crystalline structure', in the hands of an investigator who takes 
themselves to be finding out about language's necessary structures by attending to 
natural language, comes to be seen as, the unwitting creation of an artificial language 
which is made artificial by the imposition of the presumption that language has an 
essential structure.
The methodological insight I have drawn from considering Wittgenstein's 'turn' is that 
turning to the second conception of investigating language in a way which does not 
undermine itself by assuming a notion of language's essential structure, requires a re-
appropriation of the use of artificial languages. That is, we must retain the idea that we 
can use idealized languages to bring out the logic of sentences in the vernacular, but 
we ought not think that we can do so because sentences in the vernacular are part of a 
single 'crystalline structure'.
Instead of ousting artificial languages outright (a move which we have seen leads to a 
dogmatism of its own kind in the cases of Avital and Read), artificial languages must 
come to be viewed as a tool required for investigation by an ongoing process of 
comparison (a comparison between artificial languages and language as we use it) 
rather than as making perspicuous a mythical end of investigation – languages already 
'crystalline structure'. That is, we describe what we do with language by creating 
simple language games – as Diamond did with her Susan-metre – and then putting 
them to work in order better to describe particular parts of the normative and modally 
structured multiplicity of world and language which we inhabit.
The methodological shift is this: instead of seeing ourselves as paying attention to to 
the confused multiplicities of ordinary language in order to gain insight into language's 
true underlying crystalline form (that is, striving to represent used language's true 
176
conceptual unity perspicuously), the investigation is turned into a project of using ideal 
languages (which are created by stipulating a conceptual unity) in order to bring into 
view part of the boundless modal and normative multiplicity of the world of which our 
language use is a spatial and temporal part.  
The idea, then, is this: constitutive descriptions of simple languages are intransitive 
inasmuch as they are the inauguration of a set of internal relations. By inaugurating 
internal relations in this way, we  employ “a definition in terms of necessary 
conditions” (Kuusela 2008; 182) with regard to a model of the object of our 
investigation, whilst refraining from demanding that for an object of investigation to 
fall under the concept we are interested in, it must meet those necessary conditions. In 
doing this, we deploy a non-dogmatic form of a scheme-content dichotomy: we 
stipulate the determinate prerequisites of an idealised model in order to create a point  
of comparison to the way in which we already do things. 
My use of term 'Mythological', then, is intended to capture the sense in which we use 
necessarily incomplete idealisations in order to describe the modal nexus we inhabit.  
These idealisations have, at their bedrock, stipulations, or intransitive definitions, 
which, if taken to be themselves representative of the way whatever the object of 
investigation is, lead us to fall prey to the use of super-pictures. If we confuse features 
of the prerequisites of representation with features of what is represented we attribute 
to the world intrinsically normative properties. It is thus inappropriate to make claims 
about the truth or falsity of the prerequisites of such models. This is the sense in which,
in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games and calculi which have 
fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language must be playing such a 
game.....this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater 
clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also 
become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence 
and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. (PI 81)
In summary, the thought I want to uphold is this: prior to the possibility of there being 
rules which express what we do, there must be some sort of doing – a normatively and 
modally structured multiplicity which we exploit by appropriating parts of it into our 
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grammar. What I am terming 'mythological method' is the production of models of 
parts of the logical multiplicity we inhabit and what we do within it – a method 
constituted by our production of simple language games constituted by our stipulation 
of internal relations – which ought to be seen as objects of comparison. These objects 
of comparison, then, serve to both:
• Elucidate similarity: objects of comparison allow us to elucidate modal and 
normative relations within the multiplicity of relations we inhabit (such as the 
entailments and commitments a truth-functional analysis would show). Such 
elucidations then afford a way to isolate further features of our empirical 
situation as salient, and saliently related.
• Elucidate dissimilarity: objects of comparison allow us to elucidate ways in 
which idealisations are dissimilar to the roles the parts of our language games 
they represent play (such as the disanalogy between the role the standard metre-
stick plays in our practices of measurement and the role it is described as playing 
by a truth-functional analysis).
If the second, as well as the first, function of  deploying mythological language games 
is intelligible, we have a way of using particular cases to show that the very possibility 
of exhaustive description, or explanation of the prerequisites of sense is mythical; an 
idea that, if ignored, results in dogmatism – presuming that the stipulated features of 
objects of comparison must represent necessary features of the object of comparison. 
Such a confusion situates us within the circle of confusions which I described in the 
introduction (cf. p.11).
By recognising disanalogies between idealised languages and our practices, we have a 
method for coming to see that idealised languages are created by treating a criterion 
within a particular logical space as intrinsically normative. Inasmuch as we recognise 
the idealised language as a simplified model of what we normally do with language, 
we recognise the logical multiplicity of the idealised languages to be impoverished in 
relation to the multiplicity of that which they model. Objects of  comparison thus allow 
us to see that a richer modal nexus than that exhibited by an idealised language is a 
prerequisite of any concept's application. Seeing that the modal nexus we inhabit 
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outstrips any particular object of comparison, then, shows that creating objects of 
comparison cannot yield an exhaustive description of the object of investigation. In 
order to be an object of comparison, that object must, in being formed by taking 
particular features of the modal nexus we inhabit to be criterial, miss out some aspects 
of the multiplicity we inhabit.
So, by taking some portion of what we do as foundational we can model particular 
features of 'how we go on' on as if they were ultimately essential. Doing so is valuable: 
we make explicit the accountability that is already implicit in concept use (and, more  
generally, what we do), and we then may use the outcome of this to recursively model 
further aspects of our worldly practices. Once we take this thought seriously we can 
accommodate the following sort of thought.
Following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game. It 
characterises what we call description (RFM VI-28)
And we can accommodate the above sort of thought in a way which allows us to 
refrain from the destructive idea that we might exhaustively describe the 'bedrock' of 
our conceptual lives; the thought that we might provide an exhaustive explanation by 
completely representing the prerequisites of concept use. It is in this sense that,
...we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as 
what it is, as an object of comparison— as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a 
preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (PI 131)
What deploying what I am terming mythological method allows us to show, then, is 
the emptiness of dogmatically determinate characterisations of the prerequisites of our 
normative lives, not (contra Read) the emptiness of bedrock-talk itself. 
What I have intended to present in this section is not a prescription for the execution of 
philosophical method; for I do not think there is any one such thing. Nor have I made a 
claim about how to adjudicate between correct and incorrect philosophical pictures; for 
to buy into the thought that there could be criteria for correctness for accounts of the 
prerequisites of concept use would be to make the confusion I have been warning 
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against. Rather, I have only been presenting a method for showing how, by starting 
from a case by case basis, totalising philosophical claims can be destructive to the 
endeavour of making sense of what we are doing when we normally assert that things 
are true or false. The use of philosophical pictures can be destructive in this way if that 
use commits us to treating the qualities we stipulate an object of comparison to have to 
be an essential feature of what we are investigating. For to do so is to invoke 
determinate prerequisite of sense of the kind which could not play a role within a 
normative context, and of the kind we find in the lineage of transcendental idealism. 
This in no sense demotes what we do when philosophising to merely making 
comparisons between different ways of looking at the same thing. The comparison 
made by Diamond, for instance, allowed us both to stop using a way of looking at a 
thing on the grounds that that way of looking was obscuring the very thing we wanted 
to look at, and at the same time brought into view the role of criterial objects in 
particular contexts. 
Also, it is important to note that none of what I have claimed stops sentences like 'if 
what Kripke asserts about the standard metre-stick is true, then what Wittgenstein 
asserts about the standard metre-stick is false' being true – it just pushes us to ask what 
the particular preconditions of that claim being found to be true or false are. As 
Diamond demonstrated, the particular preconditions which we would have to assume 
for Kripke's claim to be true, are destructive of the very possibility of sense. 
To desire a more general way of thinking of truth and falsity than that which we glean 
from attending to what accord and discord with normative authorities amounts to in 
particular situations is to desire after the sort of totalising view of normative 
phenomena we have been at pains to avoid. A view which, in presuming that there 
must be sense to some determinate criteria of correctness which stand outside of the 
context for which they are criteria, presumes a metaphysical picture of the relation 
between normative force and normative authority. As we have seen such metaphysical 
pictures disconnects normative authorities from the contexts in which they have 
normative force.
In the next chapter I want to show how the stance we have developed in this thesis so 
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far can be applied to perhaps the most pernicious source of scheme-content 
dichotomies: the idea of the causal as opposed to the normative.
181
Chapter 5: Our Relation to Causes
This chapter will present a short application of the description of the relation between 
norms and the world which I have developed in the thesis so far to the idea of causality 
and our relation to particular causes.
Part of the point of waiting until now to do so is to fill out the idea that the Kantian 
transcendental idealist posits an external relation between the normative realm and the 
realm of substance in a way which would have taken a substantial digression from the 
argument at various junctures in this thesis (in the Introduction, 1.32, and 3-3.11).
I am also presenting the account in this chapter as an extended conclusion to the thesis 
for the following reasons. The aim of this thesis has been to show that if we try to treat 
the empirical world as externally related to the norms which make it intelligible to us,  
then we inevitably disconnect normative authority from normative force. The Kantian 
transcendental idealist endeavoured to solve this problem by explaining how concepts 
are partly constitutive of the empirical world. However, the manner of this explanation 
is self-undermining because it reinstates the problem it intends to solve. This sort of 
self-undermining approach, I have argued, is hard to shake off, because it is a symptom 
of a deep problem in the philosophical methodology we have inherited. I have 
endeavoured to bring this point out in two ways:
1.  Through a series of illustrations of symptoms of tacitly retaining some aspect of 
the transcendental idealist picture within accounts which are making an effort to 
jettison such a picture; cases where either despite the picturer's intentions, 
pictures of mind and world require for their cogency super-pictures or norms 
which are intelligible independently of their application; or, super-pictures and 
norms which are intelligible independently of their application are avoided by 
explaining how the realm of norms is autonomous using an appeal to a 
metaphysical picture which itself then serves as a problematic determinate 
prerequisite of sense (cf . 2.31-2.6, 3.1-3.33, 4-4.25).
2.  Through showing that in each instance of a picturer retaining too much of the 
transcendental idealist picture, a variation upon a particular sort of confusion 
has been manifest. In misconstruing the role of objects of comparison within 
our everyday use of language (because of failing to fully shake-off the picture 
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of sense having determinate prerequisites), these objects of comparison have 
been cast as only being capable of playing the normative role they do if there is 
a criterion of correctness for their use which is a determinate prerequisite of this 
use.
Treatments of causality are a flashpoint for such confusions, because the opposition 
between causal relations and one sort of normative relation appears natural and obvious 
–  being caused to have an experience does not justify one in believing that what one 
has experienced is true. If one does not draw the distinction between relations between 
logical spaces, and relations within logical spaces (as I did at 2.5-2.6, 4.25-4.3), then 
one runs together all relations between normatively structured objects and justificatory 
relations. If one thinks relations between normatively structured objects just are 
justificatory relations, then an account such as mine will, in being seen through the lens 
of this confusion, seem simply absurd. 
Worse still, such a confusion may make the illicit metaphysical pictures of Sacks, 
Steiner, and Rorty, appear necessary because, given the presumption of the 
anormativity of causes, if one is to avoid a disconnection between normative authority 
and normative force by casting the realm of normativity as autonomous (i.e. externally 
related to the world), then one has to oppose norms to causes. If one is to make such an 
opposition, then one ought to justify it, and the only way to do so is via an appeal to a 
sort of metaphysical picture which disconnects normative force from normative 
authority. Views that result when this is done are destructive of the idea that parts of the 
natural world can be normative authorities, and we ought to take this fact at face value, 
because if we try to explain how we can, we buy back into the Kantian problematic.
To make this extended conclusion, then, I will make the following moves. I will 
describe how Kant did not oppose causes to norms, but nonetheless erred in attempting 
to explain this lack of opposition by way of a prior opposition between the categories 
and substance. Then I will show that we can preserve some of Kant's positive insights, 
and that, in doing so, we can show an idea of a realm of anormative substance to be 
superfluous –  in the sense developed in the last three chapters – to the possibility of 
our causal concepts having content, and superfluous to that content also. This will serve 
to lay the ground for showing that causality is inherently normative in a way we ought 
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to take at face value (for if we do not take the normativity inherent in causality at face 
value, we buy back into the game of giving external explanations). Identifying what 
should count as a cause of which specific entity or event is dependent upon a wider 
modal and causal context which is normative in the way brought out in the football 
example examined at the very beginning of this thesis.
5.1 Framing
In this section I will explicate a prerequisite of establishing that we do not have to 
appeal to anything outside of the logical space of causes to understand causes 
themselves. The prerequisite in question is that we can tell a story about the relation 
between our grasp of the primary/secondary quality distinction and our grasp of a 
notion of objectivity without appealing to a distinction between the intrinsic properties 
of things and the relational properties of things. I will explicate this by borrowing from 
Langton's recent discussion of Locke's and Kant's varying but related usage of the 
primary/secondary quality distinction (1998).
Langton's discussion is especially useful because she convincingly shows both how 
subtle mistakes concerning the status of secondary qualities can lead to confusions 
between epistemological and metaphysical issues, and how, if we do not run together 
secondary qualities and phenomenological qualities, we can read Kant as offering a 
way of thinking of instances of causality as objectively real, internally related to our 
receptivity to them, and internally related to a larger causal nexus.
Langton reads Kant as inheriting particular parts of a metaphysical picture from Locke: 
Locke makes a primary/secondary/tertiary distinction (henceforth the P/S/T distinction) 
between the intrinsic properties of objects, the causal powers of objects which we 
happen to be sensitive to, and the wider class of causal powers which objects 
objectively have irrespective of our sensitivities.
The point of casting the distinction like this is to emphasise that we ought not to read 
Locke as using the terms ‘primary' and ‘secondary' to draw a distinction between things 
as they are in themselves and Lockean ideas, or more generally, as a distinction 
between the scientific and manifest images. Rather, although Locke's secondary 
properties are individuated according to our sensitivity to them, they are not 
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metaphysically dependent upon our sensitivity to them; they are special cases of the 
objective tertiary properties of objects – ones which always have humans as a relata.
Given, then, the objective status of all of the elements of Locke's P/S/T distinction – 
because the distinction is primarily metaphysical – we ought to ask what the relations 
between each element are. With regards to S/T, it seems clear that the distinction is  
metaphysically arbitrary: in as much as S is a subset of T, the two are of the same kind, 
and are distinguishable only by way of contingent facts about the sorts of things we are.
The difference between P and S/T, however, is more substantial: as we have seen it is a 
distinction within the scientific image,
Powers, like primary qualities, are in an object ‘whether we perceive them or no'; yet, 
Locke thinks, they are not in the object ‘as it is in itself'. This means there is a sense in 
which a property can fail to be in a thing ‘as it is in itself' for reasons other than its 
perceiver dependence. (Langton 1998; 149)
So there is an ontological separation here: as well as the object 'as it is in itself' there 
are also powers, and, in being perceiver independent, both are of equal interest to 
natural science. Further, as “there is a sense in which a property can fail to be in a thing 
'as it is in itself'”, the metaphysical question of how powers relate to the objects as they 
are in themselves becomes pertinent.
What is the sense in which objects can fail to possess a power? The thought is that the 
primary properties are the original qualities of an object – those qualities such that 
a thing can have them whether or not there is anything else around (op. cit.; 153)
Such properties are thus intrinsic properties. On the other hand powers are essentially 
relational: to be realised there must be more than one intrinsic property on the scene. 
Thus, importantly, primary properties are a metaphysical bedrock; without such 
properties there would be no relations between substances, and so, no powers.
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Now that the P/T distinction has been recast as an intrinsic/relational distinction, we 
can say a little more about the nature of the relation between the two ontological 
categories. The relation is modally free, i.e. external, as Locke, like Kant, held that 
no matter how many substances God cares to create, mere addition of substances 
with their intrinsic properties will never endow the substances with their relations, 
or powers to relate (op.cit.;122-123)
That is, relational properties are superadded to intrinsic properties. We might put this 
thesis in terms of possible worlds:
Could God have made a world of substances with the very same intrinsic 
properties that substances have in our world, and yet have made the world with 
different laws – or no laws at all – governing the dynamical relations of 
substances? (op. cit.; 119)
On Locke's picture the answer is clearly 'yes', and so 
the powers of things do not supervene on the intrinsic properties of things. Since 
what matters is not how many things there are, but what laws there are. (ibid).
Given that the two ontological categories are thought to be externally related – i.e. not 
logically related – and we are only privy to facts about one of the relata, then no set of 
facts about the results of those laws can tell us anything about the intrinsic nature of 
objects. This stance creates an epistemological mystery for Locke: how might we have 
knowledge of intrinsic properties at all?
The innovation Langton now makes is to use the above separation to show that Kant's 
categories allow him a position which suffers neither from the ills of phenomenalism 
nor from the epistemological mystery surrounding how we relate to intrinsic properties. 
For, although Kant inherits the distinction between intrinsic properties and relational 
properties from Locke, he does not use the term 'primary' as a label for intrinsic 
properties. Rather, he inherits the use of the term 'primary' as a label for whatever 
“properties [are] ascribed to bodies by science” (op. cit.; 156). 
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Now, Kant differs from Locke as regards the reach of scientific enquiry: whereas for 
Locke both primary (intrinsic) and tertiary (relational) qualities are the objective aim of  
scientific enquiry, for Kant intrinsic properties are a transcendental requirement for the 
possibility of scientific investigation – for there must be a substrata if there are to be 
relations – and so cannot themselves be an object of scientific enquiry. So, to interpret 
charitably Kant's talk of primary qualities, we should take them to be the properties 
Locke describes as tertiary. That is, when Kant talks of primary qualities he is not 
including talk of anything intrinsic, but rather is talking of the causal powers of objects: 
the capacity of objects to effect change in other objects which are only capable of being 
individuated by observing their place within a network of such changes.
The grounds for attributing this interpretation to Kant's use of 'primary qualities' is the 
superfluity of intrinsic properties in relation to the content of scientific claims. 
Scientific enquiry gives us criteria of individuation for empirical entities by charting 
the circumstances in which they change and in which they do not change by holding 
some dispositions fixed in order to note the variance in others. Likewise, for Kant, the 
only way in which we are receptive to the world of objects is through being a part of 
the same causal order and through being able to be receptive to effects in such a way as 
to perform an implicit analogue of scientific enquiry. We are sensitive to ourselves as a 
locus of the causal order inasmuch as we can take it that changes we undergo are part 
of a wider modal order encompassing these changes. In this regard, we need to be 
aware that there is a wider modal order – a point which will become very important 
when discussing Strawson and Evans, below.
So, for Langton's Kant, if something is not part of the causal order, it cannot be an 
object of scientific enquiry. Nor can it be intelligible to our receptivity. Furthermore,  
intrinsic properties cannot be part of the causal order. Thus, “Humility … follow[s] 
from Receptivity given Irreducibility” (op. cit.; 127). Given that we cannot be in direct 
contact with intrinsic properties, and that intrinsic properties are externally related to  
laws and so cannot be got at through a reduction, we ought to admit that we can know 
nothing of them.  I share this thought to a degree, and much of the current chapter will 
concern the relation between the irreducibility and receptivity claims. If we are to make 
sense of receptivity  at all, we have to take causal powers and our experience of them to 
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be internally related. However, the consequence of this is that the application of   the 
idea of humility presumes too much: if we can find no possible role for intrinsic 
properties to play in our notion of cause, and in causes per se, we should not presume 
to think that talk of the intrinsic properties of things makes sense at all. Intrinsic 
properties are, in the idiom of chapter 2, not part of the same logical space as empirical 
statements and their grounds; they are thus, sense-wise, superfluous.
Thus, I diverge from Langton's Kant at the making of what I think is a persistent and 
pernicious assumption: that an object's intrinsic properties and their powers are 
externally related. I will return to the assumption in more detail below. For now, 
though, to bring out the way in which I agree with Langton's Kant, and to embellish the 
connection between modal sensitivity and empirical thought, I want to look at 
Langton's application of this position to a more contemporary Kantian debate.
5.2 Strawson, Evans and Space
Seeing Kant as using the primary/secondary quality distinction to distinguish between 
the class of causal powers of objects and the class of causal powers we are receptive to 
allows Langton to clarify some issues in the literature surrounding Strawson's 
Individuals (1964). Strawson there made a case for the dependency of our concept of 
objectivity upon a notion of space, or something which plays the role space plays for 
us. For our purposes it is sufficient to say that the role the analogue of space played in 
Strawson's argument was to provide a system of reference which allowed agents to 
reidentify qualitative episodes as the same qualitative episode as before, by attaching a 
unique quality to those episodes.
Evans responded by showing that the notion of space at play in Strawson's argument 
“beg[s] the question in a subtle but decisive way” (Evans 1985: 259). The thought is 
this: objectivity is dependent upon the possibility of re- identification, and re-
identification relies on distinguishing between types and tokens. (If we could not do so 
then we may well be either counting the same thing as many different things, or 
counting many things of the same type as a single thing.) To distinguish types from 
tokens we must be able to differentiate more than one thing of the same type, and to be 
able to perform such a differentiation we need to be able to give sense to the thought 
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that two such tokens can exist simultaneously. According to Evans, Strawson's 
analogue of space is not capable of providing us with the information required to give 
sense to the thought that two tokens of the same type can exist simultaneously, for 
attaching a further quality to a qualitative episode merely creates a new qualitative  
experience.
By Evans' lights, experience of space in which two things of the same type can exist 
simultaneously is still not sufficient grounds for a concept of objectivity. For it only 
provides us with an array of structured information rather than supplying grounds for 
individuating that information in one way rather than another. In order to associate 
observational information appropriately, a grasp of the primary/secondary distinction is 
needed, insofar as, in distinguishing between events in our biography and events per se, 
we must already see the events of our mental lives as grounded by something which 
outstrips those particular mental episodes. If we did not have this prior conceptual 
apparatus there would be nothing to our experience other than its phenomenal 
character, and if the phenomenal character is exhausted by the sensation produced 
within us by a certain stimuli, then we would be stuck with Strawson's initial problem: 
we would have no grounds upon which to distinguish re-encountering an individual 
from the recurrence of a subjective mental state. 
Evans nicely captured the picture he intended the primary/secondary quality distinction 
to be a supplement to by way of the following analogy:
There is a group of currencies actively traded against the others in a situation of floating 
exchange rates. The basic propositions for describing this system will be of the form '£1 
= $1.75 at the end of ... days trading'. But we can imagine the description enriched by the 
introduction of the idea of the value of the £. (op. cit.; 115)
If this is all there is to the pound, and the value of the pound is analogous to spatial 
properties of objects, Evans claims that it is plain to see that the spatial properties are 
reducible to mere relations. What is needed by Evans' lights is a prior grounding for the 
analogue of the value of the pound – a sort of gold standard.
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Evans claims that there are only two places to look if one wants to find the grounds of 
conditional claims: to a regular experience of such conditionals, or to some categorical 
(by which he means intrinsic) grounds for that conditional. He decides upon the second 
option, roughly, because to experience something regularly is not to experience a 
regularity as a regularity – presuming that it is begs the question. Because we have 
considered such problems in chapter 2 (cf. 2.3-2.32), and because I want to get to a 
third option –  which Evans omits – I will not dwell on the details of Evans' choice. The 
third option is the line Langton's Kant takes: the objective grounds of the object's 
propensity to produce events with a certain phenomenal character are further 
dispositions.
What Langton's Kant allows us to see is that the third option is a live one because – as 
intrinsic properties are radically inaccessible to empirical agents – intrinsic properties 
cannot themselves be prerequisites for a notion of objectivity (they are, as we have seen 
in the case of private sensations and other super-pictures, normatively inert (cf. 4.11)). 
Rather, the idea of intrinsic properties is, if cogent at all, a transcendental leap away 
from the immanent objective experience of objects within the phenomenal world.
Evans missed this by conflating the fact that the effects of objects' secondary properties 
upon us are exhausted by a description of their phenomenal character with the 
assumption that the grounds of the effects of secondary properties are exhausted by 
phenomenal character. Thus he aligned the dispositional with the realm of appearance 
and the intrinsic with the objective.
It would have been all the better for Evans' account if he had not made this conflation: 
the conflation does not lend his account any substance, and in fact leads to its downfall. 
We can see this by looking at the seemingly insurmountable final challenge which 
holding to this conflation produces. If we conflate notions of objectivity with notions of 
intrinsic properties, and assume we have to account for our notion of objectivity, then 
the following question must be answered: 'Add as much conceptual apparatus into the 
picture as you like, if all the conceptual apparatus can do is deal with the secondary and 
tertiary qualities (both thought of as subject-dependent) by giving a more general 
conditional under which they fall, how can we ever discern anything truly objective 
(which under this use of 'objective' means intrinsic)?'.
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If, however, dispositions/tertiary properties have an objective existence, then we do not 
face such a challenge. If we do not face such a challenge then its insurmountability 
cannot be capitalised upon in the way available to relationalists like John Campbell.  
Campbell (2002) argues that nothing short of perceptual contact with the 
categorical/intrinsic properties of objects would be sufficient to explain our possession 
of the notion of objectivity. For, if all we are ever presented with are qualities which are 
secondary and thus subject dependent, we have no way of accounting for the 
information which would ground our possession of the notion of mind independence.
The anti-representational motivation for relationalism – where the relation is to the 
categorical properties of objects conceived of as intrinsic properties – is then, if 
Langton's Kant is right, lost: Kantian Humility does not entail a representationalism as 
Campbell conceives of it because the effect of the causal powers of objects upon us are 
not claimed to produce experiences with content which outstrips those causal powers. 
The Receptive agent is sensitive to the very causal powers which effect her, and the 
objects of her experience are the phenomenal objects which are thoroughly exhausted 
by tertiary properties. Nothing unreachable is being represented because a grasp of 
causal properties does not require a grasp of intrinsic (non-relational) properties.
Before we move on to talk about the positive aspects of Evans' account, I want to draw 
attention to the similarity between the issue at hand and that which I examined in 
chapter 2. I want to do so to make a start toward showing that the current problem is 
yet another version of the rule-following paradox. The problem Evans found in 
Strawson could be put like this: 'what makes it appropriate to associate a given set of of 
qualitative episodes of a subject?'; that is, why ought we see one effect upon us as 
appropriately connected to other effects. Evans' and Campbell's solutions are similar 
solutions in that the each take up a different horn of the dilemma that considering rule-
following poses to those looking to explain such associations. Campbell locates the 
required grounding in the objects themselves; Evans locates the required grounding it 
in our innate capacities. The more satisfying solution is, I take it, to reject the picture 
which makes such a grounding seem necessary – that is, a picture upon which the 
grounds and the experience are not externally related. I hope to show this much in the 
rest of the current chapter.
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5.21 Primitive Mechanics
The intention behind showing how Langton's clarification reflected upon the debate 
surrounding Strawson's Individuals is to reinvigorate that debate as part of a descriptive 
project which seeks to conduct itself without anything transcendent. The thought is that 
once we have explained away the realist anxiety that primary properties must be 
intrinsic, and the realist conviction that we must have contact with them in order to 
ground our notion of objectivity, we can hold to the following claim:
To grasp these primary [or tertiary, once reinterpreted] properties, one must master a set 
of interconnected principles which make up an elementary theory - of primitive 
mechanics - into which these properties fit, and which alone gives them sense. One must 
grasp the idea of a unitary spatial framework in which both oneself and the bodies of 
which one has experience have a place, and through which they move continuously. One 
must learn of the conservation of matter in different shapes, of the identity of matter 
perceived from different points of view and through different modalities, and of the 
persistence of matter through gaps in observation. One must learn how bodies compete 
for the occupancy of positions in space, and of the resistance one body may afford to the 
motion of another. And so on. (Evans 1985: 269)
And we must do so without the fear that we are providing, as it were, a syntax of our 
concept of objective space-occupying-stuff which ultimately lacks a semantics. That is,  
if dispositions are real and do not require grounding, the question 'what gives content to 
our thought about objective lynchpins which are external to the realm of causal 
relations?' no longer needs to be asked.
I want to bring a little more out of the claim that we can make the move described 
above – making an internal description of our conception of objective objects  – by 
merely showing that there must be a reciprocal relationship between any one 
disposition and a wider array of dispositions. For properly describing this relationship 
allows us to see that, if we accept that causal powers are irreducible, there is an 
unproblematic way of buying into Evans' claim that
expressions referring to 'places' [have] identity conditions [which] are tied to a 
whole network of propositions...but to no one taken individually (1985; 288)
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– For being involved in such a reciprocal relationship already provides us with all we 
need to make sense of the objectivity of dispositions. So we do not need to 
accommodate within our account a theoretical conception of intrinsic properties as 
things which stand behind a set of dispositions and ground them, but we can never 
directly know. (That is, we do not need to accept into our account a notion of intrinsic 
properties which privileges normative force in the problematic way first pointed out at 
1.32).
By looking back over chapters 3 and 4, we can see that if such a reciprocal picture 
seems mysterious, its seeming mystery ensues from the sort of mis-picturing of 
conceptual bedrock discussed in relation to Williams, Rorty (3.3-3.4), and Read (4.13). 
It seems mysterious because one has already bought into the idea of absolute 
objectivity as being guaranteed by an appeal to the intrinsic underpinnings of a causal 
nexus. And such an appeal presumes an unwarranted assumption of an ineffable 
determinate prerequisite of sense (4).
We can show this much by:
• on the one hand, examining how attempts to ground the norms which enable 
our experience of the causal properties of space occupying stuff in some 
acausal standard fails in the same way as all the other attempts to draw 
normative authority from an anormative source have (cf. 1 and 2)  – an aim 
which I will meet by examining pictures of causality which feature intrinsic 
properties as such standards in 5.3 - 5.33.
• on the other hand, making clear that if we allow ourselves only resources 
which are internal to the reciprocal relation between particular causes and a 
wider causal and modal nexus, we have as full a notion of objectivity as we 
need to make sense of the objectivity needed for claims about particular causes 
– I will outline this thought now.
5.22 Reciprocation
In chapter 2 I showed that, to make sense of the content of an experience of a visual 
scene presenting space-occupying-stuff as space-occupying-stuff, one had to be able to 
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associate the aspects of objects seen from the present point of view with an array of 
possible aspects seen from different points of view (cf .2.2-2.3). If this is true, then the 
immediate grounds for any particular apprehension of space-occupying-stuff must just 
be further relations. For what allows us to make sense of one point of view upon a 
scene as a scene in a spatial arena is the compatibility of the scene visible from the 
present point of view with actual and possible scenes viewed from other positions, and 
the same conditions hold for these scenes which might be viewed from other positions.
Evans' worry about phenomenal reduction could now be put in terms of the modal 
structure all of these sorts of relations constitute.That is, we have an idea of an aspect 
of some space-occupying- stuff having to sit amidst a nexus constituted by a 
community of its own kind (cf. 2.2-2.21, 4.25) but this is a mere network of relations, 
and so can only serve as an analogue of the sort of idea of space which Evans showed 
needs to be supplemented with a theory of primitive mechanics. 
In Chapter 2, to make sense of how appealing to a notion of space constituted by these 
sorts of relations could give content to a concept of a spatially unified object which we 
would need to experience-space-occupying stuff as space-occupying-stuff, I introduced 
the idea that inherent in the sensitivity to very general internal relations between 
aspects of space-occupying-stuff is a sort of indeterminacy (one which a proponent of a 
dispositional account of our ability to appropriately associate aspects of objects could 
not cope with). In other words, as we saw with the case of the football in Chapter 1, 
once some criteria set the standard for what is strongly internally related to what within 
a logical space, weak internal relations articulate an array of possible networks of 
actual modal relations (cf. 1.1-1.2). Many different possibilities, then, could satisfy the 
norms which articulate which internal relations are implicated in the individuation of  
space-occupying-stuff. 
What I am presently intending to emphasise about the role of indeterminacy in the 
experience of an aspect of space-occupying-stuff as space-occupying-stuff is that it is 
constitutive of the experience of an aspect of space-occupying-stuff as objective. 
Without allowing for such determinacy we would divest a description of our perceptual 
experience of the normativity which is constitutive of its content; we would be left with 
a picture of experience of space-occupying-stuff as comprised of independently 
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intelligible dispositions and disembodied norms (cf. 2.1-2.4). So, for an aspect of an 
object to be visually present to a subject as such, it must be that the aspect is presented 
as bearing indeterminate, though modally constrained, relations to other aspects. If this 
information were not present then we simply would not be experiencing an aspect of 
space-occupying-stuff as objective.
Appreciating this indeterminacy, I also argued, serves as a prerequisite of a sensitivity 
to the at once more specific and more contingent relations which articulate what it is to  
be a sort of thing which falls under the wider sortal of space-occupying-stuff (cf. 2.2-
2.3). We thus arrived at this image: relations which are to be counted as internal to the 
capacity of identifying space-occupying-stuff provide a framework upon which other 
accidental relations can be realised. Objects individuated by recourse to these 
accidental relations can then stand as criteria for identifying relations internal to a more 
particular logical space (cf. 2.2-2.3).This is one particular way in which internal 
relations are a prerequisite of external relations.
A notion of possible causal relations outstrips causal relations which we are at any 
given point privy to, and, I am likewise claiming, goes hand in hand with the separation 
between tertiary and secondary properties. In having an appreciation of the possible 
multitude of different ways things could be from the way we expect, we have the 
resources to appreciate that there may be ways an object is of which we do not know. 
Furthermore, the very possibility of experiencing any disposition at all is dependent 
upon our appreciation of the particular ways it may be associated with other 
dispositions.
We can enrich our appreciation of the causal nexus we inhabit as a causal nexus (which 
is different from just being aware of the causal nexus in itself), then, by describing our 
engagement with it by empirical method (1.51-1.6). A prerequisite of deploying such a 
method is already being rule-followers which we having seen to involve the capacity to 
make the sort of novel extension of perceptual norms I characterised at 2.2, and to to 
attribute properties to the modal nexus we inhabit by holding parts of it fixed and 
varying others (1.51-1.56): we treat things which are part of a modal and normative 
landscape we already inhabit as criteria in order to continually assess and determine 
what is internally related to what, and to discover external relations.
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The resources an agent needs in order to gain an appreciation of the capacity for causal 
powers of objects (Kant's tertiary qualities) to outstrip our knowledge of them is, then, 
something like this:
• for a sensitivity to objective dispositions to be realised, the normative ability to 
isolate a particular power of an object is required; if this ability is to be realised 
we must be able both to hold fixed a power's relation to an array of related 
powers –  for the sorts of reasons Kant gave when making a case for tertiary 
properties being the object of science – and to have the ability to accommodate 
novel extensions of the array of related powers.
If we have allowed this much then we already have allowed that we have an awareness 
of a modal structure which outstrips our immediate apprehension; and so, we already 
have accounted for something which plays the objectivity-giving role of Evans' 
primary properties. And we have done so without positing possession of a concept of 
something which is radically inaccessible to any subject. As such, the causal powers of 
an object need not be thought to be experienced as  unified in virtue of a theory about 
their intrinsic grounds; the unity falls out of the internal relation between the nexus of 
causal powers which must –  if we are to appreciate any one causal power as a causal 
power of some space occupying stuff –  be appreciated to outstrip the part of the modal 
nexus we are presently aware of. 
Thus, a similar move to the Kantian move is being made here: mysterious primary 
properties are being replaced with objective tertiary properties constituted by the 
internal relations between aspects of the environment we inhabit. 
So we have re-encountered the same sort of question as we did in chapter 2 – what 
makes it appropriate to associate experiences of aspects of space occupying stuff –  and 
can now retrace the steps between chapters 2 and 4 to see that the question of what 
grounds the association is not as problematic as it might seem.
Once the particular mode of dependence argued for in chapter 2 is realised, we also 
must accept that the immediate experience of some causal power (my analogue of 
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Evans' secondary properties) is unintelligible unless its content is the occupation of a 
place in an interwoven network of synchronically and diachronically related causal 
powers. The content of a present experience is only present as content in virtue of 
being experienced as holding a place in a network of causal powers where the network 
is constituted by other causal powers. Inasmuch as the dependence is symmetrical in 
the case of both spatial and causal properties, the characterisation of secondary 
properties offered by Evans – 
For an object to have [a secondary property] is for it to be such that, if certain 
beings were suitably situated, they would be affected with certain experiences 
(1985;  268-269)
 – is unavailable in separation from the notion of an objective network of properties (in 
the sense of a network which outstripping our awareness). So the very idea of the 
worrying phenomenal reduction is unintelligible – it digs below bedrock.
Thus, I suggest that we can recast Evans' primary/secondary distinction as an interplay 
between the placing of an experience within a network of experiences, and the network 
of experiences being re-informed by such placings (cf. 2, particularly 2.6). The upshot 
of doing so is that the idea of a primitive mechanics as a conceptual prerequisite of 
empirical experience is maintained in a way which does not instantiate a problematic  
relation between normative force and normative authority by opposing the theoretical 
abilities of the perceiver to the merely causal (anormative) experience of empirical  
qualities. We can encompass the core of Evans' insight – that it cannot be the case that 
being in perceptual contact with an anormative quality can put us in a position to be 
able to cognise it35  –  by on the one hand describing primitive mechanics as our ability 
to appreciate and exploit our place within a network of normative and modal relations; 
and on the other hand by describing perceptual contact with primary qualities as 
contact with something always already modally and normatively structured.
35
Which is the same sort of idea as I expressed as the modal myth of the given 1.51, and as a problem 
for the simple dualist 2.31.
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5.23 Summary
What is distinctive about the claim about the relation of intrinsic properties and causal  
powers given Kantian Humility is its weakness: it is not a supervenience claim to the 
effect that the powers of the object result from the intrinsic properties of objects. It is 
rather just to claim that the existence of substance is a prerequisite of the existence of 
powers; that
substance which has [a] power must have some intrinsic property or other if it is to be a 
substance at all (Langton 1998; 175).
It is in this sense that the role of intrinsic properties in Langton's Kant's picture is 
different from the role of intrinsic properties in Evans' picture. On Kant's picture we 
move to an appreciation of intrinsic properties by arguing that the concept of 
objectivity we already have must depend upon an intrinsic substrata, but that the 
concept is not given content by this dependence. On Evans' picture we possess a 
concept of objectivity because we deploy a theoretical notion of intrinsic properties 
which cannot be directly observed in imminent experience. From the two claims and 
their comparison I would like to retain the idea that a concept of objectivity does not 
depend upon an idea of intrinsic properties for its content, and that what might make 
one think that there is such a dependence is a confusion of the sort which Langton's 
Kant avoids.
My view, then, is not Kant's; my view is that we can take Kant's claims about the 
objectivity of dispositions, and, in the manner of chapters 3 and 4, reject the idea that 
there is a story to tell, or justification to give, regarding why such dispositions are 
intelligible to us. To make this clear I want to situate Kant's causal powers view within 
a wider landscape of views pertaining to the truth-makers of particular causal 
statements  and distinguish my view from Kant's.
5.3 Truth-makers for Causal statements
On a Humean or Neo-Humean view there is no such thing as a necessary connection to 
be found in nature. Nature is comprised of the occupants of some basic metaphysical 
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class – for instance, objects, events, or facts – which have “loose and separate” (Hume; 
EHU 74) existences. Their existences are loose and separate inasmuch as there is 
nothing in the totality of intrinsic facts about the occupants of the basic metaphysical 
category which explains why some of that category regularly follow others of that 
category. Thus causal facts are always retrospective, in the following sense: they are 
made true by an operation ranging over the way things happen to have been. Or, more 
precisely for the neo-Humean, they are grounded in regularities across space and time 
in this and in other similar possible worlds, where similar possible worlds are similar 
both in respect of the laws of nature, and of their constituents.
The Nomocist, by contrast, claims that we must admit more than loose and separate 
existents into our ontology in order to account for the content of our causal talk, and 
has a stock of examples to show why. For instance, differentiating causal phenomena 
from pseudo-causal phenomena, the Nomocist would claim, is impossible if our only 
resource is mere regularity, for regularity is characteristic of both phenomena. The 
required extra criterion is gained by positing a universal which necessitates A following 
B in this possible world. Of that universal we can then either say that:
• It has to be the case in every possible world;
• It has to be the case in this possible world, but could be different in other 
possible worlds. 
And then for each of those options we can say that,
• The universal relation supervenes upon the intrinsic properties of objects (i.e the 
universal could not have been the same if the intrinsic properties of the objects 
differed);
• The universal relation is somehow dependent on, but extra to the intrinsic 
properties of objects (i.e. there could have been a possible world with different 
intrinsic properties and the same observable regularities);
• The universal is directly grounded by the intrinsic properties of objects 
inasmuch as objects have as properties causal powers.
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This last option presents an overlap between the Nomocist position and a causal-
powers theory of causality. The powers theorists hold that causal powers are real, and 
that they are not separate from objects – causal powers are properties of objects 
intelligible prior to the appeal to a universal; the properties, not the universals, are the 
truth-makers. The truth of the universal claims fall out of the truth-making work of the 
properties. One way to think of the powers of these objects is to take issue with the 
Humean negative ontological claim concerning the unintelligibility of necessary 
connections in nature. Another way is to grant the Humean claim, but deny that we 
need to think of causes as necessary connections at all.
There is, though, further room for divergence within the causal powers position 
concerning how we characterise objects as having causal powers. We have so far 
ascertained that one can be a causal powers theorist by asserting that the causal power 
is grounded in the intrinsic property of the object. Another way is to eschew the idea of 
intrinsic properties providing a grounding by either adopting a position akin to 
Langton's Kant, or by dropping the idea of intrinsic properties altogether and claiming 
that an object is – under a very particular understanding of causal – nothing more than 
a set of causal powers. 
As I said at 5.23, I think we should take the second option. We should take this option 
because if we do not, then we will fall foul of the problems which in chapters 1 to 4 we 
saw to afflict transcendental idealism widely construed, namely of transgressing the 
bounds of sense in order to secure the sense of our everyday talk of the world, or of 
limiting sense to a particular domain whilst still taking talk which refers to what lies 
outside of that domain to be intelligible.
The particular worry in this case is that if we believe that there must be intrinsic 
properties, that these properties are in some sense related to causal powers, and that
...any conceivable improvement in science will give us only a better pattern of 
dispositions and powers. That's the way physics works . . . (Blackburn 1990; p253)
(– And we believe Blackburn because, for the sort of Kantian reasons explicated earlier 
in this chapter,
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...if we look at the properties of physical objects that physicists are prepared to allow 
them ... these show a distressing tendency to dissolve into relations one object has to 
another. (Armstrong 1968; 74) )
– Then it follows that we must either accept occult non-physical properties which play 
a mysterious grounding role of which we can never know (or at least can only know by 
observing how causal powers are associated – which is just as problematic because it is 
knowledge of intrinsic properties which was meant to allow for the observation of 
causal powers); or we must, with Langton's Kant,  allow for intrinsic properties which 
play no grounding role, and thus are superfluous to our normative lives.
The causal powers view which I advocate can avoid the onus of accounting for the 
relation between truth-maker of causal claims and causal claims themselves. On a 
proper account of causal powers the relation between causality and talk of causality is 
internal, and thus not a candidate for further analysis, so the requirement for the 
provision of objectivity by a relation to ungraspable intrinsic properties is vanquished.
One may, however, still think that causal powers are themselves intrinsic properties; 
this is a view I would like to distinguish from my own for reasons to be given below, at 
and after 5.31 (and the sorts of reasons I gave at 4.1-4.12 for not talking of anything as 
being intrinsically normative). So, I will call the way of treating causal powers I have 
been endorsing the causal powers view (CPV)– the view that we need to appeal to 
nothing more than the place of a causal power within a nexus of causal powers to 
understand a causal power, and, further, that thinking of causes in this way obviates 
talk of intrinsic causal powers. To distinguish my view from theories which seek to 
explain causal powers by relating them to intrinsic properties which are not causal, or 
by taking causal powers  to be sui generis intrinsic properties, let us call these latter 
views causal powers theories (CPT).
Thus, within the causality debate, I think the CPV occupies a novel position: whilst the 
Humean position and the Nomocist position (in one way and another) draw their 
substance from a debate about how to think of the relation between intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties, the view of the causal powers on which intrinsic properties are not 
appealed to –  CPV – need not.
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My interest now is to delineate some of the unwarranted assumptions which motivate 
the bad debate surrounding the relation between intrinsic properties and causes in order 
to show more fully: a) how the powers view need not engage with it; and b) how talk of 
causal powers has substance when considered apart from the debate.
5.31 A Shared Problem
I now want to describe the common ground upon which the positions in the causality 
debate which I eschew lie. To do so I want to examine the similar way in which 
perceptual experience of causing, and the ability to grasp novel causings as causings, 
are treated by some Humeans and Nomocists. I then want to trace this back to a 
presumption about how we must relate to the intrinsic properties of objects – which is a 
problem of the same form as that which we found when examining Dualism in chapter 
2 (cf. 2.11 for an overview ).
To make a start, I want to look at an assumption which looked to certain adherents of 
the Nomocist and Humean camp both to be a necessity and to have ramifications for 
how we think of perceptual experience. I then want to show how even though 
descendants of each line of thought recognise in turn that the ramifications do not 
follow, the picture which made the former claims look natural still has not been 
escaped.
Anscombe (1971) pointed out that some of the early advocates of cause as a necessary 
connection, and some of the advocates of cause as an exceptionless generalisation, take 
the following two commitments to hang together naturally:
• ‘If an effect occurs in one case and a similar effect does not occur in an 
apparently similar case, there must be a relevant further difference' (op. cit.; p.1)
• Particular instances of causality can not be observed directly.
The first commonality is an expression of commitment to a relation between cause and 
effect which guarantees that, given a particular cause, a particular effect must follow. 
The difference between the believer in necessary connection and the believer in 
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exceptionless generalisations is that whilst for the former the 'must' has its force 
because of the existence of necessary connections in nature, the latter explains away 
the need for a metaphysical commitment by treating the 'must' as merely conceptual: it  
is a qualifying criterion for the attribution of cause that a B follows an A in all cases, 
otherwise it is simply not a case of causality that we are talking about. It is in this sense 
that stating an instance of a causing to be “an object, followed by another, and where 
all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second” (Hume; 
EHU, 76) is to express a criterion of causality, rather than to identify a symptom.
Thus, for the Humean the appearance of necessity is a product of the scheme rather 
than the content; observation of constant conjunction increases the likelihood of the 
satisfaction of an exceptionless generalisation; and in reciprocation, causes and effects 
are individuated as conjoined because of the inescapability of the use of the idea of 
such necessary connections in making the empirical world intelligible to us. As the 
inescapability of the use of the idea adds nothing to its justification, we cannot make 
inferences about the nature of cause which stretch any further than our conceptual 
scheme: the Humean is in this way committed to a genre of antirealism about causality.
For our purposes, the key point in the above two paragraphs is that, either way, realist 
or antirealist, the effect of holding to the first commitment is the tacit acceptance of a  
picture upon which making sense of causal phenomena depends upon an appeal to 
something external to the intrinsic properties of the causing state and the effected state:  
for the Nomocist it is the universal (however realised) which associates the intrinsic 
properties of the cause and effect; whilst, for the Humean, it is the array of impressions 
(or whatever analogue of impressions is preferred) “drawn from objects foreign to the 
cause” (Hume; T 1.3.14) by which a subject has been conditioned to expect an A after a 
B.
Requiring that the sense of causal talk depends upon something external to any one 
instance of causing would seem to commit the sharers of the first common assumption 
to holding the second presumption.36 Both exceptionless generalisations and necessary 
36  Davidson seems to avoid this problem in claiming that we do observe particular causes, but that they 
are causes because they are instances of a general rule, and we are caused to experience them as such.  
I take this view to be a version of the modal myth of the given (cf. 1.51) and so to fail at  a level 
similar to Rorty's  picture of merely causal information finding a place within our normative practices 
(cf. 3.33), but I have not got the space to discuss this view here.
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connections outstrip any given instance; so, if we take the observable to be just that 
which we can glean evidence for from a given sensory instance, direct observation of 
causality looks to be out of the question.
What adds to the seeming naturalness of the assumptions is that holding to the second 
presumption would, at the very least, incline one toward accepting the first 
presumption: if a discrete instance of observation does not give criteria for 
individuating a cause and an effect as related (which, if we buy into the idea of loose 
and separate existents, seems intuitive), and we still want our talk of such things to be 
cogent, we might feel pushed to look for some other source to provide the missing 
information. The Nomocist points to the reality of necessary relations, whilst the 
Humean points to a necessary feature of our conceptual scheme.
Hume's argument for the potential unreality of cause can, in this way, be seen as 
exploiting a concern about how real necessary relations could ever possibly be truth-
makers for causal statements. If we can never point to the particular necessary relation 
the Nomocist posits, it seems mysterious that we should have the capacity to make any 
claim about the existence of such connections. This is not just because of a scepticism 
about existence claims concerning unverifiable entities but, rather, because of the 
impossibility of something which cannot be observed contributing to the sense of 
thoughts with content. The thought is that the idea of real causal relations is 
superfluous with regards to an explanation of what we mean when we talk of causings. 
The remedy is to solve the problem of access by conceiving of the content of causal 
relations as completely internal to our scheme.
It is not altogether clear, however, that the Humean commands all of the exploitative 
leverage here. For the idea of a groundless exceptionless generalisation looks to present 
a challenge to the Humean. Taking causality as a particular sort of modality, the causal 
realist may paraphrase the modal-realist claim Brandom (2010) makes and say that:
[the Humean merely] makes claims about what one is doing in using [causal] concepts, 
whilst [causal] realism ... makes claims about what one is saying by using causal 
concepts. [The Humean] says that what one is doing when one makes a [causal] claim is 
endorsing an inference relating descriptive concepts as subjunctively (including 
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counterfactually) robust, or treating two descriptive concepts as incompatible. [The 
causal realist] says that when one does that, one is claiming that possession or exhibition 
of one empirical property is a consequence of, or is incompatible with, possession or 
exhibition of another. (2010; 32)
This, in effect, threatens to turn the tables upon the Humean by showing that if the 
exceptionless generalisation does not reach out beyond the conceptual scheme of the 
experiencer, then it too, within the Humean picture, is equally problematic because, if 
there is no contact with objective constraints upon causal utterances, we are in a 
familiar position: trading the normative authority of claims about what causes what for 
a more robust account of normative force.
Obviously, there are lots of moves internal to this debate which I am passing over: the 
Humean can, as I have, appeal to the superfluity of an entity to which we have no 
access, whilst the Nomocist, or any other sort of realist about causal relations, can 
dispute the claim of superfluity by appealing to cases involving finks and pre-emption.
37 What I want to focus on from the discussion so far is that the assumptions which 
seemed natural to certain causal theorists have here created a familiar tension. The 
tension is between allowing that parts of the world can serve as the criteria of our 
thoughts, and allowing for a description of thought which can connect with such 
criteria. The tension, in other words, is a tension between accounting for normative 
force and allowing access to an appropriate normative authority. 
We saw in the case of descriptive language (cf. 1.43) and perception of unified spatial 
objects (cf .2) that where the norms involved in each sort of case were being deployed 
in a novel way there were particularly strong exemplifications of problems concerning 
the disconnection of normative force and normative authority. I now want to draw 
attention to the fact that the same is true for our experience of particular causings.
37 In cases of preemption effects are overdetermined by potential causes in a way which makes the  
counterfactual analysis of that causing, 'if x had not have happened, then y would not have happened',  
false for cases where it is intuitive that x did cause y. Finks are properties which mask dispositions that 
an object would have in their absence; thus finks create situations where an object has a causal power,  
but, as it is never realised, a counter factual account cannot capture it.
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5.32 Novel Causal Notions
How, then, ought we to make sense of novel applications of causal concepts? 
Anscombe claims that,
[t]he truthful—though unhelpful—answer to the question: '‘how did we come by our 
primary knowledge of causality?'' is that in learning to speak we learned the linguistic 
representation and application of a host of causal concepts. Very many of them were 
represented by transitive and other verbs of action used in reporting what is observed. 
(1971; 9)
This, I take it, is not to state a means of providing an explanation of the acquisition a 
notion of causation in terms of something else which is conceptually prior to it. Rather 
it is to point to an immanent fact which any picture of how empirical creatures like us 
relate to causal facts must have a place for: that the practice of using particular causal 
notions is learned through ostensive teaching (or perhaps more aptly, through ostensive 
training).
This picture, however, is a little misleading; the ambiguity of '‘primary causal 
knowledge'' (between knowing-how and knowing-that) might suggest a picture upon 
which our ability to pick out causation is contemporaneous with learning how to apply 
causal verbs to observational evidence. This, though, cannot be right, as the following 
example shows. The example is of a particular instance of a language learner acquiring 
the skill of using a causal verb; it makes clear that there can be no such clean divide 
between what is observed and the concept applied. 
Acquisition Example: A child who has never seen a shattering before, witnesses 
a stone being thrown at the window of a house, and then the ensuing shattering; 
an adult points to the location at which the shattering occurred, and utters an 
appropriate phrase.
In such a case there must be a sense in which such events are already experienced as 
parts of a causal process by the child. For, if it were not the case that the process were 
visually present to the child as a causal process, the content of the demonstrative which 
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the adult uttered would be, at best, radically indeterminate – the child could not 
individuate the particular change as a change in the glass because of the stone – and at 
worst contentless; there would be no way of structuring the present scene as connected 
with what has been and will come.
One might object that the child, in this case, has obviously learnt the verb 
retrospectively: she saw the shattering, and then was informed that it was a shattering. 
If all causal verbs were learnt this way, one might think that the inability to directly 
experience a causing had been evinced. For, if we gain causal notions by applying a 
causal concept to some prior experiential information, then that information may look 
to be at some point bereft of causal content.
The obvious rejoinder to this objection is the classic Kantian move against the 
empiricist tabula rasa: to ask why a succession of perceptions implies a perception of 
succession; more particularly, to ask in virtue of what the child would be able to 
associate the salient aspects of the scene, or even identify the salient aspects of the 
scene. For, in order to identify any of the salient aspects, the child would at least have 
to recognise objects; and to recognise objects as individuated agents, as we saw in 
discussion of primitive mechanics, she would have to already recognise them as causal 
role players.
One might even go further and think we can clarify what is problematic about thinking 
that the norms governing our cognising of causes are externally or weakly internally 
related to particular causings (or to some substance we will relate to by applying causal 
concepts to it) by considering this further objection to the verb-learning-child scenario 
(cf. p205): the example is too simple to show anything –  it does not, for instance, 
allow that the child would learn the concept of shattering by performing a proto-
theoretical comparison a variety of different experiences of shattering.
To allow that the child acquires particular causal notions in this manner, however, 
would be to introduce the dreaded gap between what we are presented with in 
experience and how we ought to go on by introducing a theoretical grasp of intrinsic 
properties of the sort Evans did (cf. 5.21-5.22). It would also be to miss another 
explanatory option. We can appeal to the idea of causality as a primitive phenomenon – 
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and say, rather than the information being causally bereft, that the information is 
already causally structured in such a way as to afford the child a substrata of fixed 
possibilities – the hardness of the stone, the brittleness of the window, etc – which 
serve to make the change in the state of the window the variable under observation. 
Notice, though, that for exactly the reasons given in chapter 2 regarding the idea that an 
object might guide our application of norms to it, we must be careful in how we think 
of our relation to the primitive causal phenomena we are acquiring a notion of. If we 
take it that the objects guide our deployment of norms by being intrinsically normative 
(as the CPT holds)and intimating as much to us, we have introduced super-pictures (cf. 
4.11) into our account. One might think we could salvage the CPT by establishing an 
isomorphism between the intrinsic modal structure of objects and our capacity to 
experience them, but this would be to accept, as it were, the worst of both worlds. For 
on such a picture we would have posited intrinsically modal properties, and posited an 
independently intelligible grasp of norms which allow us contact with such properties.
The problem is now familiar: if one takes there to be an external relation between a 
normative authority and the normative context which allows it normative force, then, if  
we rule out super-pictures, we are left needing to characterise norms which are 
intelligible independently of their criteria for correctness.
If we jettison the picture of norms and particular causings as externally related (as I 
showed we could when discussing Evans (5.22)), we are left with a CPV which gives 
this sort of description: a precondition of the deployment of particular causal notions is 
the experiential apprehension of particular causings, which, on further reflection we 
find requires appreciation of a wider causal nexus. Establishing what the preconditions 
of the apprehension of particular causings are only leads to the articulation of more 
causal relations. This is an instantiation of the general point made by Langton''s Kant 
regarding the interplay of receptivity and irreducibility: that no matter how far you go 
down, the description of any one causal power invokes a backdrop of more causal 
relations which are the relations we are holding fixed, just as the child in the example is 
holding fixed the causal properties of glass, stones, things producing background 
sounds, et cetera. None of this, however, possesses any threat to our experiencing an 
object's causal powers as objective.
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What is held fixed then, is a normative matter in the same way as, at the very beginning 
of this thesis, we found that we would have to know what a football is in order to 
individuate one (because to individuate a football we would have to know which modal 
relations to count as salient and which to count as accidental): to individuate a 
particular causing, we have to hold our surroundings, in appropriate ways, fixed. And 
to be able to hold our surroundings fixed in appropriate ways, we have to have some 
criteria for appropriateness.
What then of apprehension of novel causings – i.e. of, cases where we do not yet know 
what is appropriate? Here we need to look back to Steiner on novel mathematical rules 
(cf. 2.5-2.6) and Diamond on the difference between transitive and intransitive 
language use (cf. 4.22-4.3). In each of those cases we saw it was important to  identify 
a double confusion: 
•   a confusion of objects being treated as candidates for criteria with assessments of 
objects according to criteria; this confusion was created by thinking that some 
predetermined criteria must be appropriate in novel cases; 
•  confusing the fact that criteria are not accountable to the standards they set with the 
thought that they are intrinsically unaccountable – thus thinking that those objects 
are either anormative, or they are intrinsic founts of normativity.
How, then does the child know how to find her way into holding the same things as 
adults criterial? She does not know how. She shares common interests, constitution, and 
abilities with her community, and from this already norm-laden position, can try out 
treating parts of the world which are already available to her as criterial – some of 
which fall by the wayside, and some of which do not; some of which lead her into 
sharing richer normative landscapes with others, and some of which do not.
By focusing upon how a level of causally structured experience can be immediately 
available to both language teacher and language learner, then, we have met with a 
familiar Wittgenstenian theme found most explicitly at PI 242 
[i]f language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.
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It must be a natural fact that any moves we make within a language game are at once 
causal in the most basic sense we can get to, and yet still modally and normatively rich 
in a way which is shared by similar creatures.
This thought – that normative authorities must be a part of the logical space in which 
they have normative force –  is that which I explicated with regard to Kripke's view of 
the metre-stick in Paris (cf. 4) by arguing that if something is to be amenable to 
measurement by a measuring system, the thing and the system must be co-dependent 
parts of the same logical space – that, in Wittgenstein's words,
It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state 
results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain 
constancy in results of measurement. (PI 242)
With particular regard to causation, then, we must appreciate both that in order to be 
sensitive to a particular causing we have to be able to appreciate that causings always 
already occupy a place within a wider causal-space which we are holding fixed, and 
that what is held fixed is in part determined by what of the modal array we inhabit is 
taken as criterial, and what is taken as an object of investigation. Causality is in these 
senses inherently normative. Our experience of particular causings is thus internally 
related to the particular causings we experience in the same way as our experience of 
spatial aspects of space occupying stuff is internally related to spatial aspects of space 
occupying stuff.
Intrinsic properties which are thought to stand outside of this modal and normative 
space are not the things we refer to when we talk of the world, or the things we 
experience. The world is, in at least this much, always already modally and 
normatively structured.
5.33 Conclusions About Causality
As the causes we individuate are the referents of our every day talk about causality, 
and we have no way of analysing such talk which would not invoke more modal 
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contexts which are inherently normative, there is no anormative description of causes 
for us to get to. To separate off this fact about individuating causes from what causes 
are would require finding some sense in the idea of a separation between the intrinsic 
and the relational; but we have seen that acceptance of such a distinction would commit 
us to either a problematic external relation between normative force and normative 
authority, or to an internal relation between causes and their individuation which would 
render the intrinsic properties of the world superfluous to the causal properties we refer 
to. So we ought to take at face value the idea that causal phenomena are inherently 
normative.
To conclude I want to relate this stance towards causality to the mythological method 
which I outlined as a response to the key claim of this thesis which I last summarised in 
the introduction to this the current chapter – that philosophical pictures cannot explain 
the applicability of norms (cf. 4.3).
On my account there is nothing supernatural about causality: considering things as 
causally related presents us with a particular kind of logical space which is normatively 
and modally structured, but by being structured so causings do not impinge upon us in 
such a way as to show us that they are so structured. Their structure is apparent to us 
because causings bear internal relations to other parts of causal space and to us. Thus, 
in the manner which I first characterised in relation to Steiner, our present grasp of the 
causal realm we inhabit provides us, with regard to our ability to make use of causal 
relations to find out more about the causal realm, with grounds-qua-enablings not 
grounds-qua-justifications (cf. 2.5-2.6).
The idea of mythological method, which I used to summarise the stance argued for in 
chapter 4, applies to our appreciation of the causal realm in the following way. As 
subjects who inhabit the causal realm, and represent it to ourselves, we have an 
appreciation that the causal realm outstrips our appreciation of it. To explore the causal 
realm, we treat certain causal relations as givens in representations of the world, and 
attend to similarities and differences between this representation and the world we 
experience.
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There is, of course, a level of scientific practice at which it is useful to disregard as far 
as possible the norms inherent in bringing particular causings into view, and by aiming 
at such detachment, to get as unified a view as is possible upon the modal nexus we 
inhabit (how much detachment is possible, and exactly how unified the resultant view 
is, is not a concern I have addressed or intend to address here). I have given no reason 
not to accept this sort of practice as one of the most useful and fundamental ways of 
relating to the world that we have. What I have given reason to reject is the scientism 
which, in chapter 3, we saw McDowell attribute to Williams – the idea that because this 
practice is so useful we ought to take the anormative view of the world it utilises as 
representative of the true intrinsic nature of the world. 
I do not avoid such scientism, however, by making the sort of move Rorty did; by 
claiming that, in scientific practice we treat the world as anormative
simply because, when we tell our Whiggish stories about how our ancestors gradually 
crawled up the mountain on whose (possibly false) summit we stand, we need to keep 
some things constant throughout the story. (1980; 344–345)
In attributing the capacity for truth and falsity to the picture of the world we currently 
operate with (the “(possibly false) summit we stand” on), such a view misses the point 
that the role of the idea of practice-independence in scientific practice is constitutive of  
an idealised object of comparison, and thus, in that capacity, is not the sort of thing 
which is in Rorty's metaphysical sense 'possibly false'. It is, for the same reason, not the 
sort of thing which we usually have reason to say is true of the world.
There is a clear connection here to a thought expressed at 4.23, that even if the 
assumption of the conceptual unity of language is constitutive of the usefulness of 
truth-functional analysis, and truth-functional analysis is our best way of describing 
language use, this entails neither that we should treat all language use as conceptually 
unified, nor that we would be justified in attributing falsity to a truth-functional 
analysis (cf. 4.3). However, showing that truth-functional analyses produces 
inappropriate descriptions in certain instances does allow us to show that treating truth-
functional semantics as, in some absolute sense, true of language, is destructive of the 
very possibility of a useful notion of truth.
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Accepting the normativity of causality, then, is emphatically not to devalue the 
scientific image of the world by way of claiming it is not useful in the way it purports 
to be, or by claiming that it is merely a useful fiction (for to make sense of 'fiction' here 
would require making sense of what it would be to be non-fictional), or by questioning 
the truth of assertions made by using such accounts (because to do so would require a 
sense to 'truth' over and above that which falls out of the transitive use of concepts). 
What it does throw into question is a form of scientism which suffers from a confusion 
similar to Kripke's – that the means of measurement, in the context of measurement, 
are the sorts of things which it makes sense to talk of as truly or falsely representing the 
world (cf. 4.22-4.3).
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Conclusion
By looking at the problems motivating transcendental idealism, we have identified a 
deep and pernicious tendency to attempt to solve those problems by modifying a 
metaphysical scheme-content picture, or by making use of that picture to justify a 
rejection of itself. Often this modification was carried out in ways which made it seem 
like the picture of scheme and content had been dropped; but such modifications turned 
out either to be attempts to explain how content was not problematically implicated in 
scheme by disconnecting scheme from content (which on closer inspection turned out 
to be untenable (cf. 3.32-3.33)), or how content is implicated in scheme but we ought 
not talk about it (which is to lose the interplay between language use and its context 
which allows us to usefully compare parts of language to each other and the world (cf. 
4.11, 4.24)). All of these attempts still retain a picture of scheme and content which 
entails a problematic relation between normative force and normative authority first  
described at 1.31-1.33.
By playing through the transcendental idealist picture, then, we have seen that it falls 
foul of its own strictures only by attempting to give explanations where it itself has 
shown that no explanation with sense can be given. What we ought to do instead is to 
engage in the stipulative use of scheme-content pictures (pictures containing 
intrinsically normative items, or rules which contain their own criteria for application 
which hitherto seemed to stand in need of truth-makers) to make objects of 
comparisons which allow us to describe how things are, and how they are not, and also 
allow us to keep in mind that this is the role that objects of comparison are playing.
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